@techreport{li-opsec-sav-gap-analysis-02,
    number =    {draft-li-opsec-sav-gap-analysis-02},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-li-opsec-sav-gap-analysis/02/},
    author =    {Dan Li and Jianping Wu and Yunan Gu and Lancheng Qin and Tao Lin},
    title =     {{Soure Address Validation: Gap Analysis}},
    pagetotal = 12,
    year =      2021,
    month =     jul,
    day =       4,
    abstract =  {This document identifies scenarios where existing IP spoofing approaches for detection and mitigation don't perform perfectly. Exsiting SAV (source address validation) approaches, either Ingress ACL filtering {[}RFC2827{]}, unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) {[}RFC3704{]}, Feasible Path uRPF {[}RFC 3704{]}, or Enhanced Feasible-Path uRPF {[}RFC8704{]} has limitations regarding eihter automated implemetation objective or detection accuracy objective (0\% false positive and 0\% false negative). This document provides the gap analysis of the exsting SAV approaches, and also provides solution discussions.},
}