Attested TLS Token Binding
draft-mandyam-tokbind-attest-00

Token Binding Working Group                                   G. Mandyam
Internet-Draft                                              L. Lundblade
Intended status: Standards Track                                 J. Azen
Expires: April 3, 2017                        Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
                                                      September 30, 2016

                       Attested TLS Token Binding
                    draft-mandyam-tokbind-attest-00

Abstract

   Token binding allows HTTP servers to bind bearer tokens to TLS
   connections.  In order to do this, clients or user agents must prove
   possession of a private key.  However, proof-of-possession of a
   private key becomes truly meaningful to a server when accompanied by
   an attestation statement.  This specification describes extensions to
   the existing token binding protocol to allow for attestation
   statements to be sent along with the related token binding messages.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 3, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must

Mandyam, et al.           Expires April 3, 2017                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                TokBindAttest               September 2016

   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Attestation Enhancement to TLS Token Binding Negotiation  . .   3
   3.  Attestation Enhancement to TLS Token Binding Message  . . . .   4
   4.  Attestation Suppression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Example - Platform Attestation for Anomaly Detection  . . . .   5
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol] and [I-D.ietf-tokbind-negotiation]
   describe a framework whereby servers can leverage cryptographically-
   bound authentication tokens to verify TLS connections.  This is
   useful for prevention of man-in-the-middle attacks on TLS sessions,
   and provides a mechanism by which identity federation systems can be
   leveraged by a relying party to verify a client based on proof-of-
   possession of a private key.

   Once the use of token binding is negotiated as part of the TLS
   handshake, an application layer message (the Token Binding message)
   may be sent from the client to the relying party whose primary
   purpose is to encapsulate a signature over a value associated with
   the current TLS session (Exported Key Material, i.e. EKM - see
   [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol]).

   Proof-of-possession of a private key is useful to a relying party,
   but the associated signature in the Token Binding message does not
   provide an indication as to how the private key is stored and in what
   kind of environment the associated cryptographic operation takes
   place.  This information may be required by a relying party in order
   to satisfy requirements regarding client platform integrity.
   Therefore, attestations are sometimes required by relying parties in
   order for them to accept signatures from clients.  As per the
   definition in [I-D.birkholz-tuda], "remote attestation describes the
   attempt to determine the integrity and trustworthiness of an endpoint
   -- the attestee -- over a network to another endpoint -- the verifier
   -- without direct access."  Attestation statements are therefore
   widely used in any server verification operation that leverages
   client cryptography.

Mandyam, et al.           Expires April 3, 2017                 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft                TokBindAttest               September 2016

   TLS token binding can therefore be enhanced with remote attestation
   statements.  The attestation statement can be used to augment Token
   Binding message.  Moreover, the attestation may optionally be
   included by the client as part of TLS negotiation
   [I-D.ietf-tokbind-negotiation].  This could be used by a relying
   party for several different purpose, including (1) to determine
   whether to accept token binding messages from the associated client,
   or (2) require an additional mechanism for binding the TLS connection
   to an authentication operation by the client.  In addition, the
   attestation can accompany the token binding message as a separate
   application protocol message.

2.  Attestation Enhancement to TLS Token Binding Negotiation

   [I-D.ietf-tokbind-negotiation] provides the necessary extensions
   tothe TLS handshake that allows for TLS token binding to be
   negotiated as part of any connection.  It is necessary that the TLS
   client and server agree on the parameters that attach to the token
   binding session, and these extensions to TLS messaging make that
   possible.

   A new TLS extension would be defined, "attested token binding", and
   used in the client hello.

             enum {
               attested_token_binding(TBD), (65535)
             } ExtensionType;

   Based on this extension, the "TokenBindingParameters" extension data
   is modified to include attestation:

Mandyam, et al.           Expires April 3, 2017                 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft                TokBindAttest               September 2016

             struct {
               uint8 major;
               uint8 minor;
             } ProtocolVersion;

             enum {
               (255)
             } TokenBindingKeyParameters

             enum {
               packed(0), tpmv1 (1), tpmv2 (2),(255)
             } AttestationType

             struct {
               ProtocolVersion token_binding_version;
               AttestationType token_binding_attestation_type;
               TokenBindingKeyParameters key_parameters_list<1...2^8-1>;
               attestation_length_bytes<1..2^8-1>;
               attestation_data<1..2^(8*attestation_length_bytes)>
             } TokenBindingParameters;

