RPKI validated cache Update in SLURM over HTTPs (RUSH)
draft-madi-sidrops-rush-02
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Di Ma
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Hanbing Yan
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Melchior Aelmans
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2020-08-29
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SIDROPS D. Ma
Internet-Draft ZDNS
Intended status: Standards Track H. Yan
Expires: March 2, 2021 CNCERT
M. Aelmans
Juniper Networks
August 29, 2020
RPKI validated cache Update in SLURM over HTTPs (RUSH)
draft-madi-sidrops-rush-02
Abstract
This document defines a method for transferring RPKI validated cache
update information in JSON object format over HTTPs.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 2, 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. RUSH Usecase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. RUSH Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Use of SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.2. Use of HTTP as Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.3. RUSH Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
This document defines a mechanism called "RPKI validated cache Update
in SLURM [RFC 8416] over HTTPs (RUSH)", for the use of SLURM in
updating RPKI cache data over HTTP [RFC7540] using HTTPs [RFC2818]
URIs (and therefore TLS [RFC8446] security for integrity and
confidentiality). Integration with HTTP provides a secure transport
for distributing cache data, which is in alignment with SLURM file
format in order to take advantage of using one same API for a cache
server to do both remote update and local override.
The RPKI validated cache in this document refers to the validated
data of assertion information certified by corresponding RPKI signed
objects such as ROA [RFC6482] and BGPsec router certificate
[RFC8209], which are transferred from the RPKI cache server to
routers by RTR protocol [RFC8210] for the use of the RPKI. SLURM
offers a standardized method for describing RPKI cache data in JSON
format [RFC8259], and SLURM is designed to carry out incremental
update.
Note that RUSH merely focuses on a standardized transport and data
format of the RPKI cache data. RUSH has nothing to do with
synchronization at the RUSH end system, that is, more sophisticated
functions such as automatic re-synchronization and access control is
out of this scope and MAY be left to private implementation.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT","REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
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14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. RUSH Usecase
o Cache Distribution
RUSH can be used to distribute a RPKI validated cache within a single
ASN or network, for example a confederation composed of a number of
ASes. A small site or enterprise network MAY also use RUSH by
synchronizing with a third-party RPKI cache provider over external
networks.
o Local Control over Networks
Network operators MAY want to inject SLURM Assertions/Filters via an
API offered by RPKI validator/cache. RUSH is therefore able to carry
out such local control signals inside an administrative bailiwick in
a secure manner.
o AS0 SLURM File Delivery
The Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) need to publish assertions
with origin AS0 ([RFC6491]) for all the unallocated and unassigned
address space (IPv4 and IPv6) for which it is the current
administrator. RUSH is able to deliver those assertions to RPKI
relying parties if so called AS0 SLURM file are generated by the RIR.
To summarize, RUSH MUST be used in scenarios where the authenticity
of SLURM files can be assured when carried over multiple
administrative domains. Alternatively, RUSH SHOULD be used inside an
administrative domain to provide extra security by the virtue of pre-
configured trust anchors.
4. RUSH Operations
4.1. Use of SLURM
RUSH uses SLURM file format to indicate the intended update. A SLURM
file consists of a single JSON object containing some members. Among
others, "validationOutputFilters" [Section 3.3 of [RFC8416]] and
"locallyAddedAssertions" [Section 3.4 of [RFC8416]] are defined to
describe actions of deleting some of existing data items and adding
new data items respectively.
Note that RUSH re-uses the JSON members of SLURM object, not implying
the very actions are taken locally to any extent. Typically, RUSH
takes place over networks remotely while take effects to the cache in
question locally.
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The RUSH-aware HTTP server/client MUST be prepared to parse SLURM
object.
4.2. Use of HTTP as Transport
HTTP is employed by RUSH to transfer RPKI validated cache update
information as expressed as a SLURM object. A new data type is
therefore defined to identify SLURM object in HTTP message body.
The RUSH-aware HTTP server/client MUST be prepared to process media
type "application/json-slurm".
4.3. RUSH Example
Figure 1 shows an example of using RUSH to carry out RPKI validated
cache by HTTP POST method.
POST /rpki-cache HTTP/2
Host: rpki.example.com
Content-Type : application/json-slurm
Content-Length:964
<964 bytes represented by the following json string>
{
"slurmVersion": 1,
"validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [
{
"prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
"comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
},
{
"asn": 64496,
"comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
},
{
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"asn": 64497,
"comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
}
],
"bgpsecFilters": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"comment": "All keys for ASN"
},
{
"SKI": "Zm9v",
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"comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
},
{
"asn": 64497,
"SKI": "YmFy",
"comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
}
]
},
"locallyAddedAssertions": {
"prefixAssertions": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"comment": "My other important route"
},
{
"asn": 64496,
"prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
"maxPrefixLength": 48,
"comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
}
],
"bgpsecAssertions": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
"SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",
"routerPublicKey": "<some base64 public key>"
}
]
}
}
Figure 1.Example of an HTTP message for use of RUSH
5. IANA Considerations
Type name: application
Subtype name: json-slurm
Subtype name: json-slurm
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: This is a JSON object.
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Security considerations: N/A
Interoperability considerations: [RFC8416]
Published specification:
Applications that use this media type:
Systems that want to exchange RPKI cache data update information in
SLURM
file format [RFC8416] over HTTP.
Person&email address to contact for further information: Di Ma
<madi@zdns.cn>
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: N/A
Author: Di Ma <madi@zdns.cn>
Change controller: IESG
6. Security Considerations
Note that RPKI offers signed-object-oriented security, which is not
provide by RUSH any longer. There are some security issues must be
handled properly as per different usecases as described in Section 3.
Cache Identity: RUSH is designed to carry out RPKI cache data update
from one to another, with out-of-band trust established between those
cache servers. That is, the scope of RUSH usage is convergent.
Cache subscription management might be employed to implement cache
identification and verification. The RPKI cache server security and
the trust model for the interaction between cache servers is out of
the scope of this document.
Transport Security: Updating RPKI validated cache over HTTPs relies
on the security of the underlying HTTP transport. Implementations
utilizing HTTP/2 benefit from the TLS profile defined in Section 9.2
of [RFC7540].
Data Integrity: An HTTPS connection provides transport security for
the interaction between cache servers, but it does not provide data
integrity detection. An adversary that can control the cache used by
the subscriber can affect that subscriber's view of the RPKI.
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7. Acknowledgments
TBD
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA",
RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6491>.
[RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
and Certification Requests", RFC 8209,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
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[RFC8416] Ma, D., Mandelberg, D., and T. Bruijnzeels, "Simplified
Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI
(SLURM)", RFC 8416, DOI 10.17487/RFC8416, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8416>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.
Authors' Addresses
Di Ma
ZDNS
4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun
Haidian, Beijing 100190
China
Email: madi@zdns.cn
Hanbing Yan
CNCERT
Email: yhb@cert.org.cn
Melchior Aelmans
Juniper Networks
Boeing Avenue 240
Schiphol-Rijk 1119 PZ
The Netherlands
Email: maelmans@juniper.net
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