Secure Vector Routing (SVR)
draft-menon-svr-05
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Abilash Menon , Patrick MeLampy , Michael Baj , Patrick Timmons , Hadriel Kaplan | ||
| Last updated | 2024-03-18 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
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| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-menon-svr-05
Network Working Group A. Menon
Internet-Draft P. MeLampy
Intended status: Informational M. Baj
Expires: 19 September 2024 P. Timmons
H. Kaplan
Juniper Networks
18 March 2024
Secure Vector Routing (SVR)
draft-menon-svr-05
Abstract
This document describes Secure Vector Routing (SVR). SVR is an
overlay inter-networking protocol that operates at the session layer.
SVR provides end-to-end communication of network requirements not
possible or practical using network header layers. SVR uses
application layer cookies that eliminate the need to create and
maintain non-overlapping address spaces necessary to manage network
routing requirements. SVR is an overlay networking protocol that
works through middleboxes and address translators including those
existing between private networks, the IPv4 public internet, and the
IPv6 public internet. SVR enables SD-WAN and multi-cloud use cases
and improves security at the networking routing plane. SVR
eliminates the need for encapsulation and decapsulation often used to
create non-overlapping address spaces.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 September 2024.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Theory of operation of Secure Vector Routing . . . . . . . . 9
2.1. Directionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2. SVR with Other Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3. Metadata Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4. Pathway Obstructions and Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5. Metadata removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6. Modification of transport addresses . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.7. Optional use of Tenants and Service names for Routing . . 13
2.8. Unique 5-Tuples for Every Session . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.9. Session Packets Post Metadata Exchange . . . . . . . . . 14
2.10. Session State Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.11. NATs and Session Keep Alive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.12. Use of BFD on Peer Pathways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3. SVR Multi-path Routing Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1. Establishing SVR Peering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1.1. Reachability and Peer Authentication . . . . . . . . 17
3.1.2. Peer Cryptographic Key/Re-keying . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1.3. Bring Peer Into Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.4. Resulting Peer Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2. CIDR based SVR Peer FIB Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3. Optional FIB Containing Service Names . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.4. SVR Security Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5. Time Based HMAC Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.6. Security Keying/Rekeying Considerations . . . . . . . . . 24
3.7. New Session Initiation Detailed . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.7.1. East First Packet Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.7.1.1. Determine Tenant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.7.1.2. Determine Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.7.1.3. Determine Network Requirements . . . . . . . . . 26
3.7.1.4. Picking a Peer Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.7.1.5. Allocate Source NAT if Necessary . . . . . . . . 27
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3.7.1.6. Allocation of Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.7.1.7. Session State and Metadata Construction . . . . . 28
3.7.1.8. Encryption of Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.7.1.9. Insert Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.7.1.10. Signing SVR Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.7.1.11. Sending the First Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.7.2. West First Packet Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.7.2.1. Verify Source Address is a Waypoint . . . . . . . 32
3.7.2.2. Verify Metadata Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.7.2.3. Parse Metadata and Save State and Translations . 33
3.7.2.4. Restore Addresses and Route Packet . . . . . . . 33
3.7.2.5. Detection of a Looping Session . . . . . . . . . 33
3.7.3. Return Packet Path Pre-Established . . . . . . . . . 34
3.7.4. Sending Reverse Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.7.5. Subsequent Packet Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.7.6. Session Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.7.7. Unidirectional/Asymmetric Flows . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.7.8. Multi-Hop Session Ladder Diagram . . . . . . . . . . 37
4. SVR Protocol Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.1. SVR Session Definitions and Types . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.2. SVR Metadata Insertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2.1. Metadata Packet Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2.2. Metadata Prerequisites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2.3. Metadata Port Allocation for Sessions . . . . . . . . 39
4.2.4. Metadata on Idle Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2.5. Metadata Packet Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.2.6. Prevention of False Positives . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2.7. TCP to UDP Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.3. Required and Optional TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.3.1. New and Moved IP Sessions TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.3.2. ICMP TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.4. Metadata Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.5. SVR Packet Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.5.1. HMAC Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.5.2. HMAC Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.6. Processing SVR Packets with Potential Metadata . . . . . 47
4.6.1. Detection of Potential Metadata in Packets . . . . . 47
4.6.2. Verification of Metadata in Packets . . . . . . . . . 47
4.6.2.1. TLV Parsing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.6.2.2. Decryption of Metadata Blocks . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.6.3. UDP to TCP Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.6.4. SVR Session Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.6.5. Tenant/Service Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.6.5.1. Interpretation of the Service . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.6.5.2. Determination and Interpretation of the Tenant . 51
