Controlling Actuators with CoAP
draft-mattsson-core-coap-actuators-03

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2017-10-30
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text xml pdf html bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
Network Working Group                                        J. Mattsson
Internet-Draft                                               J. Fornehed
Intended status: Standards Track                             G. Selander
Expires: May 3, 2018                                        F. Palombini
                                                                Ericsson
                                                              C. Amsuess
                                             Energy Harvesting Solutions
                                                        October 30, 2017

                    Controlling Actuators with CoAP
                 draft-mattsson-core-coap-actuators-03

Abstract

   Being able to trust information from sensors and to securely control
   actuators is essential in a world of connected and networking things
   interacting with the physical world.  In this memo we show that just
   using COAP with a security protocol like DTLS, TLS, or OSCOAP is not
   enough.  We describe several serious attacks any on-path attacker can
   do, and discusses tougher requirements and mechanisms to mitigate the
   attacks.  While this document is focused on actuators, one of the
   attacks applies equally well to sensors using DTLS.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Mattsson, et al.           Expires May 3, 2018                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               CoAP Actuators                 October 2017

   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  The Block Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  The Request Delay Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  The Response Delay and Mismatch Attack  . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.4.  The Relay Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     2.5.  The Request Fragment Rearrangement Attack . . . . . . . .  12
       2.5.1.  Completing an operation with an earlier final block .  13
       2.5.2.  Injecting a withheld first block  . . . . . . . . . .  14
   3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   Being able to trust information from sensors and to securely control
   actuators is essential in a world of connected and networking things
   interacting with the physical world.  One protocol used to interact
   with sensors and actuators is the Constrained Application Protocol
   (CoAP) [RFC7252].  Any Internet-of-Things (IoT) deployment valuing
   security and privacy would use a security protocol such as DTLS
   [RFC6347], TLS [RFC5246], or OSCOAP
   [I-D.selander-ace-object-security] to protect CoAP, where the choice
   of security protocol depends on the transport protocol and the
   presence of intermediaries.  The use of CoAP over UDP and DTLS is
   specified in [RFC6347] and the use of CoAP over TCP and TLS is
   specified in [I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls].  OSCOAP protects CoAP end-
   to-end with the use of COSE [RFC8152] and the CoAP Object-Security
   option [I-D.selander-ace-object-security], and can therefore be used
Show full document text