@techreport{mattsson-tls-psk-ke-dont-dont-dont-05,
    number =    {draft-mattsson-tls-psk-ke-dont-dont-dont-05},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mattsson-tls-psk-ke-dont-dont-dont/05/},
    author =    {John Preuß Mattsson},
    title =     {{NULL Encryption and Key Exchange Without Forward Secrecy are Discouraged}},
    pagetotal = 16,
    year =      2023,
    month =     jan,
    day =       19,
    abstract =  {Massive pervasive monitoring attacks using key exfiltration and made possible by key exchange without forward secrecy have been reported. If key exchange without Diffie-Hellman is used, static exfiltration of the long-term authentication keys enables passive attackers to compromise all past and future connections. Malicious actors can get access to long-term keys in different ways: physical attacks, hacking, social engineering attacks, espionage, or by simply demanding access to keying material with or without a court order. Exfiltration attacks are a major cybersecurity threat. If NULL encryption is used an on-path attacker can read all application data. The use of psk\_ke and NULL encryption are not following zero trust principles of minimizing the impact of breach and governments have already made deadlines for their deprecation. This document evaluates TLS pre-shared key exchange modes, (EC)DHE groups, signature algorithms, and cipher suites and downgrades many entries to "N" and "D" where "D" indicates that the entries are "Discouraged".},
}