4.6.6. Security Policy and Payload Encryption . . . . . . . 52
5. BFD for Peer Pathways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.1. SVR Peering and use of BFD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
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5.1.1. Peer Determination of Received Peer IP Address . . . 56
5.1.2. Detection of NAT between Peers using BFD . . . . . . 56
5.1.3. Detection of Routers Address Changes using BFD . . . 57
5.1.4. Determining MTU Size with BFD . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.1.5. Measuring Peer Pathway quality using BFD . . . . . . 59
5.1.6. Detection of Path Failover using BFD . . . . . . . . 60
5.1.7. Peer Authentication Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.1.8. Peer Key/Rekey Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.1.9. Certificate Revocation/Replacement Procedures . . . . 66
6. Additional SVR Metadata Exchanges and Use Cases . . . . . . . 66
6.1. Moving a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.2. Moving Sessions that are Quiescent or One-Way Flows . . . 68
6.3. NAT Keep Alive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.4. Adaptive Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.5. Packet Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.6. ICMP and SVR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.7. State Recovery Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7. SVR Metadata Format and Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.1. Metadata Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
7.1.1. False Positives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.1.2. Forward and Reverse Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.2. TLVs for Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.3. Header Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
7.3.1. Fragment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
7.3.2. Security Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
7.3.3. Disable Forward Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
7.3.4. IPv4 ICMP Error Location Address . . . . . . . . . . 88
7.3.5. IPv6 ICMP Error Location Address . . . . . . . . . . 89
7.3.6. SVR Control Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
7.3.7. Path Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.3.8. Session Health Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7.4. Payload Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7.4.1. Forward Context IPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7.4.2. Forward Context IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7.4.3. Reverse Context IPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.4.4. Reverse Context IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.4.5. Session UUID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
7.4.6. Tenant Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.4.7. Service Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.4.8. Session Encrypted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
7.4.9. TCP SYN Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
7.4.10. Source Router Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
7.4.11. Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
7.4.12. Peer Pathway ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
7.4.13. IPv4 Source NAT Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7.4.14. Remaining Session Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7.4.15. Security Encryption Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
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8.1. HMAC Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
8.2. Replay Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
8.3. Payload Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
8.4. DDoS and Unexpected Traffic on Waypoint Addresses . . . . 103
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
1. Introduction
There exists a need to communicate network requirements between IP
routers and networks to provide an end-to-end experience. Selection
of specific paths whose attributes meet or exceed the networking
requirements are an objective of SVR. There is also a need for
applications to communicate their requirements to networks. This
need is increasing as workloads move to public clouds and the numbers
of cloud locations increase. The standard practice today is to use
an overlay network of tunnels to create a virtual network. SVR
overlay is being proposed as an alternative to using tunnels. SVR
simplifies the network by virtue of having only one network layer.
SVR securely transports traffic with authentication and adaptive
encryption. The absence of tunneling overhead reduces bandwidth.
Since SVR specifies requirements abstractly, it also has the
capability to interwork policies between different networks and
address spaces.
Most WAN networks are deployed with a virtual private network (VPN)
across IP backbone facilities. VPNs have the significant
disadvantage of carrying additional network layers increasing packet
size and leading to IP fragmentation as well as reduced bandwidth.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Overview
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+----------+
| Network2 |
+-----------+ | | +-----------+
| SVR<---->+<-L3-IP-->+<----->SVR |
| | +----------+ | |
| Network1 | +----------+ | Network 4 |
| SVR<--->SVR SVR<----->SVR |
+-----------+ | | +-----------+
| Network3 |
+-----------+ | |
| Client SVR<--->SVR |
+-----------+ +----------+
Figure 1
An SVR implementation describes a network requirement semantically
and shares this as metadata with a routing peer. The requirement to
a peer is conveyed by means of a cookie, often referred to as first
packet metadata, which is placed in the first packet of a session
that is targeted towards the SVR peer. SVR requires session state on
every participating SVR router and sets up a bi-flow (matching
forward and reverse flows) based on the requirement. Once the
session is established bi-directionally, the cookie is not sent in
subsequent packets, resulting in elimination of additional overhead.
Benefits from this approach include:
* Tunnel Compression: The metadata contains information required to
eliminate tunnel header information for established sessions.
This can result in anywhere from 12% to 100% bandwidth savings
when compared to IPSEC based tunnels depending on the original
packet size.
* Elimination of Elephant Flow problems: Tunnels are very long lived
and often contain large aggregates of inner flows. Tunnels are
often fixed on a specific network "hash" while each SVR session
has a unique network hash.
* QoS support is per flow, not per packet: Because each SVR flow has
a unique 5-tuple on the wire, standard MPLS routing and QoS
techniques work seamlessly. Adding QoS to Tunnels requires QoS on
entry to a tunnel, tunnel DSCP markings, and policies to copy/map
inner packet DSCP to Tunnel Packet DSCP. In practice many core
networks do not look at the DSCP markings once a fast path
forwarding rules are established.
