Responsibility for Authoritative DNS and DNSSEC Mistakes
draft-livingood-dnsop-auth-dnssec-mistakes-05
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Jason Livingood | ||
| Last updated | 2020-02-14 (Latest revision 2019-08-13) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) validation by recursive DNS resolvers has been deployed at scale. However, domain signing tools and processes are not yet as mature and reliable as is the case for non-DNSSEC-related domain administration tools and processes. This sometimes results in DNSSEC-validation failures, for which operators of validating resolvers are often blamed. This is similar to other, non-DNSSEC-related authoritative DNS errors, for which individual recursive DNS operators are sometimes incorrectly blamed. This document makes clear that responsibility for any and all authoritative DNS failures rests squarely with authoritative domain name operators, who are the only party that can properly maintain their domain names and rectify associated authoritative DNS errors.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)