In Case of DNSSEC Validation Failures, Do Not Change Resolvers
draft-livingood-dnsop-dont-switch-resolvers-04

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Domain Name System Operations                               J. Livingood
Internet-Draft                                                   Comcast
Intended status: Informational                         February 18, 2019
Expires: August 22, 2019

     In Case of DNSSEC Validation Failures, Do Not Change Resolvers
             draft-livingood-dnsop-dont-switch-resolvers-04

Abstract

   DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) validation by recursive DNS
   resolvers has been deployed at scale.  However, domain signing tools
   and processes are not yet as mature and reliable as is the case for
   non-DNSSEC-related domain administration tools and processes.  This
   sometimes results in DNSSEC validation failures, for which operators
   of validating resolvers are often blamed.  When these failures do
   occur, end users should not change to a non-validating DNS resolver,
   as that would downgrade their security.  They should instead wait
   until the authoritative domain operator updates their DNS records to
   resolve the error and that change propagates across the Internet's
   DNS resolvers, the timing of which may be dependent upon the Time To
   Live (TTL) settings in the old and/or erroneous DNS resource records.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 22, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Livingood                Expires August 22, 2019                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           Do Not Change Resolvers           February 2019

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Reasons for DNSSEC Validation Failure . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Misunderstanding DNSSEC Validation Failures . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Comparison to Other DNS Misconfigurations . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Switching to a Non-Validating Resolver is NOT Recommended . .   4
   6.  Other Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.1.  Recommendations for Validating Resolver Operators . . . .   5
     6.2.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.3.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.3.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Appendix A.  Document Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Appendix B.  Open Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   The Domain Name System (DNS), DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC), and
   related operational practices are defined extensively [RFC1034]
   [RFC1035] [RFC4033] [RFC4034] [RFC4035] [RFC4398] [RFC4509] [RFC6781]
   [RFC5155].

   DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) validation by recursive DNS
   resolvers has been deployed at scale.  However, domain signing tools
   and processes are not yet as mature and reliable as is the case for
   non-DNSSEC-related domain administration tools and processes.  This
   sometimes results in DNSSEC validation failures, for which operators
   of validating resolvers are often blamed.

   When these DNSSEC validation failures do occur, end users SHOULD NOT
   change to a non-validating DNS resolver, as that would downgrade
   their security.  They should instead wait until the authoritative
   domain operator updates their DNS records to resolve the error and
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