A Profile for ROV Deployment Transparency
draft-ling-sidrops-rov-tag-profile-02
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Sitong Ling , Ke Xu , Li Qi , Zhuotao liu , Xiaoliang Wang | ||
| Last updated | 2026-08-11 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
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draft-ling-sidrops-rov-tag-profile-02
SIDROPS S. Ling
Internet-Draft Zhongguancun Lab
Intended status: Standards Track K. Xu
Expires: 13 February 2027 Q. Li
Z. Liu
Tsinghua University
X. Wang
Capital Normal University
12 August 2026
A Profile for ROV Deployment Transparency
draft-ling-sidrops-rov-tag-profile-02
Abstract
This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) protected
content type for ROV Deployment Transparency (ROV_TAG) objects for
use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). An ROV_TAG
is a digitally signed object through which an Autonomous System (AS)
that has deployed Route Origin Validation (ROV) can declare its ROV
deployment status. When validated, an ROV_TAG's eContent can be used
by ASes to identify which ASes have deployed ROV, enabling path
selection decisions when hijacked routes are detected; see Section 3.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 13 February 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. The ROV_TAG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. The ROV_TAG Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. The ROV_TAG eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4. asID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.5. rovDeployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.6. ROV_TAG Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Use Case: Secure Path Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Querying ROV_TAG Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Deployment Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. Example ROV_TAG eContent Payload . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction
Route Origin Validation (ROV) [RFC6811] is a critical security
mechanism for BGP routing that uses the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to verify the legitimacy of route
announcements. However, ROV deployment is currently partial, with a
significant portion of ASes not yet having deployed ROV.
In partial ROV deployment scenarios, the main security concern is:
When an AS has deployed ROV and performs ROV validation, it may
detect a hijacked route announcement that was propagated by an
upstream AS. This indicates that the upstream AS has not deployed
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ROV or is not properly performing ROV validation. If the AS
continues using paths through that upstream AS, its traffic may be
hijacked. However, the AS cannot determine which alternative paths
go through upstream ASes that have deployed ROV, making it difficult
to make informed path selection decisions to avoid the compromised
upstream AS.
This document defines a profile for ROV Deployment Transparency
(ROV_TAG) objects that allows ASes to register their ROV deployment
status in RPKI. This provides transparency about which ASes have
deployed ROV. When an AS detects a hijacked route announcement from
an upstream AS, it can use ROV_TAG information to identify
alternative paths where the immediate upstream AS has deployed ROV,
enabling it to avoid paths through upstream ASes that have propagated
hijacked routes (see Section 3).
This CMS [RFC5652] protected content type definition conforms to the
[RFC6488] template for RPKI signed objects. This document defines
the object identifier (OID), ASN.1 syntax, and validation steps for
ROV_TAG objects.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Terminology
This document uses the following terminology:
* *Origin AS*: The Autonomous System (AS) that originates a BGP
route announcement. The Origin AS is defined as the last AS in
the AS_PATH attribute of the BGP route announcement, as specified
in [RFC4271].
* *Non-origin AS*: Any AS in the AS_PATH of a BGP route announcement
that is not the Origin AS. In an AS_PATH containing multiple
ASes, all ASes except the last one (the Origin AS) are non-origin
ASes.
2. The ROV_TAG
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2.1. The ROV_TAG Content Type
The content-type for an ROV_TAG is defined as id-ct-ROVTAG, which has
the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD. This OID MUST
appear both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure
as well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo
structure (see [RFC6488]).
2.2. The ROV_TAG eContent
The content of an ROV_TAG identifies the AS that has deployed ROV.
The eContent of an ROV_TAG is an instance of
ROVDeploymentAttestation, formally defined by the following ASN.1
module:
RPKI-ROV-TAG-2026
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-rpki-rov-tag-2026(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- RFC 6268
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;
id-ct-ROVTAG OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) rovtag(TBD) }
ct-ROVTAG CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE ROVDeploymentAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ROVTAG }
ROVDeploymentAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
asID ASID,
rovDeployed BOOLEAN }
ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
END
Note that this content appears as the eContent within the
encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488].