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* Avoid Re-encryption: Tunnels often encrypt all traffic. Much of
the traffic in the tunnel is already encrypted, thus there is a
re-encryption penalty. SVR support adaptive encryption which
performs encryption on only those sessions that require it.
* Firewalls and security proxies can intercept TLS sessions and
perform decryption and encryption if they tolerate SVR metadata.
This is not possible with IPSEC tunnels by design.
* Scaling of software-based encryption is much higher when session
state is available. Encryption performance is limited to what is
possible in a single processing core for a single session, and at
the time of this document being written the limit is currently
1.5GigE for Tunnel termination.
1.3. Definitions
The following terms are used throughout this document.
Authority: A textual definition of the owner of an SVR namespace.
Each namespace owner can allocate Tenant names (representing
collections of network endpoints sharing common network
enforcement policy), and Service names (representing accessible
destinations and traffic treatment policy). Authority namespaces
must be unique to permit internetworking. Claiming and resolving
disputes about authority naming are outside the scope of this
document.
Tenant(s): This is a textual description defining network endpoints
that share common access policy (allow lists or block lists to
network destinations). These may be mapped using any known
technique including source IP address mask, a VLAN tag, ingress
interface, provided by an authentication system, or even client
supplied, and this mapping is outside the scope of this document.
Often these are location specific definitions, but the Tenant has
global meaning within an authority. Tenant names can conform to
domain name syntax, and be expressed as hierarchical structures
(e.g., location.department.example)..
Service(s): This is a textual description of what server(s) can be
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accessed with this intent. Examples include Zoom, or Office365/
Outlook. Although outside the scope of this document, these could
be defined with any known technique, including URLs, IP
address(es) protocol(s) and port(s), CIDR block(s), etc. Having a
single text name to describe a network destination makes defining
network requirements easier. Other Service specific network
requirements including Quality Policies and Security Policies can
be associated with Services in data models, but are not described
in this document.
Context: This is the original "5-tuple" of an IP packet, including
source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port, and
protocol. Optionally, Layer 2 information such as MAC Address or
VLAN tags may be included for certain use cases, if required.
Signature: Metadata packets MUST be cryptographically signed using
HMAC by the source router, and all packets traversing an SVR peer
pathway SHOULD have an HMAC signature so the next hop router can
authenticate the sender of the data and verify its integrity. The
portion of the packet that is signed must not include the IP
header, as it may go through a NAT or IPv4 to IPv6 conversion.
Direction: This is inferred, and not a specific metadata field. The
Direction represents the intended client to server direction. The
initial network packet of a communication session indicates this
direction. For example, a TCP SYN packet would travel from client
to server, defining the direction of a service. Forward direction
is always client to server, and reverse is always server to the
client. These directions have nothing to do with a network
topology (for example, hub and spoke), and a single network path
could have forward sessions going bi-directionally -- traffic
going from node A to node B may represent the forward direction
for some sessions and the reverse direction for other sessions.
Peer: An SVR Peer is a client, server, or router that supports the
SVR protocol. The SVR Peer could be either directly adjacent, or
reachable through an IP network. The SVR Peer should not be
confused with BGP Peer. Since SVR Peers must be able to reach
each other, and because SVR Peers are often deployed at network
edges, SVR Peers can also be BGP Peers. In this document peer
will always mean SVR Peer.
Waypoint: A Waypoint is a reachable IP Address associated with an
SVR Router's interface. Some physical interfaces may have
multiple IP Addresses, and as such a single physical interface
could represent multiple Waypoints. In some cases, routers use
dynamically assigned addresses on interfaces. In these cases, a
Waypoint address may change dynamically.
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Peer Received IP Address: This is the destination IP address to send
packets to reach a Waypoint Address. Normally, this is the same
IP Address as a Waypoint Address, unless there is a NAT present
between Peers.
Peer Pathway: An SVR Peer Pathway is a unique pair of Waypoint
addresses that can reach each other. The path can be defined as
either a pair of IP addresses or a pair of domain names that
resolve to IP Addresses. Peer Pathways have attributes related to
availability, performance (jitter, latency, packet loss) and cost.
Techniques such as BFD [RFC5880] can ensure a Peer Pathway's state
and readiness for packet transmission.
Router Certificate: A Certificate Signing Request (CSR) is created
by every router that attaches to an SVR network that contains the
routers name, authority, and public key. The resulting
certificate is used to authenticate SVR routes on Peer Pathways.
The certificate (and public key) are fairly long lived, and seldom
used. Rekeying procedures are based on the life of the
certificate.
Peer Key: After authentication, every SVR router peer pathway
creates additional public keys to obtain a much shorter lived Peer
Key used for encrypting SVR Metadata. The Peer Key is rekeyed on
a regular basis. Peer Keys are signed using the Router
Certificate Public/Private keys. This prevents any man in the
middle between two SVR routers.
