Client ID Metadata Document Software Statement
draft-mcguinness-oauth-cimd-sw-stmt-01
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Karl McGuinness | ||
| Last updated | 2026-11-02 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
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| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-mcguinness-oauth-cimd-sw-stmt-01
Web Authorization Protocol K. McGuinness
Internet-Draft Independent
Intended status: Standards Track 2 November 2026
Expires: 6 May 2027
Client ID Metadata Document Software Statement
draft-mcguinness-oauth-cimd-sw-stmt-01
Abstract
This specification defines a software statement in which a trusted
party records its review of the exact octets of a client's Client ID
Metadata Document (CIMD), and how an authorization server enforces
that review when it admits the client at request time, without a
registration. A CIMD carries the client's own metadata, which can
change at any time, and a statement binds the review to one version
of the document by its digest. The client presents the statement in
a token or pushed authorization request, or publishes it where its
document points. The authorization server accepts a statement only
from an issuer it trusts, and also binds the presenter to the
reviewed document, although for a public client that binding does not
hold against a party that controls the user agent. Independently
operated authorization servers can consume the same review, each
under its own trust configuration and admission policy.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. The Software Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Metadata Digest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Validating a Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Issuer Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. Multi-Tenant Issuers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Runtime Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. Admission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2. Reviewed Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.3. Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.4. Presentation Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.4.1. Token Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.4.2. Authorization Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.5. Pulled Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.5.1. Retrieval and Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.5.2. Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.6. Sender Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.6.1. Confidential Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.6.2. Public Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.6.3. Review-Only Presentations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.7. Grant Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.7.1. Refresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6. Error Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.1. Statement Required Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.2. Presentation Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.3. Code Redemption and Refresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.4. Authorization Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.5. Proof Mechanism Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.6. Error Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.1. Presenting at the Token Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.2. Publishing a Statement for Servers to Pull . . . . . . . 26
7.3. Statement Header and Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8. Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9. Extension Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
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10. Relationship to Other Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10.1. Client Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10.2. Identity Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
10.3. OpenID Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11.1. Caching and Reuse of Retrieved Content . . . . . . . . . 29
11.2. Retrieval and Processing Bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11.3. Bounding Establishments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
11.4. User Interface, Audit, and Logging . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
12.1. Configuring Issuer Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
12.2. Audience and Tenant Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
12.3. Statement Lifetime and Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
13.1. Assurance Provided by a Statement . . . . . . . . . . . 32
13.2. Statement Theft and Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
13.3. Servers That Do Not Implement This Specification . . . . 34
13.4. Copied Statements and Public Clients . . . . . . . . . . 34
13.5. Tenant Confusion at a Multi-Tenant Authorization
Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
13.6. External Retrieval and Resource Exhaustion . . . . . . . 35
13.7. Expiry and Open Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
13.8. Observable State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
14. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
15.1. OAuth Parameters Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
15.2. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
15.3. JSON Web Token Claims Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
15.4. OAuth Extensions Error Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
15.5. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registry . . 39
15.6. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registry . . . . . . 39
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1. Introduction
A Client ID Metadata Document (CIMD) [CIMD] lets a client publish its
metadata and identify itself by the document's URL without prior
registration. Section 4.3 of [CIMD] permits software statements as
an independent signal, but defines no profile binding a review to a
particular document version or specifying how that review governs
admission.
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This specification supplies that profile using the software statement
of Section 2.3 of [RFC7591]. A statement names the client by its
document URL and binds the review to the document's exact octets by a
digest (Section 3.1). Independently operated authorization servers
can enforce the same review at request time without creating
registrations (Section 5). Each server chooses which issuers to
trust and for which clients and tenants (Section 4). A portable
review does not imply universal acceptance.
This specification serves deployments in which a party other than the
client decides which software can connect. For example, a
marketplace or registry can vouch for software at authorization
servers it does not operate, and an enterprise can approve a hosted
client for use at services run by other operators. Allowlisting its
CIMD URL identifies the client but does not record which metadata was
reviewed. The document can change while the URL stays the same. The
statement carries that review across operators. This specification
also serves server-hosted software, such as an agent using
client_credentials. Admission grants no access to resources: the
authorization server's policy, and the resource owner's authorization
where a grant involves one, still govern what it issues.
A statement records approval of a client configuration, not of the
software's code or behavior (Section 13.1). Possession of a
statement admits nothing by itself. The authorization server binds
the presenter to the reviewed document (Section 5.6), although for a
public client that binding does not hold against a party that
controls the user agent (Section 13.4). A statement for a native
application with a redirection URI another application on the same
device could claim is review-only: it counts for nothing in admission
(Section 5.6.3).
Under this specification, an authorization server checks a statement
only when a grant is opened. A statement's expiry ends no grant
already opened, and an earlier statement that has not expired remains
acceptable after a later one is issued (Section 13.7). Withdrawal
and supersession of statements, and refresh rules that follow later
reviews, are left to extensions (Section 9). This specification does
not define how a client obtains a statement, or how an authorization
server consumes one in an [RFC7591] registration request. Section 10
relates this specification to other work.
1.1. Protocol Overview
The following non-normative sequence summarizes runtime admission
(Section 5.1):
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1. An issuer reviews a client's CIMD and issues a statement whose
sub claim is the document's URL and whose cimd_digest claim is
the digest of the document's exact octets (Section 3).
2. Using its CIMD URL as client_id, the client presents the
statement in a token request or, for a redirect flow, a pushed
authorization request (Section 5.4). A client can instead
publish its statements at the software_statements_uri its
document names, for an authorization server that supports pulled
statements to retrieve (Section 5.5).
3. The authorization server verifies the statement's signature and
claims against its trust configuration for the issuer
(Section 3.2, Section 4), retrieves the document, and compares
the document's digest with the statement's (Section 5.2).
4. The authorization server binds the presenter to the reviewed
document, in the request or at code redemption. A confidential
client authenticates with a key the document carries, and a
public client uses PKCE and binds a key in the request
(Section 5.6). A request whose presenter cannot be bound is
rejected, except in the cases Section 5.6.3 defines, such as a
document with a redirection URI another application on the same
device could claim. A review-only statement admits nothing on
the strength of the review: unless Section 5.6 rejects the
presentation, the request proceeds as one presenting no
statement, and no establishment is created.
5. When the binding succeeds, the request proceeds under the
reviewed document's metadata, without a registration. The
authorization server records the state the grant depends on,
including the proven key, as an establishment, and checks that
key again on refresh (Section 5.7).
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This specification uses terminology from [RFC6749] (OAuth), [RFC7591]
(client metadata and software statements), and [CIMD] (Client ID
Metadata Documents).
This specification defines the following terms.
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Trusting Authorization Server: An authorization server that consumes
a software statement of this profile.
Runtime Presentation: The consumption of a validated software
statement presented in a token request or pushed authorization
request, or pulled from where the client's document points
(Section 5.5), without creating a client registration.
Admission: A trusting authorization server's acceptance of a client
for a request, either on a valid statement (Section 5.1), after
which the reviewed metadata governs its requests, or under the
server's policy for CIMD clients it has not reviewed.
Establishment: The state a successful runtime presentation creates
for the grant it opens, enumerated in Section 5.7.
Proven Key: The key an establishment is bound to: the key whose
possession the presenter proves during runtime presentation
(Section 5.6), the key it binds under Section 5.6.2, or, for a
statement pulled at the authorization endpoint, the key proved at
code redemption (Section 5.5.2).
Permitted Method: A token endpoint authentication method that a CIMD
lists in its token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported member or, if
the document has no such member, declares in its
token_endpoint_auth_method member. A document with neither member
permits only none (Section 5 of [CIMD]).
Selected Method: The permitted method an establishment records
(Section 5.7): the method with which a confidential client's
presenter authenticates, at code redemption for a statement pulled
at the authorization endpoint (Section 5.5.2), or none for a
public client.
Effective Expiry: The earlier of a statement's exp and its iat plus
the maximum statement lifetime the trusting authorization server
honors for its issuer (Section 4). A statement is expired once
its effective expiry has passed.