3.  Attestation Enhancement to TLS Token Binding Message

   The attestation statement can be processed 'in-band' as part of the
   Token Binding Message itself.  However, many attestation statements
   include a signature.  Therefore including attestation data as part of
   the Token Binding Message does not appear to provide any discernible
   advantage, while introducing additional complexity in server
   processing of the Token Binding message.  Therefore a new HTTP header
   field is defined to accompany the Sec-Token-Binding header defined in
   [I-D.ietf-tokbind-https]:

          Sec-Token-Binding-Attestation:  <base64url-encoded AttestationData>

   The attestation data itself is determined as:

Mandyam, et al.           Expires April 3, 2017                 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft                TokBindAttest               September 2016

             enum {
               packed(0), tpmv1 (1), tpmv2 (2),(255)
             } AttestationType;
             struct {
               AttestationType token_binding_attestation_type;
               attestation_length_bytes<1..2^8-1>;
               attestation_data<1..2^(8*attestation_length_bytes)>
             } AttestationData;

4.  Attestation Suppression

   It may be desirable to suppress attestation after the initial TLS
   handshake when the attestation is originally sent.  This can be
   desirable if the attestation statement does not change over time.  In
   this case, the TLS extension to be used would be "attested token
   binding with suppression", and would be used in the client hello.

             enum {
               attested_token_binding_suppressed(TBD), (65535)
             } ExtensionType;

   The "TokenBindingParameters" extension data is as defined previously.
   However, after the initial TLS handshake, the Sec-Token-Binding-
   Attestation header will not be sent in ensuing HTTP transactions
   corresponding to this TLS negotiation.

5.  Example - Platform Attestation for Anomaly Detection

   An example of where a platform-based attestation is useful can be for
   remote attestation based on client traffic anomaly detection.  Many
   network infrastructure deployments employ network traffic monitors
   for anomalous pattern detection.  Examples of anomalous patterns
   detectable in the TLS handshake could be unexpected cipher suite
   negotiation for a given source/destination pairing.  In this case, it
   may be desirable for a client-enhanced attestation reflecting for
   instance that an expected offered cipher suite in the client hello
   message is present or the originating browser integrity is intact
   through a hash over the browser application package.  This
   attestation could also be delivered as part of an application-
   encapsulated message, but this attestation may not be available to
   network traffic monitors that cannot decrypt application-layer
   traffic.  Due to the presence of the remote attestation in the client
   hello, a network traffic monitor can verify the attestation and
   potentially emit alerts based on an unexpected attestation.

Mandyam, et al.           Expires April 3, 2017                 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft                TokBindAttest               September 2016

6.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-tokbind-https]
              Popov, A., Nystrom, M., Balfanz, D., Langley, A., and J.
              Hodges, "Token Binding over HTTP", draft-ietf-tokbind-
              https-05 (work in progress), July 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-tokbind-negotiation]
              Popov, A., Nystrom, M., Balfanz, D., and A. Langley,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token
              Binding Protocol Negotiation", draft-ietf-tokbind-
              negotiation-03 (work in progress), July 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol]
              Popov, A., Nystrom, M., Balfanz, D., Langley, A., and J.
              Hodges, "The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0", draft-
              ietf-tokbind-protocol-08 (work in progress), July 2016.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.birkholz-tuda]
              Fuchs, A., Birkholz, H., McDonald, I., and C. Bormann,
              "Time-Based Uni-Directional Attestation", draft-birkholz-
              tuda-02 (work in progress), July 2016.

Authors' Addresses

   Giridhar Mandyam
   Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
   5775 Morehouse Drive
   San Diego, California  92121
   USA

   Phone: +1 858 651 7200
   Email: mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com

Mandyam, et al.           Expires April 3, 2017                 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft                TokBindAttest               September 2016

   Laurence Lundblade
   Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
   5775 Morehouse Drive
   San Diego, California  92121
   USA

   Phone: +1 858 658 3584
   Email: llundbla@qti.qualcomm.com

   Jon Azen
   Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
   5775 Morehouse Drive
   San Diego, California  92121
   USA

   Phone: +1 858 651 9476
   Email: jazen@qti.qualcomm.com

Mandyam, et al.           Expires April 3, 2017                 [Page 7]