Preventing cross-protocol attacks in TLS protocol
draft-mavrogiannopoulos-tls-server-key-exchage-00
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2012-11-17 (latest revision 2012-05-16) | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of
the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mavrogiannopoulos-tls-server-key-exchage-00.txt
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mavrogiannopoulos-tls-server-key-exchage-00.txt
Abstract
This memo proposes a fix in the TLS ServerKeyExchange message signature, to prevent cross-protocol attacks.
Authors
Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos (nikos.mavrogiannopoulos@esat.kuleuven.be)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)