DS-lite security
draft-liu-opsec-ds-lite-security-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Will (Shucheng) LIU , Fernando Gont , Tina Tsou (Ting ZOU) | ||
| Last updated | 2014-07-04 (Latest revision 2013-12-31) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
More and more operators have deployed or are about to deploy IPv6 transition technologies such as DS-lite, MAP, LAFT6, etc. The fundamental elements of these technologies are Network Address Translation (NAT) and Tunneling. The elements of these transition technologies may be subject to a number of attacks, unless appropriate mitigations are in place. This memo discusses the security implications of the aforementioned points, and additionally, provides a number of operational mitigations that could be deployed against these attacks.
Authors
Will (Shucheng) LIU
Fernando Gont
Tina Tsou (Ting ZOU)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)