Required Issuer: An issuer whose current statement a trusting
authorization server requires in one of its tenants for software
in configured client identifier namespaces (Section 4).
Current Statement: A statement whose effective expiry has not passed
and that no extension the server implements has ended. A current
statement need not be the most recently issued one: an earlier
statement for the same software remains current after a later one
is issued (Section 13.7).
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Review-Only: Describes a presentation, or a pulled statement, that
the authorization server evaluates but whose statement counts for
nothing in admission (Section 5.6.3).
Tenant: A partition of an authorization server's configuration and
issued tokens, such as one customer's. Section 3.2 says how the
authorization server determines a request's tenant.
3. The Software Statement
The software statement is a compact JWT [RFC7519] protected by JWS
[RFC7515]. Although [RFC7591] permits a MAC, a statement issued
under this specification MUST use an asymmetric digital signature,
and the none algorithm and symmetric algorithms MUST NOT be used.
Issuers and trusting authorization servers follow [RFC8725].
The JOSE header MUST include the kid header parameter, identifying
the signing key in the issuer's statement key set (Section 4), and
the typ header parameter with the value software-statement+jwt
(Section 3.11 of [RFC8725]). An incompatible revision would use a
new typ value.
A statement asserts that its issuer evaluated the CIMD whose content
the digest identifies, and vouches for that document. The JWT
payload contains the following claims.
iss: REQUIRED. The issuer's identifier, a URL using the https
scheme with no query or fragment component. For an issuer that is
an authorization server, it is its issuer identifier as defined by
[RFC8414].
sub: REQUIRED. The exact client identifier URL of the CIMD the
issuer reviewed.
aud: OPTIONAL. One or more authorization server issuer identifiers
([RFC8414]) restricting which authorization servers can accept the
statement. If the claim is absent, any authorization server that
trusts the issuer for the subject can accept it (Section 4).
aud_tenant: OPTIONAL. A tenant identifier at a trusting
authorization server, as [IDJAG] defines the claim, naming the
tenant in which the statement's decision applies. A statement
whose decision is confined to one of a server's tenants MUST carry
an aud claim naming exactly one authorization server. It MUST
also carry an aud_tenant claim naming the tenant, unless the
issuer and that server have agreed that the server's trust
configuration confines the issuer to the tenant (Section 4).
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The absence of aud_tenant does not mean that the statement applies
in every tenant (Section 12.2).
statement_uses: OPTIONAL. A JSON array identifying the permitted
uses of the statement: registration ([REGISTRATION]) and
presentation (Section 5). If the claim is absent, only
presentation is permitted. A server ignores a value it does not
recognize, and an empty array permits no use. A pulled statement
(Section 5.5) is a presentation use.
iat: REQUIRED. A NumericDate value, which MUST be an integer,
giving the time the statement was issued. An issuer MUST ensure
that the iat claim values of its statements for a given iss and
sub increase strictly, which the selection of a pulled statement
(Section 5.5.1) and extensions rely on.
exp: REQUIRED. A NumericDate value, which MUST be an integer,
giving the expiration time.
jti: REQUIRED. A unique identifier for the statement within the
issuer's namespace.
cimd_digest: REQUIRED. The metadata digest (Section 3.1) of the
CIMD the issuer evaluated.
Profiles and extensions can define further claims.
A statement issued under this specification MUST NOT contain a claim
named in the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata"
registry, and a trusting authorization server MUST NOT take client
metadata from a statement's claims.
A CIMD can carry a software_statement member (Section 4.3 of [CIMD]).
A trusting authorization server MUST NOT consume a statement of this
profile from that member, and MUST NOT treat that member as
satisfying any requirement of this specification. A statement inside
the document could not name the document's digest, because it would
be part of the octets it digests, so this specification carries
statements in requests (Section 5.4) or at a separate location
(Section 5.5). Statements of other kinds in the member are out of
scope for this specification.
An authorization server implementing this specification MUST reject a
statement of this profile in an [RFC7591] registration request with
the unapproved_software_statement error code (Section 3.2.2 of
[RFC7591]), unless an extension it implements defines consumption of
the statement at registration (Section 9). Section 13.3 explains
why.
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3.1. Metadata Digest
The metadata digest is the SHA-256 hash [RFC6234] of the retrieved
representation body after removal of content coding, base64url-
encoded without padding (Section 2 of [RFC7515]). The body is not
transcoded, normalized, or re-serialized. Any byte order mark or
trailing newline is included.
Retrieval for digest purposes follows [CIMD] and MUST NOT use content
negotiation: the retrieving party sends Accept: application/json
(Section 6 of [CIMD]) and no other variant selection. Equal digests
show that the issuer and the trusting authorization server obtained
the same octets, so any condition that makes retrieval depend on who
is asking defeats the comparison.
A 304 Not Modified response shows that stored octets, and their
digest, are still current only if it carries a strong entity tag that
matches the one stored with them under strong comparison
(Section 8.8.3.2 of [RFC9110]). Otherwise, the server retrieves the
body again.
3.2. Validating a Statement
Before accepting a statement, a trusting authorization server MUST
ensure the following:
* The typ JOSE header parameter has the value software-
statement+jwt, and the kid header parameter is present.
* The signature verifies under a key trusted for the exact iss
value, obtained as Section 4 requires.
* Every required claim of Section 3 is present and of the correct
type.
* The statement is not expired, and its iat is not unreasonably far
in the future according to the server's clock-skew policy.
* If the statement carries nbf, the current time is not before it,
according to the same clock-skew policy (Section 4.1.5 of
[RFC7519]).
* If the statement carries aud, a value in it exactly matches one of
the server's issuer identifiers that its trust configuration
permits the statement's issuer to name (Section 4).
* If the statement carries aud_tenant, aud carries exactly one value
and aud_tenant identifies the request's tenant.
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* If the server requires a tenant-scoped decision for the request,
the statement carries aud_tenant, or the server's trust
configuration confines the statement's issuer to the request's
tenant (Section 4).
* If the server's trust configuration confines the statement's
issuer to a tenant, the statement carries an aud claim with
exactly one value, and the request belongs to that tenant.
* The use being made of the statement is one its statement_uses
claim permits (Section 3).
* The sub claim is a client identifier URL conforming to [CIMD] and
falls within the client identifier namespaces for which this
server accepts the issuer (Section 4).
* Any claim the server does not recognize, and any client metadata
claim (Section 3), is ignored.
* The JWT validation guidance in [RFC8725] has been applied.
A trusting authorization server that hosts more than one tenant MUST
evaluate every tenant-specific check, such as an aud value that
identifies one of its tenants, the aud_tenant claim, and a required
issuer (Section 4), against the request's tenant. The request's
tenant is the tenant that scopes what the server issues on the
statement. The server MUST determine it before evaluating the
statement, by its own means or from a signed assertion it has
validated, and otherwise never from a request parameter, statement
claim, or document member the client supplies.
Rejections outside a registration endpoint use Section 6.
4. Issuer Trust
A trusting authorization server MUST derive issuer trust from its
trust configuration, which is established out of band, and MUST NOT
derive it from an iss, jku, x5u, or other key-location value carried
in a statement. This specification defines no in-band issuer
discovery or trust decision.
For each trusted issuer, the configuration records at least the
following:
* The exact iss value the server accepts.
* The signing algorithms it accepts from the issuer.
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* The client identifier namespaces the issuer can attest through
sub.
* The authorization server issuer identifiers the issuer can name in
aud.
* Any tenant to which the server confines the issuer's decisions.
* The maximum statement lifetime the server honors, which sets each
statement's effective expiry.
A client identifier namespace is an https URL with no query or
fragment whose path ends in /, such as https://client.example/ or
https://client.example/apps/. A client identifier URL falls within a
namespace if the namespace is a prefix of it under simple string
comparison (Section 6.2.1 of [RFC3986]).
