A Profile for Signed Group of Multiple-Origin Autonomous Systems for Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
draft-li-sidrops-rpki-moasgroup-00
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Qi Li , Ke Xu , Zhuotao liu , Li Qi , Jianping Wu | ||
| Last updated | 2024-07-07 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
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draft-li-sidrops-rpki-moasgroup-00
SIDR Operations Q. Li
Internet-Draft Zhongguancun Laboratory
Intended status: Standards Track K. Xu
Expires: 9 January 2025 Z. Liu
Q. Li
J. Wu
Tsinghua University
8 July 2024
A Profile for Signed Group of Multiple-Origin Autonomous Systems for Use
in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
draft-li-sidrops-rpki-moasgroup-00
Abstract
This document defines a "Signed MOAS Group", a Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS) protected content type for use with the Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to authenticate the collective announcement
of IP prefixes by Multiple Origin Autonomous System (MOAS). The
Signed MOAS Group includes two parts: an IP prefix and a list of
Autonomous Systems (ASes) authorized to announce the prefix. At
least one of these ASes SHOULD be authorized to announce the prefix
by the prefix owner through a Route Origin Authorization (ROA). The
validation of a Signed MOAS Group confirms that the authorized ASes
and other listed ASes have collectively agreed to announce the
prefix, ensuring that the announcement is legitimate, accurate, and
consensually authorized.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 9 January 2025.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Signed MoasGroup eContentType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Signed MoasGroup eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. asList . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. ipAddressPrefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3.1. addressFamily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3.2. prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Signed MoasGroup Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.2. RPKI Signed Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.3. RPKI Repository Name Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
This document defines a "Signed MOAS Group", a Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] [RFC626] protected content type to carry an IP
prefix and a list of Autonomous Systems (ASes) authorized to announce
this prefix. The Signed MOAS Group allows multiple ASes to
collaboratively and securely announce an IP prefix, supporting
scenarios such as business partnerships, traffic engineering, and
DDoS protection services.
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A Signed MOAS Group object consists of two components: an IP prefix
and a list of Autonomous Systems (ASes) intended to announce the
prefix collaboratively, which allows other RPKI-validating routing
entities to audit the collection of announcements from multiple
originating AS. At least one AS in the AS list SHOULD be authorized
to announce the prefix by the prefix owner through a corresponding
ROA, which means the IP prefix in the ROA SHOULD match the IP prefix
in the Signed MOAS Group and the AS number in the ROA SHOULD appear
in the AS list. The object is collectively signed by the listed ASes
using a multi-signature technique, and the aggregated global
signature is attached to the Signed MOAS Group object, ensuring that
the announcement could be legitimately proposed by all participating
ASes and is verifiable by any RPKI-validating remote routing
entities.
To validate a Signed MoasGroup object, a relying party (RP)
aggregates the public keys of all ASes in the AS list into a global
public key, which is subsequently used to verify the multi-signature
of the Signed MOAS Group object. There are three possible validation
outcomes. First, if the Signed MOAS Group is verified and at least
one corresponding ROA is found, it is considered valid. Second, if
the Signed MOAS Group is verified but no corresponding ROA is found,
it is deemed suspicious. Lastly, if the Signed MOAS Group cannot be
verified, it is considered invalid.
The Signed MOAS Group provides a mechanism for securely managing
multi-origin AS announcements, offering a robust and flexible
solution to handle modern routing requirements. Any prefixes
announced by ASes that are not included in a ROA or a validated
Signed MOAS Group SHOULD be regarded as invalid, though their
handling is subject to local routing policies. The intent is to
offer a secure and authenticated method for managing MOAS scenarios,
enhancing the overall security and integrity of the routing system.
Signed MOAS Group objects follow the Signed Object Template for the
RPKI [RFC6488].
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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3. Signed MoasGroup eContentType
The eContentType for a MoasGroup is defined as id-ct-
rpkiSignedMoasGroup, with Object Identifier (OID)
1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD.
This OID MUST appear within both the eContentType in the
encapContentInfo object and the ContentType signed attribute in the
signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]).
