Knowledge Transmission Using Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel
draft-li-dots-knowledge-trans-04
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| Authors | Kun Li , Hua-chun Zhou , Zhe Tu , Feiyang Liu , Weilin Wang | ||
| Last updated | 2023-02-26 | ||
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draft-li-dots-knowledge-trans-04
INTERNET-DRAFT K. Li
Intended status: Proposed Standard H. Zhou
Z. Tu
F. Liu
W. Wang
Document: draft-li-dots-knowledge-trans-04.txt Beijing Jiaotong
University
Expires: August 2023 February 2023
Knowledge Transmission Using Distributed Denial-of-Service Open
Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel
Status of this Memo
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Abstract
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The document specifies new DOTS data channel configuration parameters
that customize the DDoS knowledge transmission configuration between
distributed knowledge bases. These options enable assist the
distributed knowledge base to share attack knowledge in different
fields and actively adapt to dynamically changing DDoS attacks.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................2
2. Terminology....................................................3
3. DOTS Knowledge Transmission Architecture.......................3
4. DOTS Knowledge Transmission YANG Module........................5
4.1 Generic Tree Structure.....................................5
4.2 YANG Module................................................6
5. Managing DOTS Knowledge Transmission..........................10
6. IANA Considerations...........................................11
7. Security Considerations.......................................11
8. References....................................................12
8.1 Normative References......................................12
8.2 Informative References....................................12
Acknowledgments..................................................13
Author's Addresses...............................................13
1. Introduction
To detect DDoS attacks, various security organizations have designed
series of network security datasets by conducting various simulations
or collecting data related to DDoS attacks in actual network
environments. Such an effort is meant aiming to reflect the recent
trends of DDoS attacks that are more sophisticated and dynamic by
designing a comprehensive data set containing normal and abnormal
behavior.
As a new knowledge representation method, the knowledge graph [KG]
represents the relationship between entities in the form of graphs,
and is essentially a semantic network that reveals the relationships
between entities. Knowledge graph technology can standardize and
integrate DDoS attack-related intelligence, generate DDoS attack
knowledge and store it in the network security malicious behavior
knowledge base to solve the problem that multi-source heterogeneous
data is difficult to share and reuse.
The DOTS data channel [RFC8783] is used to exchange bulk data between
DOTS agents, coordinate multiple DOTS servers and DOTS clients, and
perform tasks such as creating resource aliases and managing
filtering rules. [RFC8783] specifies the YANG data model and the
basic data channel functions.
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The knowledge base can describe the malicious behavior of DDoS
attacks from multiple dimensions, and contains a large number of DDoS
attack-related data and knowledge graph structures, thereby assisting
the DOTS server to issue mitigation measures to defend against DDoS
attack traffic. In order to ensure the timeliness of the knowledge
base, it is necessary to continuously transmit new data for the
knowledge base and ensure the sharing and synchronization of
knowledge among the distributed knowledge bases. The data channel as
specified in [RFC8783] lacks a knowledge transmission structure.
Therefore, it is difficult to meet the dynamically changing form of
DDoS attacks.
This document defines new DOTS data channel attributes. It mainly
builds a new YANG data model for distributed scenarios that need to
constantly update and synchronize the content of the knowledge base,
including a general tree structure and YANG data modules, aiming to
customize the DDoS knowledge transmission configuration between
distributed knowledge bases.
2.Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Readers should be familiar with the terms and concepts defined in
[RFC8612] [RFC8783] and [RFC8811].
3.DOTS Knowledge Transmission Architecture
A complete example of the DOTS knowledge transmission architecture
may be a DDoS attack-oriented network security knowledge base
deployed on a large scale in the form of distributed nodes as the
server, and the attacked target as the client. The host suspects that
it is under a DDoS attack based on the detection results of the
third-party intrusion detection model. It obtains DDoS attack
information according to the traffic feature extraction tool deployed
on the DOTS client, and forwards it through the access gateway. The
access gateway matches DDoS attack traffic and converts it into
attack knowledge and stores it in a nearby network security knowledge
base. Specifically, each access gateway stores a mapping table
between the knowledge base and the arrival delay. The access gateway
will transmit the attack knowledge to the knowledge base with the
lowest transmission delay at the current moment. After DDoS attacks
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are mitigated, distributed nodes transmit new knowledge through data
channels to achieve knowledge synchronization. Therefore, they aim to
share attack knowledge in different domains and actively adapt to
dynamically changing DDoS attacks.