The issuer's statement key set is the JWK Set at the
software_statement_jwks_uri in its authorization server metadata
(Section 8), discovered from the configured iss ([RFC8414]). For an
issuer that is not an authorization server, it is the JWK Set at a
statement key set URL in the configuration. It is never the JWK Set
at a jwks_uri metadata value. Its URL MUST use the https scheme, and
a trusting authorization server MUST validate the certificate of the
host serving it. The issuer MUST NOT publish a key of its statement
key set in any other JWK Set, or sign anything other than statements
under this specification with those keys. A trusting authorization
server reuses a retrieved statement key set only as Section 5.3
permits.
The configuration can also make an issuer a required issuer for
client identifier namespaces in one of the server's tenants
(Section 12.1). The server then MUST NOT admit software in a covered
namespace in that tenant without a current statement from the
required issuer, whatever its policy for CIMD clients it has not
reviewed. Without this rule, a holder could evade the required
issuer's decision by withholding that issuer's statement or by
presenting or publishing only a broader one, such as a marketplace
listing. A required issuer configured for software whose document
makes every presentation review-only (item 1 of Section 5.6.3)
excludes that software from the tenant, and the server rejects a
request for such software there.
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4.1. Multi-Tenant Issuers
If an issuer reviews software for several customers whose decisions
are each trusted independently, it MUST issue under a distinct iss
value for each customer, so that each customer's decisions, and any
state a server keeps per iss value, stay separate.
5. Runtime Presentation
An authorization server that admits clients at request time under
this specification MUST support statements presented in requests
(Section 5.4). Support for pulled statements (Section 5.5) is
optional, and a server advertises it with the
software_statement_pull_supported metadata value (Section 8). A
server that consumes statements only to create or renew registrations
([REGISTRATION]) need not support runtime presentation.
5.1. Admission
For a runtime presentation, the authorization server proceeds as
follows, rejecting at the first failure (Section 6):
1. Obtain the statement, presented in the request (Section 5.4) or
pulled (Section 5.5).
2. Validate the statement (Section 3.2), completing every check that
needs no client-controlled retrieval before any such retrieval
(Section 5.3).
3. Verify the client_id rule of Section 5.4.
4. Resolve the reviewed document and compare its digest
(Section 5.2). A server that proceeds without the statement on a
mismatch ends admission on the statement here.
5. Apply Section 5.6 to that document, verifying the sender
constraint unless the statement is review-only (Section 5.6.3).
If Section 5.6 or Section 5.5.2 defers the proof to code
redemption, the server verifies it there.
6. Evaluate the request against the reviewed metadata (Section 5.2).
7. Create the establishment (Section 5.7), unless the statement is
review-only (Section 5.6.3).
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5.2. Reviewed Metadata
Having validated the statement, and before verifying the proof
(Section 5.1), the authorization server MUST obtain the CIMD at the
statement's sub, only by retrieval or from octets it has already
digested for that identifier (Section 5.3), and compare its digest
with the cimd_digest claim. If octets it already holds do not match,
it retrieves the document once more before treating the mismatch as a
change.
A match means the served document is the reviewed one, and its
members are the client's metadata for the request. The server takes
those members from the octets whose digest matched, not from another
retrieval or a copy it has not digested. A mismatch means the
document changed after review, and the authorization server MUST NOT
treat the changed document as reviewed. It rejects the presentation
or, by local policy, proceeds without the statement. If it proceeds,
it applies its policy for CIMD clients it has not reviewed to the
current document and creates no establishment for the statement.
A trusting authorization server MUST reject a reviewed document
containing duplicate object member names (Section 4 of [RFC8259]),
wherever it resolves one. Parsers interpret such names differently
despite an identical digest.
The request is evaluated against the reviewed metadata as against any
client's registered metadata ([RFC6749], [CIMD]): any requested grant
type, response type, or scope MUST fall within it. A document that
omits scope sets no ceiling on scope beyond the server's own policy.
Omitted grant_types and response_types members take their [RFC7591]
defaults.
5.3. Retrieval
Every retrieval this specification causes inherits the server-side
request forgery protections in Section 10.7 of [CIMD], whether of the
CIMD, a jwks_uri it names, the statements its software_statements_uri
names, or a statement key set or the issuer metadata that locates one
(Section 4). A trusted signature does not make a URL safe: the
authorization server MUST apply its URL, redirect, address-range,
transport, and content-type policy independently to every referenced
location.
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If a retrieval fails, the authorization server MUST reject the
request and MUST NOT fall back to a weaker proof. The exception is a
failed pull of statements, or a failed retrieval of a statement key
set (Section 4) needed to verify a pulled statement, for a request
opening a new grant: that failure does not by itself reject the
request, which proceeds as Section 5.5.1 describes.
A retrieval does not complete if it times out, its connection fails,
or the response has a 429 (Too Many Requests) status code (Section 4
of [RFC6585]) or a 5xx status code. Any other failure to obtain an
acceptable representation is final, such as another 4xx status code,
a body that is not a JSON object, or a response exceeding the
server's configured size bound (Section 10.11 of [CIMD]), which the
authorization server MUST treat as a failure rather than digesting
what it read. After a final failure, a document is treated as
failing validation, a key set as carrying no acceptable key, and a
statements location as publishing no statement. For the document, a
retrieval that does not complete is a transient failure and a final
failure is a terminal failure (Section 6.1 of [CIMD]).
A trusting authorization server MAY reuse document octets it holds
for digest comparison (Section 5.2), a key set retrieved from a
document's jwks_uri, and a statement key set from either source
(Section 4), only within ordinary HTTP caching bounds and a maximum
reuse period of its own choosing. It MUST NOT let the publisher's
cache directives alone (the client's for the document and its key
set, the issuer's for a statement key set) determine how long held
octets continue to match a statement or a removed key continues to
verify (Section 13.2). Without this rule, a key the document carries
inline would continue to verify after the publisher removes it.
5.4. Presentation Request
A client presents a software statement by including the following
parameter in a token request or a pushed authorization request:
software_statement: REQUIRED for a presentation made in a request.
The software statement (Section 3). It is consumed as a runtime
presentation or in a role defined by an extension the server
implements. On refresh-token use under an establishment, a server
ignores the parameter unless an extension it implements defines
its role there. A request carrying the parameter in any other
role is rejected.
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A request making a runtime presentation MUST include the client_id
parameter, even if the client authenticates, and its value, the
client's CIMD URL, MUST exactly equal the statement's sub claim. The
authorization server MUST reject a request that omits the parameter
or carries another value. The effective client_id is the statement's
sub, and the authorization server assigns none.
An authorization server that does not implement this specification
ignores the parameter (Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of [RFC6749]).
5.4.1. Token Endpoint
At the token endpoint, a runtime presentation is valid on a request
that opens a new grant in that request, such as one using the
client_credentials grant, the JWT or SAML 2.0 assertion grant
(Section 2.1 of [RFC7523] and Section 2.1 of [RFC7522]), or token
exchange [RFC8693].
It is not valid on a request that continues or completes a grant an
earlier request began, such as authorization-code redemption,
refresh-token use (Section 5.7, Section 5.7.1), or redemption of a
device code [RFC8628]. Admission belongs to the request that begins
the grant, before the resource owner approves the client.
5.4.2. Authorization Endpoint
Presentation in an authorization request MUST use a pushed
authorization request [RFC9126]. The subsequent authorization
request MUST use a client_id parameter exactly equal to the
establishment's sub and MUST NOT include the software_statement
parameter. A pulled statement needs no pushed authorization request
(Section 5.5).
5.5. Pulled Statements
A client can publish its statements at a URL its document names
instead of presenting one. When a client opening a new grant
presents no statement, at the token endpoint, the pushed
authorization request endpoint, or the authorization endpoint, an
authorization server that supports pulled statements MAY retrieve
them. Admission then follows Section 5.1, except that:
* The server chooses the statement (Section 5.5.1).
* If the pull yields no usable statement, the request proceeds as if
the client had presented none (Section 5.5.1).
