OSPFv3 Destination Address Filter
draft-lindem-ospfv3-dest-filter-03
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Acee Lindem | ||
| Last updated | 2004-09-29 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
OSPFv2 has been criticized for it vulnerability to Denial of Service (DOS) attacks. With OSPFv3, it is a simple matter to filter on the destination address at an implementation dependent level in order to limit the scope of DOS attacks to directly attached routers. Unlike hop limit checking mechanisms, it is compatible with the existing OSPFv3 behavior. However, this level of protection will preclude the deployment of virtual links in topologies where the filtering is applied.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)