Network Attestation for Secure Routing (NASR) Architecture
draft-liu-nasr-architecture-00
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draft-liu-nasr-architecture-00
NASR C. Liu
Internet-Draft Huawei
Intended status: Informational M. Chen
Expires: 8 January 2025 China Mobile
M. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
D. Lopez
Telefonica
7 July 2024
Network Attestation for Secure Routing (NASR) Architecture
draft-liu-nasr-architecture-00
Abstract
This document provides an architecture overview of NASR entities,
interactive procedures and messages.
Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Architectural Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Single client - single operator (An
Oversimplification) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.2. Multi Client - Multi Operator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
Endpoints typically perceives no information of the properties of the
paths over which their traffic is carried, especially when the
properties are security-related. Therefore, data security
(confidentiality, integrity and authenticity) has been insofar
primarily protected by traffic signing and encryption mechanisms.
Endpoint cannot choose devices with specific properties to bear
transmission.
However, clients with high security and privacy requirements are not
anymore satisfied with traffic signing and encryption mechanisms
only; they now request information of the trustworthiness or security
properties of the network paths over which the traffic is carried,
preferably to choose the desired properties. For example, some
clients may require their data to traverse through trusted devices
and trusted links only, in order to avoid data being exposed to
insecure devices, causing leakage.
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Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) working group developed
procedures to establish a level of confidence in the trustworthiness
of a device or a system. RATS provide 1. objective, appraisable
evidence of a device’s trust or security properties, and 2.
verifiable integrity proof to the evidence (Attestation Result).
Devices with integrity proof are expected to function correctly and
deterministically, as anticipated.
Following the same RATS philosophy and building on top of it, Network
Attestation for Secure Routing （NASR) aims at a solution specifically
designed for the routing use case. NASR aims to provide 1.
objective, appraisable evidence of a routing path’s trust or security
properties, 2. verifiable integrity proof in the path-level, and 3.
verifiable proof that certain packets/flows traveled such paths.
Altogether, the NASR goal is to 1. Allow clients to choose desired
security attributes of his received network service, 2. Achieve
dependable forwarding by routing on top of only devices that
satisfies certain trust requirements, and 3. prove to the clients
that certain packets or flows traversed a network path that has
certain trust or security properties.
This document introduces the architecture, entities, interactive
procedures, and messages sent between the entities, so to achieve the
NASR objective.
2. Use Cases
Please refer to the use cases identified in
[I-D.liu-nasr-requirements-01]
3. Terminology
Please refer to the terminologies identified in
[I-D.richardson-nasr-terminology-01]. Terminology from RATS
Architecture document [RFC9344] also applies.
NASR will leverage RATS implementations and specifications, including
but not limited to [I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si-06][I-D.ietf-rats-corim-04].
4. Architectural Overview
4.1. Single client - single operator (An Oversimplification)
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+--------------------+
| |
| Relying Party |
| |
| |
+----+---------^-----+ Path | | Request| | Report
| |
+----v---------+-----+ +--------------------+
| | Path Attestation Result (PAR) | |
| Orchestrator | | Verifier |
| <------------------------------------+ |
| | | |
+----+---------------+ +----------^---------+
| | Path | | Path Evidence | | Evidence (PE) | | (PE)
+----v---------------+ +--------------------+ +----------+---------+
| | | | | |
| Attester +-------> Attester... +-------> Attester |
| | | | | |
+--------------------+ +--------------------+ +--------------------+
Update PE with Update PE with
AR/RE/PoT AR/RE/PoT
Figure 1. NASR Architecture-- Oversimplified
Fig. 1 is an oversimplification to ease understanding of the concept.
In a single client - single operator scenario, a client (Relying
Party) sends a Path Request containing his security or
trustworthiness requirements of a leased line. The Orchestrator, run
by the operator, would choose qualifying devices (Attesters) and send
out an empty Path Evidence inquiry. The Attesters update the Path
Evidence with its own Raw Evidence or Attestation Results one-by-one.
The Verifier verifies the filled Path Evidence, produce a Path
Attestation Result (PAR), and sends it back to the Relying Party.
The Relying Party now have confidence over the trustworthiness of
received network. After the end-to-end service is delivered, during
service, Proof-of-Transits are also created by each Attester, being
sent in-band accumulatively or out-of-band, to detect unexpected
routing deviation.
This process is repeated periodically to continuously assure
compliance.