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* A pulled statement is review-only in the cases Section 5.5.2
identifies.
This specification defines the following client metadata member:
software_statements_uri: OPTIONAL. URL, in a CIMD, at which the
client publishes software statements about itself. The member has
no meaning in a registration request. The URL MUST use the https
scheme. A request to it returns, with a JSON media type such as
application/json, a JSON object whose software_statements member
is an array of statements (Section 3), each a string in JWS
compact serialization. The metadata digest covers this member
(Section 3.1).
An authorization server advertises support through
software_statement_pull_supported (Section 8).
5.5.1. Retrieval and Selection
In retrieving the software_statements_uri, the authorization server:
* MUST send a GET request with Accept: application/json.
* MUST NOT automatically follow redirects.
* MUST accept a new representation only from a 200 response with a
JSON media type, and can instead reuse a stored representation
that a 304 Not Modified response revalidates (Section 15.4.5 of
[RFC9110]).
The document and this URL are necessarily retrieved before any
statement is validated, so the ordering of step 2 of Section 5.1
applies only to the retrievals that follow.
The server considers only statements that meet all of the following
conditions, and ignores the rest:
* The sub claim equals the document's client identifier.
* The statement validates under Section 3.2.
* The cimd_digest claim equals the digest of the document the server
resolved.
If the server's trust configuration requires an issuer for this
client (Section 4), the server also ignores statements from any other
issuer. If more than one statement remains, it applies the most
recently issued statement from an issuer of its choice.
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Having selected a statement, the server continues from step 5 of
Section 5.1, with the document already resolved. The selection
satisfies the client_id rule of step 3.
If retrieving the statements does not complete or no statement
remains, the server applies its policy for CIMD clients it has not
reviewed, subject to any required issuer (Section 4), and rejects the
request if that policy or a required issuer requires reviewed
software.
5.5.2. Binding
Unless the reviewed document's redirection URIs make it review-only
(Section 5.6.3), a pulled statement is bound to the presenter as a
presented statement is (Section 5.6), at the point the following
table shows:
+===============+===================+===============================+
| Where the | Confidential | Public client |
| statement is | client | |
| pulled | | |
+===============+===================+===============================+
| Token | The request's | Review-only |
| endpoint, | client | |
| opening a new | authentication | |
| grant | | |
+---------------+-------------------+-------------------------------+
| Pushed | The request's | PKCE with S256 and a key |
| authorization | client | bound through a DPoP |
| request | authentication | proof or dpop_jkt, as |
| endpoint | | Section 5.6.2 requires. |
| | | Otherwise review-only |
+---------------+-------------------+-------------------------------+
| Authorization | Client | PKCE with S256 and a key |
| endpoint | authentication at | bound through dpop_jkt, |
| | code redemption, | as Section 5.6.2 |
| | before any token | requires, which |
| | is issued | redemption then proves. |
| | | Otherwise review-only |
+---------------+-------------------+-------------------------------+
Table 1
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At code redemption, a confidential client whose statement was pulled
at the authorization endpoint authenticates with a key the reviewed
document carries, in its jwks or at its jwks_uri within the reuse
bounds of Section 5.3, not one that only a later retrieval of the
document carries, and that key becomes the establishment's proven
key. The method with which the client authenticates becomes the
establishment's Selected Method.
5.6. Sender Constraint
A runtime presentation that is not review-only (Section 5.6.3) MUST
be sender-constrained under one of two models:
* Confidential client: by a key the reviewed document carries
(Section 5.6.1).
* Public client: by an installation key the presenter binds
(Section 5.6.2), while its reviewed redirection URIs, with PKCE
S256, bind the presentation itself (Section 13.4).
The authorization server determines the model from the reviewed
document's permitted methods that it supports and its policy allows,
not from the request. It MUST apply the confidential-client model if
those methods include one other than none, and otherwise applies the
public-client model if they include none. If they include neither,
Section 5 of [CIMD] applies. A document sets one model at a server.
Components of one piece of software that differ in client type, such
as a backend that holds a key and a desktop application that does
not, therefore each use their own CIMD (Section 2.1 of [RFC6749]).
For a presentation that is not review-only, under either model:
* The presenter proves possession of the key its model requires
through the applicable client authentication method or a DPoP
proof [RFC9449]. A public client that binds its key through
dpop_jkt proves possession at code redemption (Section 5.7). If a
confidential client's request carries both client authentication
and a DPoP proof, the key its client authentication proves is the
proven key.
* The proof MUST be bound to the current request and validated with
the replay protections of that mechanism.
* A confidential client's presenter MUST authenticate with a
permitted method other than none that the server supports and its
policy allows, and that method is the establishment's Selected
Method. A public client's Selected Method is none.
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* The authorization server MUST reject a presentation without such a
proof or, for a confidential client, whose proven key the reviewed
document does not carry.
5.6.1. Confidential Clients
For a confidential client's presentation that is not review-only, the
proven key MUST appear in the jwks or at the jwks_uri of the reviewed
document (Section 5.2). A key appears there if the document's jwks,
or the JWK Set at its jwks_uri, contains a key with the same JWK
Thumbprint ([RFC7638]), computed with SHA-256. The comparison covers
key material only: the key's algorithm and intended use are checked
as the client authentication method requires. The same comparison
applies wherever this specification asks whether a document carries a
key. Methods that prove possession of a key the document carries,
such as private_key_jwt (Section 5 of [CIMD]) and
self_signed_tls_client_auth (Section 2.2 of [RFC8705]), satisfy this
directly.
5.6.2. Public Clients
Software distributed to end users cannot hold a key its reviewed
document carries: a key shipped in every copy identifies the
software, not the installation. Such a document permits none and
carries no key material.
An authorization server MUST reject a presentation made in a request,
even a review-only one, that opens a new grant at the token endpoint
(Section 5.4.1) from a public client. Such a presentation opens no
redirect and has nothing to bind it. Section 5.5.2 covers a pulled
statement.
For a public client's presentation that is not review-only, made or
pulled at the pushed authorization request endpoint, or pulled at the
authorization endpoint (Section 5.5.2), the authorization server:
* MUST require PKCE [RFC7636] with the S256 method.
* MUST require the presenter to bind a key it holds, through the
dpop_jkt parameter or, at the pushed authorization request
endpoint, a DPoP proof (Section 10.1 of [RFC9449]), and records
that key as the proven key of the establishment (Section 5.7).
* MUST NOT require that key to appear in the reviewed document.
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5.6.3. Review-Only Presentations
The following are review-only:
1. Every presentation and pulled statement for a reviewed document
that carries any redirection URI another application on the same
device could claim, whatever methods the document permits. Such
a URI is a non-https URI, such as a private-use scheme or an http
loopback redirection URI (Sections 7.1 and 7.3 of [RFC8252]), or
an https URI whose host is a loopback address, localhost, or a
name ending in .localhost (Section 6.3 of [RFC6761]), ignoring
case and a trailing dot. The application that claims such a URI
receives the code, so neither the reviewed redirection URIs nor a
key shipped in every copy of the software can bind the presenter.
2. A pulled statement that Section 5.5.2 makes review-only.
A review-only presentation or pulled statement creates no
establishment, and its statement MUST NOT satisfy a policy requiring
reviewed software: the authorization server proceeds as it would for
the same CIMD client presenting no statement, though it can record
the statement's issuer for audit (Section 11.4).
5.7. Grant Binding
A successful presentation creates an establishment: the state against
which the subsequent authorization request, code redemption, and
refresh under the grant it opens are checked. It comprises the
following:
* The validated sub.
* The statement identity (its iss and jti), its iat and effective
expiry, and any claim an extension uses to locate the statement.
* The authorization server's own tenant the grant was opened for, if
it hosts more than one.
* The reviewed metadata and the digest it matched (Section 5.2).
* The issuer trust decision.
* The Selected Method, the sender-constraint mechanism, and the
proven key.
