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Integrity Transform Carrying Roll-Over Counter for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)
draft-lehtovirta-srtp-rcc-06

Yes

(Russ Housley)

No Objection

(Bill Fenner)
(Brian Carpenter)
(Cullen Jennings)
(David Kessens)
(Jari Arkko)
(Jon Peterson)
(Lars Eggert)
(Magnus Westerlund)
(Ross Callon)
(Ted Hardie)

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 06 and is now closed.

Russ Housley Former IESG member
Yes
Yes () Unknown

                            
Bill Fenner Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Brian Carpenter Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Cullen Jennings Former IESG member
(was Discuss) No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Dan Romascanu Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2006-09-10) Unknown
The write-up mentions that 'The RoC is carried in every rth packet, which is bandwidth-sensitive'. I cannot find any mention in the document about this issue. Is there any impact on the applications or network operation, like an increase in bandwidth consumption to care about, or is this only about consuming a number of bits in the header to carry the RoC?
David Kessens Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Jon Peterson Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Lars Eggert Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Magnus Westerlund Former IESG member
(was Discuss) No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Ross Callon Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Sam Hartman Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2006-09-13) Unknown
It's unfortunate that this integrity transform needs to be coupled to
a choice of hash.  That means that in the future we'll end up with a
lot of integrity transforms if we need new hashes.  However that seems
like the best design tradeoff available to us.
Ted Hardie Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown