EAP-based Authentication Service for CoAP
draft-marin-ace-wg-coap-eap-07
ACE Working Group R. Marin
Internet-Draft University of Murcia
Intended status: Standards Track D. Garcia
Expires: July 25, 2021 University of Oviedo
January 21, 2021
EAP-based Authentication Service for CoAP
draft-marin-ace-wg-coap-eap-07
Abstract
This document describes an authentication service that uses EAP
transported by means of CoAP messages with the following purposes:
o Authenticate a CoAP-enabled device that enters a new security
domain against a AAA infrastructure through a domain Controller.
o Bootstrap key material to protect CoAP messages exchanged between
them.
o Enable the establishment of Security Associations between them.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. General Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. General Flow Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. EAP over CoAP: Running an OSCORE Security Association . . 4
3.2. The SeqNum Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Key Derivation for protecting CoAP messages . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Deriving the OSCORE Security Context . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Use Case Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. CoAP as EAP lower-layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. Size of the EAP lower-layer vs EAP method size . . . . . 12
6.3. Controller as the CoAP Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.4. Possible Optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.4.1. Empty Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.4.2. Removing SeqNum Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.4.3. Further re-authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.1. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.2. Cryptographic suite selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.3. Freshness of the key material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. CoAP-EAP with DTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.1. Deriving DTLS_PSK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Introduction
The goal of this document is to describe an authentication service
that uses the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748].
The authentication service is built on top of the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] and allows authenticating two
CoAP endpoints by using EAP without the need of additional protocols
to bootstrap a security association between them.
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