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The authorization server MUST bind the resulting request_uri,
authorization code, refresh token, and other grant continuation state
to the establishment, as applicable. An establishment ends once no
continuation state bound to it remains usable.
A token request that redeems an authorization code bound to an
establishment:
* MUST have a client_id parameter exactly equal to the
establishment's sub, even if the client authenticates.
* MUST be made in the tenant the establishment records, if the
authorization server hosts more than one tenant (Section 3.2).
* MUST demonstrate possession of the establishment's proven key
under the same sender-constraint mechanism or, for a confidential
client whose statement was pulled at the authorization endpoint
(Section 5.5.2), authenticate with the key that becomes the proven
key.
* MUST NOT carry the software_statement parameter.
A redemption that carries a statement, has a wrong client identifier,
is made in another tenant, or fails the key binding is rejected.
5.7.1. Refresh
On refresh-token use under an establishment, the authorization
server:
* MUST verify that the request is made in the tenant the
establishment records, if it hosts more than one tenant.
* MUST verify possession of the establishment's proven key under the
same sender-constraint mechanism.
* MUST, except for an establishment created under Section 5.6.2,
verify that the document currently served at the establishment's
sub still carries that key, in its jwks or at its jwks_uri, within
the reuse bounds of Section 5.3.
If any of these checks fails, the server rejects the refresh. The
refreshed access MUST fall within the establishment's reviewed
metadata.
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Under this specification, refresh evaluates no statement
(Section 13.7) and never changes the establishment's proven key or
reviewed metadata. A client that needs a different key or review
opens a new grant by presentation. An extension can instead provide
for replacing the review on refresh.
6. Error Responses
A rejection uses the error response and HTTP status codes of its
endpoint: Section 5.2 of [RFC6749] at the token endpoint, Section 2.3
of [RFC9126] at the pushed authorization request endpoint, and
Section 4.1.2.1 of [RFC6749] at the authorization endpoint.
A rejection for a reason this specification defines uses the first of
the following error codes that applies:
1. invalid_request, if the request carries the software_statement
parameter in a role Section 5.4 does not permit.
2. temporarily_unavailable, if a retrieval the request needs did not
complete (Section 5.3), including a pull of statements
(Section 5.5) or the retrieval of a statement key set needed to
verify a pulled statement.
3. The code that Section 6.2, Section 6.3, or Section 6.4 assigns.
At the token and pushed authorization request endpoints, an
authorization server MUST respond with HTTP status code 503 to a
request it rejects with the temporarily_unavailable error code, as
Section 6.1 of [CIMD] requires for a transient failure to retrieve
the document.
A rejection for another reason, such as an assertion grant whose
assertion is invalid (Section 3.1 of [RFC7523]) or an expired or
revoked refresh token, uses the error code its grant or endpoint
assigns. An extension assigns codes to the rejections it defines.
6.1. Statement Required Error
This specification defines the following error code:
statement_required: A current software statement is required and
none was presented or pulled, or the one presented or pulled is
expired and otherwise valid. An extension can assign it to
further cases. The client recovers by obtaining a current
statement, from the required issuer if the tenant has one
(Section 4).
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6.2. Presentation Requests
A presentation at the token or pushed authorization request endpoint
is rejected with the following error codes:
invalid_client: Any of the following:
* The statement is malformed or fails validation (Section 3.2)
for a reason other than expiry.
* The request's client_id differs from the statement's sub
(Section 5.4).
* The request fails the sender constraint (Section 5.6),
including a presentation opening a new grant at the token
endpoint for a public client (Section 5.6.2).
* The reviewed document cannot be obtained, including over the
size bound, fails validation as [CIMD] requires, contains
duplicate member names (Section 5.2), or does not match and the
server does not proceed without the statement (Section 5.2).
* The bound on establishments is reached (Section 11.3).
statement_required: Expiry is the statement's only validation
failure (Section 6.1), or a required statement is absent,
including one from an issuer required for the tenant (Section 4).
unauthorized_client: Any of the following, in place of
statement_required if both apply at the step of Section 5.1 where
the server rejects the request:
* The request exceeds the reviewed document's grant types or
response types (Section 5.2).
* The document carries metadata this server's policy refuses.
* The client's statement is review-only where policy or a
required issuer requires reviewed software (Section 5.6.3).
* The request is for software a required issuer excludes from the
tenant (Section 4).
invalid_scope: The request exceeds the reviewed document's scope
(Section 5.2), or the document carries a scope this server's
policy refuses.
invalid_request: The request omits client_id (Section 5.4).
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6.3. Code Redemption and Refresh
Under an establishment, code redemption (Section 5.7) is rejected
with the following error codes:
invalid_grant: The request has a wrong client identifier, is made in
another tenant, or fails the key binding.
invalid_client: The bound on establishments is reached
(Section 11.3).
Under an establishment, a refresh-token request is rejected with the
following error codes:
invalid_client: The document currently served at the establishment's
sub cannot be obtained or fails validation (Section 5.3), as
Section 6.1 of [CIMD] requires.
invalid_grant: Any other check of Section 5.7.1 fails.
unauthorized_client or invalid_scope: The refreshed access exceeds
the reviewed metadata or this server's policy, as for a
presentation.
None of these rejections indicates refresh-token replay ([RFC9700]),
whose detection this specification does not change.
6.4. Authorization Requests
If the authorization server's policy or a required issuer (Section 4)
requires reviewed software, an authorization request from a client
the server has not admitted on a statement is rejected in the
authorization error response (Section 4.1.2.1 of [RFC6749]) with the
following error codes:
unauthorized_client: The client's statement is review-only
(Section 5.6.3), or a required issuer excludes the software from
the tenant (Section 4).
statement_required: In any other case, subject to the order of
Section 6, the authorization server MUST return this code.
When an authorization request is evaluated against a statement pulled
at the authorization endpoint (step 6 of Section 5.1), one that
exceeds the reviewed document's response types or scope is rejected
with unauthorized_client or invalid_scope, as for a presentation
(Section 6.2).
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Before redirecting with an error, the authorization server validates
the redirect_uri against the client's CIMD, which it resolves first,
or, for a registered client, against its registered redirection URIs
(Section 4.1.2.1 of [RFC6749]). If it cannot obtain a CIMD client's
document, or the document fails validation, it MUST NOT redirect
(Section 6.1 of [CIMD]).
6.5. Proof Mechanism Errors
If the proof mechanism defines an error of its own for a proof it
does not accept, such as invalid_dpop_proof for a DPoP proof that
fails the checks of Section 4.3 of [RFC9449] or use_dpop_nonce for a
nonce challenge (Section 8 of [RFC9449]), the request is rejected
with that error in place of the code this specification assigns to a
failed sender constraint.
A proof that its mechanism accepts but that proves a key other than
the one this specification requires, such as a key the reviewed
document does not carry or one other than the establishment's proven
key, is not an invalid proof but a failed sender constraint.
6.6. Error Descriptions
The authorization server can return non-sensitive diagnostics in the
error_description parameter to a client it has authenticated, but
MUST NOT reveal details of its issuer trust configuration
(Section 4), such as the client identifier namespaces an issuer can
attest, to an unauthenticated requester.
7. Examples
The examples in this section are non-normative.
7.1. Presenting at the Token Endpoint
The following is an example of a client presenting a statement at the
token endpoint of a server holding no record for the client (line
breaks for display purposes only). The reviewed document, which is
not shown, names a jwks_uri, the private_key_jwt authentication
method, the client_credentials grant type, and a scope that includes
tools.read, so the client authenticates with a key that document
carries. The client_id is the statement's sub.
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POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=client_credentials
&scope=tools.read
&client_id=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example%2Fapp
&client_assertion_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3A
client-assertion-type%3Ajwt-bearer
&client_assertion=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjIwMjYtMDgifQ...
&software_statement=eyJ0eXAiOiJzb2Z0d2FyZS1zdGF0ZW1l...
