DTLS/SRTP Protection Profiles for 256-bit AES-CTR Encryption
draft-lennox-avtcore-dtls-srtp-bigaes-01

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AVTCore Working Group                                          J. Lennox
Internet-Draft                                                     Vidyo
Intended status: Informational                              July 3, 2017
Expires: January 4, 2018

      DTLS/SRTP Protection Profiles for 256-bit AES-CTR Encryption
                draft-lennox-avtcore-dtls-srtp-bigaes-01

Abstract

   This memo defines Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Secure
   Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) Protection Profiles for 256-bit
   Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2018.

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Lennox                   Expires January 4, 2018                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft              DTLS/SRTP AES-258                  July 2017

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions, Definitions and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  SRTP Protection       Profiles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   This memo defines Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Secure
   Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) Protection Profiles for 256-bit
   Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode.

   DTLS-based key establishment for SRTP is defined in [RFC5764].  The
   use of AES-256 counter mode with SRTP is defined in [RFC6188].

   The draft document that became [RFC5764] initially defined protection
   profiles for AES-256; they were removed because the document that
   became [RFC6188] was not yet ready.  However, the definitions of the
   protection profiles were not transfered to the [RFC6188] drafts,
   apparently as an oversight.  This document restores those codepoints,
   with their original values.

1.1.  Motivation

   The question might arise as to why this is necessary.  [RFC7714]
   defines the use of AES-256 with Galois Counter Mode, and current
   thought is that Galois Counter Mode is preferable to Counter Mode
   plus HMAC-based authentication.

   The reason is to minimize the difficulty of moving implementations
   away from Security Descriptions-based keying [RFC4568].  Use of
   Security Descriptions is strongly discouraged, as its security
   properties are much weaker than those of DTLS/SRTP.  However, as
   [RFC6188] defines Security Descriptions signaling elements for AES-
   256-CTR, existing implementations use them to negotiate the use of
   these crypto suites, and many of the these implementations do not
   have Galois Counter Mode cryptography implemented (or certified).
   Thus, defining AES-256-CTR codepoints for DTLS/SRTP allows these
   implementations to continue using their existing SRTP cryptography
   while moving to a more secure keying protocol.

Lennox                   Expires January 4, 2018                [Page 2]
Internet-Draft              DTLS/SRTP AES-258                  July 2017
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