Preventing cross-protocol attacks on the TLS protocol
draft-mavrogiannopoulos-tls-cross-protocol-03
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos , Bart Preneel | ||
| Last updated | 2013-05-13 (Latest revision 2012-11-09) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This memo proposes a fix in the TLS key exchange signature generation to prevent cross-protocol attacks.
Authors
Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Bart Preneel
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)