The basic DOTS knowledge transmission architecture is illustrated in
Figure 1:
+------------+ +--------------+ +-------------+
| | |Access Gateway| | |
| +--------+ | +--------------+ | +---------+ |
| |DDoS | | | Knowledge | | |knowledge| |
| |Target-1| | | Collection | +--> |base-1 | |
| +--------+ | +-------+------+ | | +---------+ |
| | | | | | | |
DDoS | +--------+ | +-------v------+ | | +---------+ |
Attack | |DDoS | | | Knowledge | | | |knowledge| |
------>| |Target-2| | | Transmission | +--> |base-2 | |
| +--------+ | +------+-+-----+ | | +---------+ |
| ...... | | | | | | | ...... |
| +--------+ | | | | | | | +---------+ |
| |DDoS | | | | | | | | |knowledge| |
| |Target-n| | | | | | +--> |base-n | |
| +--------+ | | Data Channel | | | +---------+ |
| C <--+--------------+--+--> S |
+------------+ +--------------+ +-------------+
* C is for DOTS client
* S is for DOTS server
Figure 1: Basic DOTS Knowledge Transmission Architecture
In some cases, part of the domain has never been attacked, and
another part of the domain may be frequently subjected to DDoS
attacks, so new knowledge of DDoS attacks will be continuously
introduced. The administrator needs to configure a corresponding
update cycle according to the attack situation in the DOTS client
domain. Specifically, for domains with few attack records, the update
period should be appropriately extended to reduce bandwidth
consumption. For domains with high security requirements, such as
enterprise networks, the number of requests should be increased and
DOTS data channels should be established with more domains with
similar security requirements to obtain more comprehensive knowledge
of DDoS attacks.
This document augments the "ietf-dots-data-channel" (dots-data) DOTS
data YANG module defined in [RFC8783] with the following additional
attributes that can be shared between DOTS servers to realize the
secure and periodic transmission of DDoS attack knowledge:
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related-time: This attribute contains the creation-time and merge-
time of DDoS attack knowledge. The default value of this attribute is
'now-date' obtained from the system.
This is an optional attribute.
label: This attribute represents the type of network security
knowledge graph currently transmitted. Different types of graphs are
responsible for different security functions. Among them, the graph
type used to maintain traffic characteristics is set to '0'. The
graph type used to describe topological relationships is set to '1'.
The graph type used to store the detection results corresponding to
the flow is set to '2'. The default value of this attribute is '0'.
This is an optional attribute.
knowledge-base: This attribute represents the name of the currently
transmitted network security knowledge graph. The default value of
this attribute is 'none'.
This is an optional attribute.
entities: This attribute contains all node information in the
knowledge graph. Optional under this attribute include 'type', 'id',
'labels', and 'properties'.
This is an optional attribute.
relationship: This attribute contains all the node relationships in
the knowledge graph. Optional under this attribute include 'id',
'type', 'label', 'properties', 'start', and 'end'.
This is an optional attribute.
4. DOTS Knowledge Transmission YANG Module
4.1 Generic Tree Structure
This document defines the YANG module "li-dots-knowledge-trans"
(Section 3), which has the following tree structure:
module: li-dots-knowledge-trans
+--rw dots-data
+--rw dots-client* [cuid]
| ...
+--ro capabilities
| ...
+-- knowledge-trans
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+-- related-time
| +--rw creation-date-and-time string
| +--rw merge-date-and-time string
+--rw label
+--rw knowledge-base string
+--rw model-param string
+-- entities
| +--rw type string
| +--rw id uint32
| +--rw labels string
| +-- properties
| +-- rw name string
| +-- rw establishdate uint8
+-- relationship
+--rw id uint32
+--rw type string
+--rw label string
+--rw properties string
+-- start
| +--rw id uint32
| +--rw labels string
+-- end
+--rw id uint32
+--rw labels1 string
Figure 2: DOTS Knowledge Transmission Subtree
Based on the above-mentioned yang module structure, a method is
provided for the distributed network security knowledge base to
periodically update and synchronize the new DDoS attack knowledge in
each domain, so as to more effectively deal with the ever-changing
DDoS attack types.
4.2 YANG Module
This module uses the common YANG types defined in [RFC6991] and types
defined in [RFC8519].
<CODE BEGINS> file "li-dots-knowledge-trans@2021-08-06.yang"
module li-dots-knowledge-trans {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:li-dots-knowledge-trans";
prefix dots-knowledge;
import ietf-dots-data-channel {
prefix dots-data;
reference
"RFC 8783: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification";
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}
organization
"IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
WG List: <mailto:dots@ietf.org>
Author: Kun Li
<mailto:19111021@bjtu.edu.cn>;
Author: Huachun Zhou
<mailto:hchzhou@bjtu.edu.cn>";
Author: Zhe Tu
<mailto:19111038@bjtu.edu.cn>;
Author: Feiyang Liu
<mailto:19120077@bjtu.edu.cn>;
Author: Weilin Wang
<mailto:19111021@bjtu.edu.cn>;
description
"This module contains YANG definitions for the configuration
of parameters that can be negotiated between DOTS servers to
realize the secure and periodic transmission of DDoS
attack knowledge.