4.2. Multi Client - Multi Operator
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┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │
│ ┌────────────┐ ┌────────────┐ │
│ │ Verifier │ │ Verifier │ ... │
│ │ Vendor A │ │ Vendor B │ │
┌───────────────────┐ │ └────▲─────┬─┘ └───▲────┬───┘ Vendors │ ┌───────────────────┐
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ │ └────────────┼─────┼───────────────────────┼────┼────────────────┘ │ │
│ Client A │ │ │ │ │ │ Client B │
│ │ Path │ │ │ │ Path │ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ │ Request │ │ │ │ Attestation │ ┌────────────┐ │
│ │ Relying ├─┼──────────┐ ┌─────┼─────┼───────┐ ┌──────┼────┼───────┐ Result (PAR)│ │ Relying │ │
│ │ Party │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┌───────┼───┤ Party │ │
│ └───┬──────────┘◄├────────┐ │ │ │ │ │ Intra │ │ │ │ │ │ └────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ RE │ │AR │ ISP │ RE │ │ AR │ │ │ ▲ │
│ │ │ Answer │ └─► ┌───┴─────▼─────┐ │ API │ ┌───┴────▼────┐ │ │ │ │ │
│ │Path │ Report │ │ │ Orchestrator ├─┼────────┼─►│ Orchestrator│◄─┼─────┘ │ │ │
│ │Evidence │ └───┤ └───▲─────┬─────┘ │ │ └───▲────┬────┘ │ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ RE │ │AR │ │ RE │ │ AR │ │ │ │
│ ┌──▼────────┐ │ │ ┌───┴─────▼─────┐ │ │ ┌───┴────▼─────┐ │ │ ┌───────┴───┐ │
│ │ Attester │ │ │ │ Attester │ │ │ │ Attester │ │ │ │ Attester │ │
│ │ ├───┼────────────┤►│ Vendor A ├─┼────────┼─►│ Vendor B ├─┼─────────────┼──►│ │ │
│ └───────────┘ │ Update PE │ └───────────────┘ │ │ └──────────────┘ │ Update PE │ └───────────┘ │
│ │ with │ │ │ │ with │ │
│ │ AR/RE/PoT │ Operator 1 │ │ Operator 2 │ AR/RE/PoT │ │
└───────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘
Figure 2. NASR Architecture
In a more generalized scenario, due to geographic distances, a single operator cannot span across a long distance to deliver an end-to-end service-- multiple operators collaborate to deliver it. The Customer A would send the Path Request to the Operator nearest to him (Operator 1). Operator 1 pass down the Path Request to the collaborating operators, through an intra-ISP API. Operators of different domains choose qualifying devices to altogether orchestrate the path.
Relying Party (customer) then sends the Path Evidence inquiry to check and attest to this path. Following the same procedure, the client of other side would return the Path Attestation Result back, through the operators. The Operator 1 would send back a comprehensive answer/report to the Client.
Also, the operators may have heterogeneous network devices from different vendors. Since vendors provide Verifier software/hardware and Reference Values, Verifiers can be deployed either outside the operators (Fig 2) or inside of the operators (Fig 3).
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │
│ ┌────────────┐ ┌────────────┐ │
│ │ Verifier │ │ Verifier │ │
│ │ Owner │ │ Owner │ ... │
│ │ Vendor A │ │ Vendor B │ │
│ └───────┬────┘ └──────┬─────┘ Vendors │
│ │ │ │
└───────────────┼─────────────────────────────┼──────────────────┘
│ Verifier software/hardware │
│ Reference Value │
┌───────────────────┐ ┌────────┼──────────┐ ┌─────────┼─────────┐ ┌───────────────────┐
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│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ │ │ ┌─────▼──────┐ │ │ ┌─────▼──────┐ │ │ │
│ Client A │ │ │ Verifier │ │ │ │ Verifier │ │ │ Client B │
│ │ Path │ │ from │ │ │ │ from │ │ Path │ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ │ Request │ │ Vendor A │ │ │ │ Vendor B │ │ Attestation │ ┌────────────┐ │
│ │ Relying ├─┼──────────┐ │ └──┬─────┬───┘ │ │ └──┬────┬────┘ │ Result (PAR)│ │ Relying │ │
│ │ Party │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┌───────┼───┤ Party │ │
│ └───┬──────────┘◄├────────┐ │ │ │ │ │ Intra │ │ │ │ │ │ └────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ RE │ │AR │ ISP │ RE │ │ AR │ │ │ ▲ │
│ │ │ │ └─► ┌───┴─────▼─────┐ │ API │ ┌───┴────▼────┐ │ │ │ │ │
│ │Path │ Report │ │ │ Orchestrator ├─┼────────┼─►│ Orchestrator│◄─┼─────┘ │ │ │
│ │Evidence │ └───┤ └───▲─────┬─────┘ │ │ └───▲────┬────┘ │ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ RE │ │AR │ │ RE │ │ AR │ │ │ │
│ ┌──▼────────┐ │ │ ┌───┴─────▼─────┐ │ │ ┌───┴────▼─────┐ │ │ ┌───────┴───┐ │
│ │ Attester │ │ │ │ Attester │ │ │ │ Attester │ │ │ │ Attester │ │
│ │ ├───┼────────────┼─┤ Vendor A ├─┼────────┼─►│ Vendor B ├─┼─────────────┼──►│ │ │
│ └───────────┘ │ Update PE │ └───────────────┘ │ │ └──────────────┘ │ Update PE │ └───────────┘ │
│ │ with │ │ │ │ with │ │
│ │ AR/RE/PoT │ Operator 1 │ │ Operator 2 │ AR/RE/PoT │ │
└───────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘
Figure 3. Verifier deployed in operators
# Roles {#roles}
The existing roles from RATS Architecture document {{RFC9344}} applies.