4. Signed MoasGroup eContent
The content of a MoasGroup is a single IP prefix and a list of ASes.
A MoasGroup is formally defined as follows:
RpkiSignedMoasGroup-2024
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0)
id-mod-rpkiSignedMoasGroup-2024(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) };
ct-rpkiSignedMoasGroup CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE RpkiSignedMoasGroup
IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-rpkiSignedMoasGroup }
id-ct-rpkiSignedMoasGroup OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) TBD }
RpkiSignedMoasGroup ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
ipAddressPrefix AddressFamilyIPAddress,
asList SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF ASID,
}
ASID ::= INTEGER (1..4294967295)
AddressFamilyIPAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
addressFamily ADDRESS-FAMILY.&afi ({AddressFamilySet}),
prefix ADDRESS-FAMILY.&Prefix ({AddressFamilySet}{@addressFamily}) }
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ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= CLASS {
&afi OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) UNIQUE,
&Prefix
} WITH SYNTAX { AFI &afi PREFIX-TYPE &Prefix }
AddressFamilySet ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= { addressFamilyIPv4 | addressFamilyIPv6 }
addressFamilyIPv4 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= { AFI afi-IPv4 PREFIX-TYPE AddressesIPv4 }
addressFamilyIPv6 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= { AFI afi-IPv6 PREFIX-TYPE AddressesIPv6 }
afi-IPv4 OCTET STRING ::= '0001'H
afi-IPv6 OCTET STRING ::= '0002'H
AddressesIPv4 ::= Prefix{32}
AddressesIPv6 ::= Prefix{128}
Prefix {INTEGER: len} ::= SEQUENCE {
address BIT STRING (SIZE(0..len)) }
END
4.1. Version
The version number of the RpkiSignedMoasGroup MUST be 0.
4.2. asList
This field contains the AS numbers that are intended to originate
routes to the given IP address prefixes. The AS numbers that are
authorized by ROA SHOULD be put in front of other AS numbers. The AS
numbers MUST NOT duplicate.
4.3. ipAddressPrefix
This field contains an AddressFamilyIPAddress which contains one
instance of addressFamily and one instance of prefix.
4.3.1. addressFamily
This field contains an OCTET STRING which is either '0001'H (IPv4) or
'0002'H (IPv6).
4.3.2. prefix
This field contains a BIT STRING, its length bounded through the
addressFamily field. The type is a BIT STRING, see Section 2.2.3.8
of [RFC3779] for more information.
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5. Signed MoasGroup Validation
To validate a MoasGroup, the relying party MUST perform all the
validation checks specified in [RFC6488]. In addition, the RP MUST
perform the following validation steps:
1. The contents of the CMS eContent field MUST conform to all of the
constraints described in Section Section 4.
2. The RP MUST verify the signatures of the Signed MOAS Group. This
involves aggregating the public keys of all ASes listed in the AS
list into a global public key. The aggregated global public key
is subsequently used to verify the global signature attached to
the Signed MOAS Group object.
3. The RP MUST check for the existence of a corresponding ROA for
the IP prefix in the Signed MOAS Group. The IP prefix in the ROA
MUST match the IP prefix in the Signed MOAS Group, and the AS
number in the ROA MUST appear in the AS list.
4. A Signed MOAS Group has three possible validation outcomes. (1)
Valid: If the Signed MOAS Group is verified and at least one
corresponding ROA is found, it is considered valid. (2)
Suspicious: If the Signed MOAS Group is verified but no
corresponding ROA is found, the Signed MOAS Group is considered
suspicious. (3) Invalid: If the Signed MOAS Group cannot be
verified, it is considered invalid.
6. Operational Considerations
To aggregate the signatures of all ASes in the AS list, the Signed
MOAS Group MUST use BLS Signatures with BLS12-381 elliptic curve
[I-D.draft-ietf-cose-bls-key-representations-05]. This ensures that
the signatures can be efficiently combined into a single global
signature.
