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Key Exchange Without Forward Secrecy is NOT RECOMMENDED
draft-mattsson-tls-psk-ke-dont-dont-dont-01

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Author John Preuß Mattsson
Last updated 2021-11-19 (Latest revision 2021-05-18)
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Expired & archived
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mattsson-tls-psk-ke-dont-dont-dont-01.txt

Abstract

Key exchange without forward secrecy enables passive monitoring. Massive pervasive monitoring attacks relying on key exchange without forward secrecy has been reported, and many more have likely happened without ever being reported. If key exchange without Diffie-Hellman is used, access to the long-term authentication keys enables a passive attacker to compromise past and future sessions. Entities can get access to long-term key material in different ways: physical attacks, hacking, social engineering attacks, espionage, or by simply demanding access to keying material with or without a court order. psk_ke does not provide forward secrecy and is NOT RECOMMENDED. This document sets the IANA registration of psk_ke to NOT RECOMMENDED.

Authors

John Preuß Mattsson

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)