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 8783; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2021-08-06 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC 8783: Knowledge Transmission Using Distributed
Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
(DOTS) Data Channel";
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}
list knowledge-trans {
description
"Top-level grouping for knowledge transmission.";
container related-time {
description
"Relevant time for knowledge transmission.";
leaf creation-date-and-time {
type string
description
"Knowledge graph establishment date and time.";
}
leaf merge-date-and-time {
type string
description
"Knowledge synchronization initiation date and time.";
}
}
leaf label {
type string
description
"Type of network security knowledge graph currently
transmitted.";
}
leaf knowledge-base {
type string
description
"Name of network security knowledge graph currently
transmitted.";
}
leaf model-param {
type string
description
"Attached machine learning h5 model parameters.";
}
list entities {
key id;
description
"Entity contains all node information in the knowledge
graph.";
leaf id {
type uint32
description
"Id of the new node.";
}
leaf type {
type string
description
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"Type of the new node.";
}
leaf labels {
type string
description
"Label of the new node.";
}
container properties {
description
"Properties of the new node.";
leaf name {
type string
description
"Property name of the new node.";
}
leaf establishdate {
type uint8
description
"Node creation time.";
}
}
}
list relationship {
key id;
description
"Relationship contains all the node relationships in the
knowledge graph.";
leaf id {
type uint32
description
"Id of the new relationship.";
}
leaf type {
type string
description
"Type of the new relationship.";
}
leaf labels {
type string
description
"Label of the new relationship.";
}
leaf properties {
type string
description
"Properties of the new relationship.";
}
container start {
description
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"Starting node of the new relationship.";
leaf id {
type uint32
description
"Id of starting node.";
}
leaf labels {
type string
description
"Label of starting node.";
}
}
container end {
description
"Ending node of the new relationship.";
leaf id {
type uint32
description
"Id of ending node.";
}
leaf labels {
type string
description
"Label of ending node.";
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
5. Managing DOTS Knowledge Transmission
A POST request is used by a DOTS client to periodically synchronize
knowledge about DDoS attacks. This knowledge can be used to guide
subsequent mitigation measures to more effectively deal with multiple
types of DDoS attacks. An example of a request for periodic
transmission of DDoS attack knowledge is shown in Figure 3.
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
/dots-client=cuid HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}: {port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
"ietf-dots-data-channel:knowledge-trans": {
[
{
"type": "node",
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"id": 0,
"labels": ["Slow-DDoS"],
"properties": {
"name": "Shrew",
"establishdate": 20210806094618
},
{
"type": "node",
"id": 1,
"labels": ["Application-layer-DDoS"],
"properties": {
"name": "Http-get",
"establishdate": 20210806100512
},
},
{
"id": 0,
"type": "relationship",
"label": "Related-to",
"properties": {}
"start": {
"id": 0,
"labels": "Slow-DDoS"
}
"end": {
"id": 1,
"labels": "Application-layer-DDoS"
}
}
]
}
}
Figure 3: An Example of DOTS Request Knowledge Update Process
A DOTS client use the POST request to update the knowledge,
otherwise the server respond with a "404 Not Found" status-line.
6. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
7. Security Considerations
The security considerations for the DOTS data channel protocol are
discussed in Section 10 of [RFC8783].
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This document defines YANG data structures that are meant to be used
as an abstract representation in DOTS data channel. As such,
the "li-dots-knowledge-trans" module does not introduce any new
vulnerabilities beyond those specified above.
8. References
8.1 Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,DOI 10.17487/RFC2119,
March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119
Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8783] Boucadair, M., Ed. and T. Reddy.K, Ed., "Distributed
Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel
Specification", RFC 8783, DOI 10.17487/RFC8783, May 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8783>.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types", RFC 6991,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor
.org/info/rfc6991>.
[RFC8519] Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Huang, L., and D. Blair,
"YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs)",
RFC 8519, DOI 10.17487/RFC8519, March 2019, <https://www.
rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8519>.
8.2 Informative References
[RFC8612] Mortensen, A., Reddy, T., and R. Moskowitz, "DDoS Open
Threat Signaling (DOTS) Requirements", RFC 8612,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8612, May 2019, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc8612>.
[RFC8811] Mortensen, A., Ed., Reddy.K, T., Ed., Andreasen, F., Teague,
N., "DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)
Architecture", RFC 8811, DOI 10.17487/RFC8811,
August 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8811>.
[KG] Knowledge Graph, "A Survey on Knowledge Graphs:
"Representation, Acquisition and Applications",
Architecture", April 2021,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/TNNLS.2021.3070843>
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Acknowledgments
Thanks to Boucadair Mohamed for comments and review.
Author's Addresses
Kun Li
Beijing Jiaotong University
Beijing
Phone: <86-15652992293>
Email: 19111021@bjtu.edu.cn
Huachun Zhou
Beijing Jiaotong University
Beijing
Phone: <86-13718168186>
Email: hchzhou@bjtu.edu.cn
Zhe Tu
Beijing Jiaotong University
Beijing
Phone: <86-13146050755>
Email: 19111038@bjtu.edu.cn
Feiyang Liu
Beijing Jiaotong University
Beijing
Phone: <86-18813006511>
Email: 19120077@bjtu.edu.cn
Weilin Wang
Beijing Jiaotong University
Beijing
Phone: <86-15910887582>
Email: 20120122@bjtu.edu.cn
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