SFC Security Mimicry Defense
draft-li-ietf-sfc-security-mimicry-defense-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Chuanhuang Li  , Zhongyun Tang  , Chao Chen 
Last updated 2021-03-12
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SFC                                                                C. Li
Internet-Draft                                                   Z. Tang
Intended status: Informational                                   C. Chen
Expires: September 13, 2021                Zhejiang Gongshang University
                                                          March 12, 2021

                      SFC Security Mimicry Defense
             draft-li-ietf-sfc-security-mimicry-defense-00

Abstract

   With the increase of network threats, the Service Function Chain
   (SFC) is vulnerable to various attacks, and as a key component of the
   entire SFC, the security of the service function (SF) is more
   critical.  This document proposes a mimic SF security architecture
   based on the dynamic heterogeneous redundancy model, which can
   effectively protect the normal execution function of SF in SFC.  The
   security architecture adopts an active defense method to defend
   against network attacks, and it can effectively defend against most
   SF attacks.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 13, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Security issues of SFC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Tamper with Network Service Header  . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Attack Service Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  SFC Security Mimicry Defense  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Mimicry Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  SFC Mimicry Defense Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.3.  Data Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.4.  Analysis of Attack and Defense  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   SF is the most critical part of the entire SFC.  The data flow in the
   SFC domain must go through specific SFs to complete a specific
   function.  If the SF is controlled by the hacker, the hacker can
   tamper with and discard the data by the hijacked SF, and even
   paralyze the SFF by DOS attacks.  It can not only result in the
   failure of specified functioning when operating SF, but it may also
   cause the collapse of the entire SFC domain, which completely
   violates the original intention of SFC.

   This document describes a mimic security architecture based on
   Dynamic Heterogeneous Redundancy Model (DHRM), adopting a proactive
   defense method to deal with the SFC security problems mentioned
   above.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].

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3.  Security issues of SFC

3.1.  Tamper with Network Service Header

   RFC 8300 [2] points out that the NSH (Network Service Header) is the
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