The ASes in the AS List that are authorized by the ROA SHOULD be
placed at the beginning of the AS list, ahead of any non-authorized
ASes. This ordering can improve the efficiency of the RP's
validation process. It is highly RECOMMENDED that the RP only
verifies whether the first AS and the prefix can be validated by the
ROA.
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Multiple valid Signed MOAS Group objects can exist that contain the
same IP prefix. However, it is highly RECOMMENDED that an AS only
participate in one Signed MOAS Group for the same IP prefix. If the
AS List of a Signed MOAS Group needs modification, it is highly
RECOMMENDED to revoke the current Signed MOAS Group and sign a new
one.
7. Security Considerations
Despite it is highly RECOMMENDED that a Signed MOAS Group SHOULD be
validated by at least one ROA, the data contained in a Signed MOAS
Group is still self-asserted by the group of AS holders. This means
that the presence of an AS in the Signed MOAS Group does not
inherently imply any authority from the IP prefix holder for the AS
to originate a route for any prefixes. Such authority is separately
conveyed in the RPKI through a ROA.
8. IANA Considerations
8.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)
IANA is requested to allocate the following in the "SMI Security for
S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry:
+=======+=========================+===============================+
|Decimal|Description |Reference |
+=======+=========================+===============================+
|TBD |Id-ct-rpkiSignedMoasGroup|draft-li-sidrops-rpki-moasgroup|
+-------+-------------------------+-------------------------------+
Table 1
8.2. RPKI Signed Objects
IANA is requested to register two OIDs in the "RPKI Signed Objects"
registry [RFC6488] as follows:
+===========+=============================+===================+
| Name | OID | Reference |
+===========+=============================+===================+
| Signed | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD | draft-li-sidrops- |
| MoasGroup | | rpki-moasgroup |
+-----------+-----------------------------+-------------------+
Table 2
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8.3. RPKI Repository Name Schemes
IANA is requested to add the Signed MoasGroup file extension to the
"RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry [RFC6481] as follows:
+====================+===========+=================================+
| Filename Extension | RPKI | Reference |
| | Object | |
+====================+===========+=================================+
| .smg | Signed | draft-li-sidrops-rpki-moasgroup |
| | MoasGroup | |
+--------------------+-----------+---------------------------------+
Table 3
8.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)
IANA is requested to allocate the following in the "SMI Security for
S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:
+=========+=================================+===================+
| Decimal | Description | Reference |
+=========+=================================+===================+
| .TBD | id-mod-rpkiSignedMoasGroup-2024 | draft-li-sidrops- |
| | | rpki-moasgroup |
+---------+---------------------------------+-------------------+
Table 4
9. Normative References
[I-D.draft-ietf-cose-bls-key-representations-05]
Looker, T. and M. B. Jones, "Barreto-Lynn-Scott Elliptic
Curve Key Representations for JOSE and COSE", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-cose-bls-key-
representations-05, 17 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-
bls-key-representations-05>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
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[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3779>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5652>.
[RFC626] Kleinrock, L. and H. Opderbeck, "On a possible lockup
condition in IMP subnet due to message sequencing",
RFC 626, DOI 10.17487/RFC0626, March 1974,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc626>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6481>.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6488>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6811>.
[RFC7454] Durand, J., Pepelnjak, I., and G. Doering, "BGP Operations
and Security", BCP 194, RFC 7454, DOI 10.17487/RFC7454,
February 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7454>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Shenglin Jiang, Yangfei Guo, Xingang
Shi, Shuhe Wang, Xiaoliang Wang, Hui Wang, and Di Ma.
Authors' Addresses
Qi Li
Zhongguancun Laboratory
Beijing
China
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Email: liq23@zgclab.edu.cn
Ke Xu
Tsinghua University
Beijing
China
Email: xuke@tsinghua.edu.cn
Zhuotao Liu
Tsinghua University
Beijing
China
Email: zhuotaoliu@tsinghua.edu.cn
Qi Li
Tsinghua University
Beijing
China
Email: qli01@tsinghua.edu.cn
Jianping Wu
Tsinghua University
Beijing
China
Email: jianping@cernet.edu.cn
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