- Attester: The definition in {{RFC9344}} applies. Additionally, it can be performed by either a physical device or a virtual function. The Attester can update Path Evidence with his Attestation Result/Raw Evidence/Proof of Transit.
- Produces: (updated) Path Evidence
- Relying Party: The definition in {{RFC9344}} applies. Additionally, it creates Path Request to the Orchestrator, and receive Reports from Orchestrator as an auditable result, comparing the actually received network service versus the requested PR attributes.
- Produces: Path Request
- Consumes: Report
In the case where an Attester is deployed in the customer premises, the Relying Party could also start the unfilled Path Evidence inquiry at his side.
New role(s) are defined below.
- Orchestrator: A role performed by an entity (typically a controller or a special device) that performs two functions: path orchestration and path attestation. The input and output of different functions are different.
- Path Orchestration: The Orchestrator receives a Path Request from the Relying Party. After path computation/orchestration, he creates configurations to be distributed to the Attesters/devices.
- Consumes: Path Request
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- Produces: Configurations
- Path Attestation: The Orchestrator receives a Path Request from the Relying Party, send unfilled Path Evidence (PE) inquiry to Attesters, collects Path Attestation Result (PAR) from the Verifier, and send PAR back to the Relying Party.
- Consumes: Path Request, Path Attestation Result
- Produces: (unfilled) Path Evidence
- Verifier: A role performed by an entity that appraises the validity of filled Path Evidence about a set of Attesters and produces Path Attestation Results to be used by an Orchestrator.
- Consumes: (filled) Path Evidence
- Produces: Path Attestation Results
# Conceptual Messages {#messages}
The existing artifacts from RATS Architecture document {{RFC9344}} applies. New conceptual message(s) are defined here.
- Path Request: A set of claims, describing the properties of a network path that a Relying Party requested.
- Consumed By: Orchestrator
- Produced By: Relying Party
- Path Attestation Result: The output generated by a Verifier, including information about a set of Attesters, where the Verifier vouches for the validity of the results.
- Consumed By: Relying Party
- Produced By: Verifier
- Path Evidence: The output generated by the Orchestrator and a set of Attesters, to be appraised by a Verifier. Path Evidence may include each Attester's raw Evidence {{RFC9344}}, Attestation Results, Proof-of-Transit, or other proof suggesting correctness of functioning of each Attester.
- Consumed By: Verifier
- Created By: Orchestrator
- Updated By: Attester(s)
- Report: An auditable result that compares the actually received network service versus the requested PR attributes.
- Created By: Orchestrator
- Consumed By: Relying Party
# Orchestration
The orchestration process collects client's path requests and output configurations. The Orchestrator/Controller then distribute them to the attester/device using NETCONF/YANG or other control plane protocols. In the first case, a new YANG module needs to be defined.
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+------------------------+
| | Path Request |Orchestrator/Controller | -------------->| |
+----------+-------------+
|
|Path and Security Configuration
|(YANG/NETCONF)
|
+-----v------------+
| Attester/Device |
+------------------+
~~~~
5. Security Considerations
TODO Security
6. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
7. Informative References
[RFC9344] Asaeda, H., Ooka, A., and X. Shao, "CCNinfo: Discovering
Content and Network Information in Content-Centric
Networks", RFC 9344, DOI 10.17487/RFC9344, February 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9344>.
[I-D.liu-nasr-requirements-01]
Liu, P. C., Iannone, L., Lopez, D., Pastor, A., Chen, M.,
and L. Su, "NASR Use Case and Requirements", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-liu-nasr-requirements-01,
3 March 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-liu-nasr-requirements-01>.
[I-D.richardson-nasr-terminology-01]
Richardson, M. and P. C. Liu, "Terminology and Use cases
for Secured Routing Infrastructure", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-richardson-nasr-terminology-01, 20
May 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
richardson-nasr-terminology-01>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si-06]
Voit, E., Birkholz, H., Hardjono, T., Fossati, T., and V.
Scarlata, "Attestation Results for Secure Interactions",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-
06, 4 March 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-06>.
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[I-D.ietf-rats-corim-04]
Birkholz, H., Fossati, T., Deshpande, Y., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Concise Reference Integrity Manifest", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-corim-04, 4
March 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-rats-corim-04>.
Acknowledgments
We sincerely thank contribution from NASR mailing list.
Authors' Addresses
Chunchi Liu
Huawei
Email: liuchunchi@huawei.com
Meiling Chen
China Mobile
Email: chenmeiling@chinamobile.com
Michael Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
Email: mcr@sandelman.ca
Diego Lopez
Telefonica
Email: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com
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