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2.3. version
The version number of the ROVDeploymentAttestation that complies with
this specification MUST be 0 and MUST be explicitly encoded.
2.4. asID
The asID field contains the AS number of the Autonomous System that
is declaring its ROV deployment status.
2.5. rovDeployed
The rovDeployed field is a BOOLEAN that indicates whether the AS has
deployed ROV. Since only ASes that have deployed ROV register
ROV_TAG objects, this field MUST be set to TRUE.
For ASes that provide transit services (i.e., ASes that forward
traffic for other ASes) that have deployed ROV, it is RECOMMENDED
that they register an ROV_TAG object with rovDeployed set to TRUE.
Stub ASes (end networks, content providers, etc. that do not provide
transit services) are NOT RECOMMENDED to register ROV_TAG objects, as
they typically appear as Origin ASes in BGP route announcements.
2.6. ROV_TAG Validation
To validate an ROV_TAG, a relying party MUST perform all the
validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following
additional ROV_TAG-specific validation steps:
* The Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension [RFC3779]
MUST be present in the end-entity (EE) certificate contained
within the ROV_TAG. The asID in the ROV_TAG eContent MUST match
the ASId specified by the EE certificate's Autonomous System
Identifier Delegation Extension.
* The Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension MUST contain
exactly one "id" element (Section 3.2.3.6 of [RFC3779]) and MUST
NOT contain any "inherit" elements (Section 3.2.3.3 of [RFC3779])
or "range" elements (Section 3.2.3.7 of [RFC3779]).
* The IP Address Delegation Extension [RFC3779] MUST be absent.
* The rovDeployed field MUST be present and MUST be set to TRUE.
Since only ASes that have deployed ROV register ROV_TAG objects,
this field MUST always be TRUE.
If any of the above checks fail, the ROV_TAG in its entirety MUST be
considered invalid and an error SHOULD be logged.
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3. Use Case: Secure Path Selection
In partial ROV deployment scenarios, when an AS filters a hijacked
route announcement received from an upstream AS through ROV
validation, this indicates that the upstream AS has accepted and
propagated the hijacked route. This may occur because the upstream
AS has not deployed ROV or is not properly performing ROV validation.
In this situation, the AS SHOULD avoid using paths through that
upstream AS for traffic destined to the affected prefix.
This use case describes a defensive mechanism that is triggered when
an AS detects a security problem. Specifically:
1. The AS performs ROV validation and detects a hijacked route
announcement.
2. The AS identifies that the hijacked route was propagated by an
upstream AS (the immediate upstream AS).
3. The AS recognizes that *the current path it is using also goes
through this same immediate upstream AS* that propagated the
hijacked route.
4. *At this point*, if the AS continues using the current path
through that upstream AS, the data plane traffic will go through
the hijacked upstream AS, leading to the same hijacking.
5. As a defensive measure, the AS can use ROV_TAG information
obtained from its RPKI Relying Party (RP) to identify alternative
paths from the BGP route announcements it has already received.
An alternative path is one where the immediate upstream AS has
deployed ROV (i.e., has registered an ROV_TAG object with
rovDeployed set to TRUE).
6. The AS checks the ROV deployment status of upstream ASes in the
AS_PATH of received route announcements against the ROV_TAG
information. If such alternative paths exist, the AS MAY prefer
them over the path through the upstream AS that propagated the
hijacked route.
This approach is based on the following reasoning:
* If an upstream AS has deployed ROV, it will filter invalid route
announcements and will not propagate hijacked routes.
* If an upstream AS has deployed ROV, it may also implement secure
path selection (i.e., avoid paths through upstream ASes that have
propagated hijacked route announcements when it detects such
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announcements). This creates a mechanism where ASes can prefer
paths through upstream ASes that have deployed ROV. The logic is
straightforward: if an AS detects that an upstream AS has
propagated a hijacked route announcement (by filtering it through
ROV validation), it SHOULD select an alternative secure path.
Conversely, if no hijacked route announcements are detected from
an upstream AS, that upstream AS is considered secure, and there
is no need to select an alternative path.
