Soure Address Validation Architecture (SAVA): Intra-domain Use Cases
draft-li-sava-intra-domain-use-cases-00

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Network Working Group                                              D. Li
Internet-Draft                                                     J. Wu
Intended status: Informational                                  Tsinghua
Expires: January 13, 2021                                          Y. Gu
                                                                  Huawei
                                                                  L. Qin
                                                                Tsinghua
                                                                  T. Lin
                                                                     H3C
                                                           July 12, 2020

  Soure Address Validation Architecture (SAVA): Intra-domain Use Cases
                draft-li-sava-intra-domain-use-cases-00

Abstract

   This document identifies scenarios where existing approaches for
   detection and mitigation of source address spoofing don't perform
   perfectly.  Either Ingress ACL filtering [RFC3704], unicast Reverse
   Path Forwarding (uRPF) [RFC3704], feasible path uRPF [RFC 3704], or
   Enhanced Feasible-Path uRPF [RFC8704] has limitations regarding
   eihter automated implemetation objective or detection accuracy
   objective (0% false positive and 0% false negative).  This document
   identifies two such scenarios and provides solution discussions.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 13, 2021.

Li, et al.              Expires January 13, 2021                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         SAVA Intra-domain Use Cases             July 2020

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Source Address Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Existing SAV Techniques Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  SAV Requirements and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  SAVA Intra-domain Use Case 1: Intra-AS Multi-homing . . .   7
     3.2.  SAVA Intra-domain Use Case 2: Inter-AS Multihoming  . . .   8
   4.  Solution Consideration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Source Address Validation

   The Internet is open to traffic, which means that a sender can
   generate traffic and send to any receiver in the Internet without
   permission of the receiver.  Although this openness design improves
   the scalability of the Internet, it also leaves security risks,
   namely, a sender can forge his/her source address when sending the
   packets, which is also well known as source address spoofing.

   Due to the lack of source address spoofing detection mechanism,
   Denial of Service (DoS) attacks seriously compromise network
   security.  By employing source address spoofing, attackers can well
   hide themselves and pin the blame on the destination networks.
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