Problems with Max-Forwards Processing (and Potential Solutions)
draft-lawrence-maxforward-problems-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Scott Lawrence | ||
| Last updated | 2005-10-18 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes an attack against SIP networks where a small number of legitimate, even authorized, SIP requests can stimulate massive amounts of proxy-to-proxy traffic. The document analysis ways to limit the impact of this kind of attack, and proposes changes to the SIP protocol to help mitigate the risk. The document also proposes ways to improve diagnosis of failures caused by the hop limit being reached. The purpose of this document is to stimulate discussion of the identified problem and proposed solutions. Much of the proposed solution language appears normative, but implementors should not treat the current document as such. Comments are solicited, and should be directed to the SIPPING working group list at 'sipping@ietf.org'.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)