Issues with existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing Protocols
draft-manral-rp-existingcrypto-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Vishwas Manral | ||
| Last updated | 2005-07-21 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Routing protocols often use cryptographic mechanisms to authenticate data being received from a neighboring router has not been modified in transit, and actually originated from the nrighboring router purporting to have originating the data. Most of the cryptographic mechanisms rely on hash algorithms applied to the data in the routing protocol packet, which means the data is transported, in the clear, along with the has signature based on the data itself. These mechanisms rely on the manual configuration of the keys used to seed, or build, these hash based sigantures. This document outlines some of the problems with manual keying of these cryptographic algorithms.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)