* Therefore, if an alternative path exists where the immediate
upstream AS has deployed ROV, that path is more likely to be
secure from that point forward, reducing the risk that traffic
will be hijacked.
The decision to use alternative paths is a matter of local policy.
An AS MAY:
* Continue using normal BGP path selection when no hijacked route
announcements are detected.
* When an AS filters a hijacked route announcement received from an
upstream AS, consider alternative paths (where the immediate
upstream AS has deployed ROV) as a defensive measure to avoid the
path through the upstream AS that propagated the hijacked route.
This defensive measure is triggered only when a security problem
is detected.
* Fall back to normal BGP path selection if no alternative paths
with ROV-deployed upstream ASes are available.
This addresses the security vulnerability problem by enabling ASes to
avoid paths through upstream ASes that have propagated hijacked
routes. Such paths are identified through ROV validation. When
alternative secure paths are available, this reduces the risk of
route hijacking even in partial ROV deployment scenarios.
Note: This is a heuristic defensive mechanism and does not provide
cryptographic security guarantees. The use of alternative paths is
OPTIONAL and subject to local policy.
4. Operational Considerations
This section discusses operational aspects of ROV_TAG deployment and
usage.
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4.1. Querying ROV_TAG Information
ROV_TAG objects are stored in the RPKI repository alongside other
RPKI objects (e.g., ROAs, ASPAs). Relying Parties (RPs) process
ROV_TAG objects as part of their standard RPKI repository
synchronization and validation procedures, as specified in [RFC6488].
ASes obtain ROV_TAG information from their RPKI Relying Party (RP)
(e.g., through RPKI-to-Router protocols such as [RFC6810] or
[RFC8210]). ASes can query this information efficiently to determine
whether upstream ASes have deployed ROV. Real-time queries to the
RPKI repository or RP are not required during BGP path selection.
4.2. Performance Considerations
The number of ASes that provide transit services is relatively small
compared to the total number of ASes, which means the total number of
ROV_TAG objects is expected to be manageable. This results in
minimal storage and query overhead compared to other RPKI objects
such as ROAs.
Query operations for ROV_TAG information can be performed efficiently
using standard data structures (e.g., hash tables keyed by AS
number), enabling fast lookups during BGP path selection.
4.3. Deployment Recommendations
For ASes that provide transit services and have deployed ROV, it is
RECOMMENDED that they register an ROV_TAG object with rovDeployed set
to TRUE. This provides transparency about ROV deployment. It also
enables downstream ASes to make informed path selection decisions
when hijacked routes are detected.
Stub ASes (end networks, content providers, etc.) are NOT RECOMMENDED
to register ROV_TAG objects, as they typically appear as Origin ASes
in BGP route announcements.
5. Implementation Considerations
This section provides guidance for implementers of ROV_TAG support.
ROV_TAG is a new RPKI object type. Existing RPKI RP implementations
that do not support ROV_TAG will simply ignore ROV_TAG objects during
repository synchronization, as per the RPKI validation rules
specified in [RFC6488]. This ensures backward compatibility: ROV_TAG
objects do not interfere with existing RPKI operations, and ASes that
have not deployed ROV_TAG support can continue to operate normally.
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RP implementations that support ROV_TAG SHOULD:
* Validate ROV_TAG objects according to the validation steps
specified in Section 2.6.
* Make validated ROV_TAG information available to ASes (e.g.,
through RPKI-to-Router protocols such as [RFC6810] or [RFC8210]).
The number of ROV_TAG objects is expected to be relatively small
compared to other RPKI objects such as ROAs. This is because only
ASes that provide transit services are expected to register ROV_TAG
objects.
Implementers that choose to implement the secure path selection
described in Section 3 SHOULD:
* Obtain ROV_TAG information from the RPKI Relying Party (RP) (e.g.,
through RPKI-to-Router protocols such as [RFC6810] or [RFC8210]).
* Implement efficient ROV_TAG lookup mechanisms, such as hash tables
keyed by AS number, to quickly determine whether upstream ASes in
the AS_PATH have deployed ROV by querying the ROV_TAG information.
