Certificate Transparency
draft-laurie-pki-sunlight-05

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2013-01-24 (latest revision 2012-12-20)
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Experimental
Formats plain text pdf html bibtex
Reviews
Stream WG state (None)
Document shepherd None
IESG IESG state Waiting for AD Go-Ahead::Revised I-D Needed
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date
Responsible AD Stephen Farrell
Send notices to benl@google.com, agl@google.com, ekasper@google.com, draft-laurie-pki-sunlight@tools.ietf.org
Network Working Group                                          B. Laurie
Internet-Draft                                                A. Langley
Intended status: Experimental                                  E. Kasper
Expires: June 23, 2013                                 December 20, 2012

                        Certificate Transparency
                      draft-laurie-pki-sunlight-05

Abstract

   The aim of Certificate Transparency is to have every public end-
   entity (for example, web servers) and intermediate TLS certificate
   issued by a known Certificate Authority recorded in one or more
   certificate logs.  In order to detect misissuance of certificates,
   all logs are publicly auditable.  In particular, domain owners or
   their agents will be able to monitor logs for certificates issued on
   their own domain.

   To protect clients from unlogged misissued certificates, each log
   signs all certificates it records, and clients can choose not to
   trust certificates that are not accompanied by an appropriate log
   signature.  For privacy and performance reasons log signatures are
   embedded in the TLS handshake via the TLS authorization extension, in
   a stapled OCSP extension, or in the certificate itself via an X.509v3
   certificate extension.

   To ensure a globally consistent view of any particular log, each log
   also provides a global signature over the entire log.  Any
   inconsistency of logs can be detected through cross-checks on the
   global signature.  Consistency between any pair of global signatures,
   corresponding to snapshots of a particular log at different times,
   can be efficiently shown.

   Logs are only expected to certify that they have seen a certificate,
   and thus we do not specify any revocation mechanism for log
   signatures in this document.  Logs are append-only, and log
   signatures do not expire.

Laurie, et al.            Expires June 23, 2013                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft          Certificate Transparency           December 2012

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 23, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Laurie, et al.            Expires June 23, 2013                 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft          Certificate Transparency           December 2012

Table of Contents

   1.  Informal introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Cryptographic components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.1.  Merkle Hash Trees  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.1.1.  Merkle audit paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.1.2.  Merkle consistency proofs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.1.3.  Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       2.1.4.  Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   3.  Log Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.1.  Log Entries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.2.  Including the Signed Certificate Timestamp in the TLS
           Handshake  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     3.3.  Merkle Tree  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     3.4.  Tree Head Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   4.  Client Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     4.1.  Add Chain to Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     4.2.  Add PreCertChain to Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Show full document text