Problem Statement for a Digital Emblem
draft-linker-digital-emblem-02
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Felix Linker , Mauro Vignati , Tommy Jensen | ||
| Last updated | 2024-12-29 (Latest revision 2024-06-28) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
In times of armed conflict, the protective emblems of the red cross, red crescent, and red crystal are used to mark _physical_ assets. This enables military units to identify assets as respected and protected under international humanitarian law. This draft explores how one could apply the protective emblems to _digital_, network- connected infrastructure using a _digital emblem_, and defines the requirements of a digital emblem, emphasizing security requirements. Notably, a digital emblem has a unique combination of security requirements, namely, authentication, accountability, and a property that we call _covert inspection_. Covert inspection means that those wishing to authenticate assets as protected must be able to do so without revealing that they may attack unprotected entities.
Authors
Felix Linker
Mauro Vignati
Tommy Jensen
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)