Reliable Transparency and Revocation Mechanisms
draft-mcmillion-tls-transparency-revocation-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Brendan McMillion , Devon O'Brien , Dennis Jackson | ||
| Last updated | 2025-12-31 (Latest revision 2025-06-29) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes reliable mechanisms for the publication and revocation of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates. This reliability takes several forms. First, it provides browsers a strong guarantee that all certificates they accept are truly published and unrevoked at the time they're accepted. Second, it allows operators to monitor for mis-issuances related to their websites in a highly efficient way without relying on third-party services. Third, it provides a high degree of operational redundancy to minimize the risk of cascading outages.
Authors
Brendan McMillion
Devon O'Brien
Dennis Jackson
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)