Controlling Actuators with CoAP
draft-mattsson-core-coap-actuators-02

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Last updated 2017-05-31 (latest revision 2016-11-27)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mattsson-core-coap-actuators-02.txt

Abstract

Being able to trust information from sensors and to securely control actuators is essential in a world of connected and networking things interacting with the physical world. In this memo we show that just using COAP with a security protocol like DTLS, TLS, or OSCOAP is not enough. We describe several serious attacks any on-path attacker can do, and discusses tougher requirements and mechanisms to mitigate the attacks. While this document is focused on actuators, one of the attacks applies equally well to sensors using DTLS.

Authors

John Mattsson (john.mattsson@ericsson.com)
John Fornehed (john.fornehed@ericsson.com)
Göran Selander (goran.selander@ericsson.com)
Francesca Palombini (francesca.palombini@ericsson.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)