The authorization server validates the statement, retrieves the
document at the statement's sub, checks its digest, verifies the
client assertion against a key from that document's jwks_uri, and
checks that the requested scope falls within the document's scope.
It keeps no registration.
7.2. Publishing a Statement for Servers to Pull
The following is an example of a CIMD that names where its statements
are published:
{
"client_id": "https://client.example/app",
"redirect_uris": ["https://client.example/cb"],
"token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": ["private_key_jwt"],
"jwks_uri": "https://client.example/jwks.json",
"software_statements_uri":
"https://client.example/statements.json"
}
A request to that URL returns the statements, here one:
{
"software_statements": [
"eyJ0eXAiOiJzb2Z0d2FyZS1zdGF0ZW1lbnQrand0Iiwi..."
]
}
An authorization server receiving an ordinary authorization request
with this client_id resolves the document, retrieves the statements,
and selects the one from a trusted issuer whose cimd_digest matches
the document it retrieved. It completes the binding when the client
authenticates with private_key_jwt at code redemption
(Section 5.5.2).
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7.3. Statement Header and Payload
The following is an example of the JOSE header and payload of a
statement over the document in the previous example, served exactly
as shown there, with two-space indentation, LF line endings, and a
single final newline, and without any indentation added for display
(287 octets):
{
"typ": "software-statement+jwt",
"alg": "ES256",
"kid": "2026-10"
}
{
"iss": "https://issuer.example",
"sub": "https://client.example/app",
"aud": ["https://as.example"],
"statement_uses": ["presentation"],
"iat": 1790812800,
"exp": 1793404800,
"jti": "c2a907b34d28",
"cimd_digest": "DHPektjuDKWb2ZSp3nQs-hSrZ_tJE5nOv5-H_J83zn0"
}
The statement names one audience and permits only runtime
presentation, as omitting statement_uses would. It carries no client
metadata: the reviewed document supplies it.
8. Authorization Server Metadata
This specification defines the following authorization server
metadata [RFC8414] values:
software_statement_jwks_uri: REQUIRED for an authorization server
that issues statements under this specification. URL of its
statement key set (Section 4), a JWK Set containing only the keys
with which it signs them.
software_statement_signing_alg_values_supported: REQUIRED for an
authorization server that issues statements under this
specification. A JSON array containing the asymmetric JWS alg
values that the authorization server can use to sign them. The
array MUST NOT contain none or a symmetric algorithm.
software_statement_pull_supported: OPTIONAL. Boolean value
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indicating whether the authorization server retrieves statements
from a client's software_statements_uri member when admitting a
client that presented none (Section 5.5). If omitted, the default
value is false.
9. Extension Points
The following extensions are left to separate specifications:
* Consumption at registration ([REGISTRATION]): a statement in an
[RFC7591] registration request, with the registered metadata taken
from the reviewed document.
* Attested keys: a client attestation [ABCA] vouching for a key the
reviewed document does not carry. Without one, software whose
instances authenticate with keys of their own cannot prove those
keys (Section 5.6).
* Statement conveyance within a client attestation, rather than as a
request parameter.
* Runtime presentation in the request that begins a grant at an
endpoint this specification does not cover, such as the device
authorization endpoint of [RFC8628].
* Partial review, by which an issuer vouches for particular members
rather than a whole document (Section 3.1).
* Statement lifecycle: withdrawal, supersession, requiring a current
statement on refresh, and refresh replacement.
10. Relationship to Other Work
This section is non-normative.
10.1. Client Attestation
A software statement and a client attestation [ABCA] are both signed
third-party assertions. A statement records a review of client
configuration. A client attestation attests a running instance and
the key it holds, and is presented with a proof bound to the request.
Neither assertion grants access nor substitutes for the other.
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10.2. Identity Assertions
A statement records that a named party reviewed software, not that a
particular customer currently permits that software to act in its
tenant. A tenant-scoped decision (aud_tenant) authorizes no
particular user or transaction. When a customer's identity provider
mediates a grant, as with a cross-domain identity assertion [IDJAG],
it issues assertions per grant only for clients the customer permits.
A statement serves when the issuer is not in the request path, or
when a customer wants a portable record of what its review covered.
10.3. OpenID Federation
A trust mark [OPENID-FED] is also a signed third-party assertion
about an entity. Section 17.5 of [OPENID-FED] permits trust marks
whose accreditation authority is established out of band. This
specification binds a review to exact CIMD octets and defines its use
at admission, with directly configured issuers (Section 4) and no
dependency on federation metadata resolution.
11. Implementation Considerations
This section gives guidance to implementers. It adds no requirement.
11.1. Caching and Reuse of Retrieved Content
A response from a software_statements_uri ought to be cached no
longer than the document is. Because [CIMD] forbids caching an error
response (Section 6.2 of [CIMD]), a failed retrieval (Section 5.3) is
followed by back-off.
11.2. Retrieval and Processing Bounds
An authorization server can bound the retrieval and processing work
of Section 13.6 as follows:
* Rate-limit presentations per statement identity, per subject, and
per source, and pulls (Section 5.5) per client identifier and per
source, before spending retrieval or storage on a new
presentation.
* Refuse a presentation that would create a new establishment,
before spending retrieval or storage on it, once a bound on
establishments (Section 11.3) is reached.
* Bound JWT size and parsing work, concurrent retrievals, response
size, and response time.
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* Bound the size of a software_statements_uri response and the
number of statements examined separately from the document's.
Several issuers' statements outgrow a document-sized bound, and a
host can pad the array.
* Discard pulled statements from unconfigured issuers before
verifying any signature.
A response size bound also decides which reviewed documents a server
can admit. Section 10.11 of [CIMD] recommends that a server read at
most 5 kilobytes, so an issuer ought not to issue a statement over a
larger document.
11.3. Bounding Establishments
A statement attests client software, identified by sub, not its
runtime instances, and this specification defines no instance
identifier. One unexpired statement can therefore open
establishments at each trusting authorization server in its audience,
and more than one at each.
A trusting authorization server can bound the number of
establishments derived from one issuer's statements about one piece
of software, identified by iss and sub claims. How it counts toward
a bound is local policy, and a multi-tenant server keeps any bound
per tenant. A bound stays effective only if what anyone holding a
copy of a statement can create does not count toward it: a pushed
authorization request and its unredeemed code, which a holder of a
copy of a public client's statement can approve with its own account.
Otherwise a holder of a copy could exhaust the bound for the
software's other instances.
For software admitted under Section 5.6.2, a server can also bound
establishments per resource owner, so that one user cannot exhaust a
bound the software's other users share.
When a request is refused at a bound (Section 6.2, Section 6.3), the
authorization server ought to state that reason in error_description,
and the client can retry once earlier establishments end
(Section 5.7).
11.4. User Interface, Audit, and Logging
An authorization server ought not to present the review in a review-
only presentation to the user as an assurance about the presenter
(Section 5.6.3). It can record the statement's issuer for audit and
inventory.
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Authorization servers ought to avoid logging software statements,
which are sensitive in transit and at rest. A statement names
reviewed software and, if it carries an audience, that software's
intended relationships.
12. Deployment Considerations
This section gives guidance to operators and issuers. It adds no
requirement.
12.1. Configuring Issuer Trust
Trust configuration ought to constrain each issuer to the client
identifier namespaces it is expected to attest (Section 4), for
example URLs under the domains of the software publishers it serves.
Without such a scope, a compromised or over-broad issuer can mint
acceptable statements about any client software.
When a trusting authorization server configures an issuer whose
decisions are confined to one of its tenants, as a customer's own
issuer is, it ought to record with that configuration the client
identifier namespaces for which the issuer's decision is required in
that tenant (Section 4).
12.2. Audience and Tenant Claims
An issuer ought to name an audience.
An issuer ought to omit the aud_tenant claim from a statement whose
review applies wherever its aud reaches, such as a marketplace
listing. The claim is also unnecessary if the authorization server
has one tenant, or if the issuer and the server have agreed that the
server's trust configuration confines the issuer to a tenant, as they
can for an issuer that does not know the tenant's identifier.
