Security Considerations for SRv6 Networks
draft-li-spring-srv6-security-consideration-00

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Spring                                                             C. Li
Internet-Draft                                                     Z. Li
Intended status: Standards Track                                  Huawei
Expires: December 13, 2019                                 June 11, 2019

               Security Considerations for SRv6 Networks
             draft-li-spring-srv6-security-consideration-00

Abstract

   SRv6 inherits potential security vulnerabilities from Source Routing
   in general, and also from IPv6.  This document describes various
   threats to SRv6 networks and existing approaches to solve these
   threats.

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Li & Li                 Expires December 13, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                 SR-security                     June 2019

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Security Principles of SRv6 Networking  . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Types of Vulnerabilities in SR Networks . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Eavesdropping Vulnerabilities in SRv6 Networks  . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Packet Falsification in SRv6 Networks . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.3.  Identity Spoofing in SRv6 Networks  . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.4.  Repudiation in SRv6 Networks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.5.  Packet Replay in SRv6 Networks  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.6.  DOS/DDOS in SRv6 Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.7.  Malicious Packet Data in SRv6 Networks  . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Effects of the above on SRv6 Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Security Policy Design  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  Basic Security Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       6.1.1.  ACL for External Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       6.1.2.  ACL for Internal Interface  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       6.1.3.  SID Instantiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.2.  Enhanced Security Design  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   Segment routing (SR) [RFC8402] is a source routing paradigm that
   explicitly indicates the forwarding path for packets at the source
   node by inserting an ordered list of instructions, called segments.
   A segment can represent a topological or service-based instruction.

   When segment routing is deployed on IPv6 [RFC8200] dataplane, called
   SRv6 [I-D.ietf-6man-segment-routing-header], a segment is a 128 bit
   value, and it can be an IPv6 address of a local interface but it does
   not have to.  For supporting SR, an extended header called Segment
   Routing Header (SRH), which contains a list of SIDs and several
   needed information such as Segments Left, has been defined in
   [I-D.ietf-6man-segment-routing-header].  By using SRH, an Ingress
   router can steer SRv6 pakcets into an explicit forwarding path so
   that many use cases like Traffic engineering, Service Function
   Chaining can be deployed easily by SRv6.

   However, SRv6 also bring some new security problems.  This document
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