* Implement logic to detect when a hijacked route announcement is
received from an upstream AS and identify alternative paths where
the immediate upstream AS has deployed ROV.
* Provide configuration options to enable or disable secure path
selection. This allows operators to make informed decisions based
on their operational requirements and risk tolerance.
* Log secure path selection decisions (e.g., when alternative paths
are selected) to facilitate troubleshooting and security auditing.
* Handle cases where ROV_TAG information is unavailable gracefully
by falling back to normal BGP path selection.
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations of [RFC6481], [RFC6485], and [RFC6488]
also apply to ROV_TAG objects.
There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in an ROV_TAG;
it is anticipated that ROV_TAG objects will be stored in repositories
that are accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users.
The integrity of an ROV_TAG MUST be established through cryptographic
signing and validation according to [RFC6488].
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A fundamental limitation of ROV_TAG is that the information is self-
asserted: an AS may register an ROV_TAG with rovDeployed set to TRUE
but not actually perform ROV validation. ROV_TAG does not provide
cryptographic verification that ROV validation is actually being
performed. A malicious AS could register an ROV_TAG to attract
traffic when other ASes are looking for alternative paths. However,
several factors mitigate this risk:
* The secure path selection mechanism is defensive in nature - it is
triggered only when a security problem is detected (hijacked
route), not used for general path selection. This reduces the
opportunity for exploitation.
* Registering an ROV_TAG in RPKI creates a public record. ASes
generally care about their reputation in the routing community,
and false claims about ROV deployment could damage that
reputation. While this does not provide cryptographic
verification, it does provide some level of accountability.
* ASes could maintain local violation records (not in RPKI) to track
when upstream ASes that have registered ROV_TAG propagate invalid
route announcements. Such mechanisms are non-standardized and
implementation-specific, but they demonstrate that ROV_TAG can
enable accountability even without cryptographic verification of
actual ROV deployment.
These factors reduce the risk of exploitation, though they do not
eliminate it entirely.
7. IANA Considerations
This document will require IANA to assign values in several
registries. The specific assignments will be determined during the
IETF review process. The following registrations are anticipated:
* An OID for the RPKI-ROV-TAG-2026 ASN.1 module in the "SMI Security
for S/MIME Module Identifier" registry.
* An OID for the ROV_TAG content type in the "SMI Security for S/
MIME CMS Content Type" registry.
* An entry for ROV_TAG in the "RPKI Signed Object" registry.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3779>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4271>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5652>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6481>.
[RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
RFC 6485, DOI 10.17487/RFC6485, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6485>.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6488>.
[RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6810>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6811>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
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[RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8210>.
[X.680] ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", name ITU-T
Recommendation, value X.680, 2021,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>.
[X.690] ITU-T, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", name ITU-T Recommendation, value X.690, 2021,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6268>.
Appendix A. Example ROV_TAG eContent Payload
Below is an example of a DER-encoded ROV_TAG eContent with annotation
following the '#' character.
Example: Transit AS with ROV deployed
$ echo 30080201000203000D050201FF | xxd -r -ps | openssl asn1parse \
-inform DER -dump -i 0:d=0 hl=2 l= 8 cons: SEQUENCE 2:d=1 hl=2 l= 1
prim: INTEGER :00 # version = 0 5:d=1 hl=2 l= 3 prim: INTEGER :0D05 #
asID = 3333 10:d=1 hl=2 l= 1 prim: BOOLEAN :FF # rovDeployed = TRUE
Authors' Addresses
Sitong Ling
Zhongguancun Lab
Beijing
China
Email: lingst@zgclab.edu.cn
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Ke Xu
Tsinghua University
Beijing
China
Email: xuke@tsinghua.edu.cn
Qi Li
Tsinghua University
Beijing
China
Email: qli01@tsinghua.edu.cn
Zhuotao Liu
Tsinghua University
Beijing
China
Email: zhuotaoliu@tsinghua.edu.cn
Xiaoliang Wang
Capital Normal University
Beijing
China
Email: wangxiaoliang@cnu.edu.cn
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