Encrypted Key Transport for Secure RTP
draft-mcgrew-srtp-ekt-06
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | David McGrew , Flemming Andreasen , Dan Wing , Lakshminath R. Dondeti | ||
| Last updated | 2009-10-26 | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-avt-srtp-ekt | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-avt-srtp-ekt | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
SRTP Encrypted Key Transport (EKT) is an extension to SRTP that provides for the secure transport of SRTP master keys, Rollover Counters, and other information, within SRTP or SRTCP. This facility enables SRTP to work for decentralized conferences with minimal control, and to handle situations caused by early media. This note defines EKT, and also describes how to use it with SDP Security Descriptions, DTLS-SRTP Key Transport (KTR), and MIKEY. These other key management protocols provide an EKT key to everyone in a session, and EKT coordinates the keys within the session.
Authors
David McGrew
Flemming Andreasen
Dan Wing
Lakshminath R. Dondeti
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)