12.3. Statement Lifetime and Renewal
Short lifetimes tighten an issuer's control and increase renewal
traffic. A fleet of statements issued together expires together, so
issuers ought to stagger expiries or renew ahead of the boundary.
A changed document is always served before a statement over it
exists, so presentations under an earlier statement fail the digest
comparison (Section 5.2), and the client cannot be admitted on a
statement until one over the changed document is issued. A
statement's lifetime bounds how long a review stands without being
renewed.
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Instances need the most recently issued statement from a shared
source rather than a copy fixed at build or install time, because the
document can change (Section 5.2).
13. Security Considerations
The security considerations of [CIMD] and Section 5 of [RFC7591]
apply.
13.1. Assurance Provided by a Statement
A statement binds an issuer's review to the octets of a CIMD, which
describes an OAuth client configuration. It does not bind the
software's code, dependencies, or behavior. Software can change
while its document stays the same, and the statement remains
acceptable until it expires (Section 13.7) or is withdrawn under an
extension. Assurance about the software itself rests on the issuer's
review process. Any change to the document's octets, including one
that changes no metadata value, makes statements over the earlier
octets fail the digest comparison (Section 5.2). The digest covers a
URL the document carries, such as logo_uri, but not the content
served at it, which can change after review.
The following table states what admission on a statement does and
does not establish:
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+===============================+===============================+
| Property | Established |
+===============================+===============================+
| A configured issuer signed | Yes |
| the statement for this client | |
| identifier and, if the | |
| statement names an audience, | |
| one that includes this server | |
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| The served document is the | Yes |
| one the issuer reviewed, | |
| octet for octet | |
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| The presenter controls a key | Yes, before any token is |
| the reviewed document carries | issued, except under |
| | Section 5.6.2. A jwks_uri |
| | attests only the keys' |
| | location (Section 13.2) |
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Authorization codes reach | Yes, in a redirect flow. For |
| only a reviewed redirection | a public client under |
| URI | Section 5.6.2 it is the only |
| | binding, and it does not hold |
| | against a party that controls |
| | the user agent (Section 13.4) |
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| The running software is the | No; an attested-key extension |
| software the issuer reviewed | can add evidence for it |
| | (Section 9) |
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| The client may access a | No; the authorization |
| particular resource | server's policy, and the |
| | resource owner's |
| | authorization where a grant |
| | involves one, decide |
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
Table 2
13.2. Statement Theft and Replay
A copied statement admits nothing without the sender constraint
(Section 5.6), which for a public client does not hold against a
party that controls the user agent (Section 13.4). Except under
Section 5.6.2 (Section 13.4), admitting only keys the reviewed
document carries also prevents a downgrade to a key the issuer did
not review. An extension admitting attested keys (Section 9) has to
address downgrade itself.
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Attesting a jwks_uri attests the location, not its contents: a
compromised key host can add keys that satisfy the proof without a
digest change. If that matters, an issuer attests jwks inline and
accepts that rotation changes the digest. A server reusing a cached
key set (Section 5.3) also accepts that a just-removed key can
briefly continue to verify.
13.3. Servers That Do Not Implement This Specification
A statement carries no client metadata, so an [RFC7591] server that
verified one without implementing this specification would take every
metadata value from the registration request, attaching the issuer's
approval to an attacker's redirection URIs and keys. Keeping
statement signing keys in a dedicated statement key set, out of any
jwks_uri, and away from statements of other profiles (Section 4,
Section 8) means such a server finds no key that verifies a statement
through the jwks_uri in an issuer's [RFC8414] metadata. It is
exposed only if its operator configures the statement key set in it.
For an issuer that is not an authorization server, that configuration
is the only route to its keys, so the protection rests on operators
recording the statement key set URL only in servers that implement
this specification.
13.4. Copied Statements and Public Clients
A statement for a document that permits none can be presented under
the public-client model by anyone holding a copy, at any server that
supports none of the document's other methods or whose policy refuses
them (Section 5.6). An issuer that intends software to be admitted
only as a confidential client reviews only documents that do not
permit none.
A party holding a copied statement for a public client can open a
pushed authorization request in the reviewed software's name. It
cannot receive an authorization code that another resource owner
approves in a user agent the party does not control (Section 5.6.2),
so other users are exposed only to a consent prompt carrying the
reviewed software's name and branding. Rate limits (Section 11.2)
and the issuer's choice of audience and lifetime bound that exposure.
A party that controls the user agent receives the code: an
application embedding a user agent (Section 8.12 of [RFC8252]), or a
holder authorizing with its own account. It redeems the code with a
PKCE verifier and key of its own choosing. An admission under
Section 5.6.2 therefore shows where codes are delivered, not which
software holds the grant, and a tenant's required issuer (Section 4)
cannot keep unreviewed software out for a user who chooses to run it.
This is the client impersonation that Section 8.6 of [RFC8252]
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describes for public clients. An attested-key extension (Section 9)
would strengthen the binding by giving the instance a key a third
party vouches for.
13.5. Tenant Confusion at a Multi-Tenant Authorization Server
A multi-tenant server that derives the tenant one way to check a
decision and another way to scope a token lets a client reach one
tenant's resources on another tenant's decision. Section 3.2
requires one tenant for both, which the client cannot select through
a request parameter, statement claim, or document member.
This specification defines no tenant parameter, and a CIMD URL is the
same client_id in every tenant, so neither a client nor an issuer can
verify that a server honored the tenant rule of Section 3.2.
The aud_tenant claim names a tenant at the trusting authorization
server, not which of the client's own customers is asking. Software
that acts for many customers under one client identifier and key
presents the same statement and key for each, so a statement naming a
tenant admits the software there on behalf of every customer it
serves, and any of those customers can direct the software at another
customer's tenant. A statement attests software and cannot prevent
this. A deployment that needs a customer-to-tenant binding records
it at the trusting authorization server.
13.6. External Retrieval and Resource Exhaustion
The retrievals of Section 5.3 happen before any client is registered
or any user has interacted, so an unauthenticated requester can cause
them with one acceptable statement or, at a server that pulls
statements, with none. The bounds of Section 11.2 limit this work
but do not prevent it.
13.7. Expiry and Open Grants
Under this specification, expiry limits new admissions and ends
nothing already opened: a grant lasts for the life of its refresh
tokens, whatever the statement's lifetime, unless the server finds
the proven key gone from the client's document (Section 5.7.1). An
older statement that has not expired remains admissible after a newer
one narrows the review. A deployment that needs withdrawal,
supersession, or grants that follow later reviews implements an
extension providing them (Section 9). Removing an issuer from trust
configuration, or narrowing what it can attest, does not by itself
end a grant already admitted on one of its statements. Nor does
configuring a required issuer (Section 4) end a grant already
admitted. A server ends such grants by its own means, such as
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revoking refresh tokens.
13.8. Observable State
A statement_required refusal at the authorization endpoint
(Section 6.4) travels through the user agent, so anyone who can see
the redirection learns that this client has no established standing
at this server. The disclosure is accepted because a client that
cannot learn why it was refused cannot act. Outcomes still reveal
some policy. By probing with public client identifier URLs, anyone
can learn whether a request is admitted and, from statement_required
versus unauthorized_client, whether a required issuer covers a client
identifier in a tenant. Section 6.6 keeps further detail of the
issuer trust configuration out of error_description for
unauthenticated requesters.
14. Privacy Considerations
The privacy considerations of [CIMD] and Section 6 of [RFC7591]
apply.
A presentation reveals to the authorization server the client's
issuer relationship and, if the statement carries an aud claim, the
other authorization servers the client intends to use. Omitting that
claim discloses nothing beyond the review. Pushed authorization
requests (Section 5.4.2) keep statements out of browser history,
referrers, and front-channel logs.
Retrieving the document tells its host that the server is resolving
the client. Pulling statements (Section 5.5) tells the host of
software_statements_uri the same. That host is an additional party
only if the URL is on another origin. Published statements are
readable by anyone, so their aud and aud_tenant claims disclose which
servers and tenants a review names. A statement whose audience is
sensitive is presented rather than published.
15. IANA Considerations
15.1. OAuth Parameters Registry
This specification requests registration of the software_statement
parameter in the IANA "OAuth Parameters" registry established by
[RFC6749]:
Parameter Name: software_statement
Parameter Usage Location: authorization request, token request
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Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): This specification, Section 5.4 and
Section 5.4.2
The "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata" registry established
by [RFC7591] already contains a software_statement member, which this
registration does not affect. The parameter reuses the name because
it carries the same [RFC7591] artifact.
15.2. Media Type Registration
This specification requests registration of the application/software-
statement+jwt media type in the IANA "Media Types" registry
[RFC6838]. [RFC7591] defines no media type for software statements.
This registration covers only statements under this specification, as
its "Applications that use this media type" entry states, and a
statement of another profile carries a typ value of its own.
Type name: application
Subtype name: software-statement+jwt
Required parameters: n/a
Optional parameters: n/a
Encoding considerations: 8bit. A software statement is a JWT. JWT
values are encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values
separated by period ('.') characters, as registered for
application/jwt in Section 10.3.1 of [RFC7519].
Security considerations: See Section 13 of this specification and
Section 11 of [RFC7519].
Interoperability considerations: n/a
Published specification: This specification
Applications that use this media type: Issuers, authorization
servers, and clients that issue, request, or accept software
statements under this specification; other profiles are
distinguished by their own typ values
Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
Additional information: Magic number(s): n/a. File extension(s): n/
a. Macintosh file type code(s): n/a.
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Person & email address to contact for further information: Karl
McGuinness, public@karlmcguinness.com
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: none
Author: Karl McGuinness, public@karlmcguinness.com
Change controller: IETF
15.3. JSON Web Token Claims Registry
This specification requests registration of the following values in
the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry established by [RFC7519]:
Claim Name: cimd_digest
Claim Description: Unpadded base64url-encoded SHA-256 digest of the
retrieved octets of the Client ID Metadata Document evaluated
during software statement issuance
Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): This specification, Section 3
Claim Name: statement_uses
Claim Description: Permitted uses of a software statement
Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): This specification, Section 3
15.4. OAuth Extensions Error Registry
This specification requests registration of the following error code
in the IANA "OAuth Extensions Error Registry" established by
[RFC6749]:
Error Name: statement_required
Error Usage Location: authorization error response, token error
response, pushed authorization request error response
Related Protocol Extension: Client ID Metadata Document Software
Statement
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Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): This specification, Section 6
This specification also requests that IANA update the existing
temporarily_unavailable entry, adding the token error response and
the pushed authorization request error response to its usage
locations and this specification as a reference:
Error Name: temporarily_unavailable
Error Usage Location: token error response, pushed authorization
request error response, in addition to the locations already
registered
Related Protocol Extension: OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework
Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): [RFC6749], this specification (Section 6)
15.5. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registry
This specification requests registration of the following value in
the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata" registry
established by [RFC7591]. A client publishes this member in its
CIMD:
Client Metadata Name: software_statements_uri
Client Metadata Description: URL, in a Client ID Metadata Document,
at which the client publishes software statements about itself for
an authorization server to retrieve. It is not meaningful in a
registration request.
Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): This specification, Section 5.5
15.6. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registry
This specification requests registration of the following values in
the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry established
by [RFC8414]:
Metadata Name: software_statement_jwks_uri
Metadata Description: URL of the JWK Set containing only the keys
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with which the authorization server signs software statements.
Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): This specification, Section 8
Metadata Name: software_statement_signing_alg_values_supported
Metadata Description: JSON array containing the asymmetric JWS
algorithms supported by the authorization server for signing
software statements.
Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): This specification, Section 8
Metadata Name: software_statement_pull_supported
Metadata Description: Boolean value indicating whether the
authorization server retrieves software statements from a client's
software_statements_uri.
Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): This specification, Section 8
16. References
16.1. Normative References
[CIMD] Parecki, A. and E. Smith, "OAuth Client ID Metadata
Document", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
oauth-client-id-metadata-document-03, 2 November 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
client-id-metadata-document-03>.
[IDJAG] Parecki, A., McGuinness, K., and B. Campbell, "Identity
Assertion JWT Authorization Grant", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-
grant-06, 30 October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
identity-assertion-authz-grant-06>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
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[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986>.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6234>.
[RFC6585] Nottingham, M. and R. Fielding, "Additional HTTP Status
Codes", RFC 6585, DOI 10.17487/RFC6585, April 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6585>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.
[RFC6761] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Special-Use Domain Names",
RFC 6761, DOI 10.17487/RFC6761, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6761>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6838>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.
[RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7591>.
[RFC7636] Sakimura, N., Ed., Bradley, J., and N. Agarwal, "Proof Key
for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients", RFC 7636,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7636, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7636>.
[RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7638>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8252] Denniss, W. and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps",
BCP 212, RFC 8252, DOI 10.17487/RFC8252, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8252>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8414>.
[RFC8725] Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best
Current Practices", BCP 225, RFC 8725,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8725, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8725>.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.
[RFC9126] Lodderstedt, T., Campbell, B., Sakimura, N., Tonge, D.,
and F. Skokan, "OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests",
RFC 9126, DOI 10.17487/RFC9126, September 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9126>.
[RFC9449] Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T.,
Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of
Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449,
September 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9449>.
16.2. Informative References
[ABCA] Looker, T., Bastian, P., and C. Bormann, "OAuth 2.0
Attestation-Based Client Authentication", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-
based-client-auth-12, 12 October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
attestation-based-client-auth-12>.
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[OPENID-FED]
Hedberg, R., Ed., Jones, M. B., Solberg, A. Å., Bradley,
J., De Marco, G., and V. Dzhuvinov, "OpenID Federation
1.0", 17 February 2026,
<https://openid.net/specs/openid-federation-1_0.html>.
[REGISTRATION]
McGuinness, K., "Client ID Metadata Document Software
Statement Registration", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-mcguinness-oauth-cimd-sw-stmt-registration-00, 2
November 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-mcguinness-oauth-cimd-sw-stmt-registration-00>.
[RFC7522] Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., and M. Jones, "Security
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0
Client Authentication and Authorization Grants", RFC 7522,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7522, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7522>.
[RFC7523] Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token
(JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and
Authorization Grants", RFC 7523, DOI 10.17487/RFC7523, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7523>.
[RFC8628] Denniss, W., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
"OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant", RFC 8628,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8628, August 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8628>.
[RFC8693] Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J.,
and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693>.
[RFC8705] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T.
Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication
and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8705>.
[RFC9700] Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett,
"Best Current Practice for OAuth 2.0 Security", BCP 240,
RFC 9700, DOI 10.17487/RFC9700, January 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700>.
McGuinness Expires 6 May 2027 [Page 43]
Internet-Draft oauth-cimd-sw-stmt November 2026
Acknowledgments
This mechanism began as the consumption part of a draft on software
statement issuance and was split out so that consumption can evolve
separately from issuance. It draws on working-group discussion of
CIMDs and attestation-based client authentication.
Document History
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]
-01
* Updated references for draft -03 of [CIMD], including its section
numbers and the Accept header field it specifies.
* Defined Permitted Method and Selected Method. The client model
follows the methods the reviewed document permits, and components
that differ in client type use separate documents (Section 5.6).
* A document that declares no authentication method permits only
none and is no longer rejected.
* Aligned retrieval failures with Section 6.1 of [CIMD], including
HTTP status code 503 for temporarily_unavailable and
invalid_client on refresh when the document cannot be used.
* Updated the pull example for
token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported.
-00
* Initial version.
Author's Address
Karl McGuinness
Independent
Email: public@karlmcguinness.com
McGuinness Expires 6 May 2027 [Page 44]