Session HMAC Key: Timed Based HMAC signatures can be used to protect
SVR pathways against replay attacks. Upon start, every session
creates a Session HMAC Key which is the Peer Key at the time the
session was created. Session HMAC Keys must be saved for the life
of a session, and do not change. Time based HMAC signatures
essentially change the key every 2 seconds.
2. Theory of operation of Secure Vector Routing
Secure Vector Routing is a session stateful routing overlay that
operates at edges of networks where stateful NATs are normally
performed. It is at these same locations where multi-path routing is
being deployed. These locations include edge routers located at
branches, data centers, and public clouds. SVR maps local network
requirements into administratively defined text strings that have
global meaning. These are communicated or signaled by insertion of a
networking cookie called SVR metadata directly into IP Packets in
transit.
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SVR metadata is inserted into existing packets directly after the L4
header (see Section 4.2). The metadata in the first packet of a new
session (TCP or UDP bidirectional flow) can be used for path
selection and security. Metadata can be inserted in any subsequent
packet to change/update the networking requirements. The metadata is
inserted into the payload portion of a packet to guarantee it makes
it unchanged between SVR routers.
Sessions supported by SVR include TCP, UDP, UDP Unicast, point-to-
point ethernet, and ICMP. Sessions are characterized by having an
initial first packet that is unique to an SVR router. Often this is
described as a unique 5-tuples as seen by the router. Sessions start
when the first packet is processed, and end when either the L4
protocol indicates the session is completed (TCP FIN/FIN ACK) or
there has been no activity for a length of time (UDP, ICMP, UDP
Unicast, point-to-point ethernet).
2.1. Directionality
SVR utilizes the concept of session direction. The direction of the
session is what creates a Secure Vector. Routing policies include a
Tenant (source) and Service (destination) pair that exactly match the
direction of sessions. When describing metadata in this document,
direction is either forward or reverse; it is not tied to network
topology, but rather the direction of session establishment. For
TCP, the forward direction is always the client side towards the
server side. For UDP, the forward direction is from the sender of
the first packet. Reverse is the opposite direction. On a given
pathway, Secure Vector Routes could be traversing on the same
pathways with opposite directions.
Metadata formats described in this document will be labeled as
"forward" or "reverse". Forward metadata is inserted in packets
going from client to server. Reverse metadata is inserted in packets
that travel from server to client.
2.2. SVR with Other Traffic
SVR co-exists with traditional routing. In fact, the router
interface addresses known as Waypoints in this document MUST be
reachable via traditional networking for every peer relationship.
When packet routing is being decided in the router, should the route
resolve to an SVR capable router (i.e., the next hop address returned
in the route equals a known Waypoint address of an SVR Peer) then
metadata MAY be inserted and session stateful SVR is performed.
Otherwise, the packet is forwarded like any traditional IP router.
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2.3. Metadata Handshake
To ensure the metadata is received and understood between peers, a
handshake is performed. A router that supports SVR peer pathways
inserts metadata for each packet flow in the following circumstances:
* It is a "forward" packet representing a new session and the
ingress node has not yet received any reverse metadata from the
recipient egress node.
* It is a "reverse" packet from the recipient egress node to the
initiating ingress node and recipient egress node has not received
forward packets from this session without metadata.
These two comprise what is known as the "metadata handshake" -- that
is, the initiating router includes metadata in all packets it sends
to the recipient router until it receives a reverse packet with
metadata from that recipient. Likewise, the recipient continues to
send metadata to the initiating router until it receives a packet
without metadata. This is how two routers acknowledge receipt of
metadata from their counterparts: the absence of metadata in a packet
indicates that it has received metadata from its counterpart.
2.4. Pathway Obstructions and Changes
Firewalls and middleboxes that sit along a peer pathway may not
propagate TCP SYN messages with data in the payload (Despite being
valid), or may verify sequence numbers in TCP streams (which are
invalidated due to the inclusion of SVR metadata). The two devices
that represent the peer pathway endpoints may determine through
testing if there is a firewall, NAT, or other active middlebox
between the two routers. The BFD protocol with metadata can be used
to detect the presence of a NAT. See Section 5.1.2. Additional
procedures like STUN [RFC8489], TURN [RFC6062], and ICE [RFC8445] are
well-known, and not included in this document.
If a NAT is detected on the Peer Pathway, the SVR Router that
determines its Waypoint address is being changed saves this as an
attribute of the pathway. The NAT will change the port address
assignment, and require NAT keep alives as exemplified in
Section 6.3.
If a middlebox is detected, the packets can be UDP-transformed (i.e.,
the protocol byte can be changed from TCP to UDP) by the transmitting
router and restored to TCP by the receiving router for packets
flowing in both directions. See Section 4.2.7 and Section 4.6.3 for
more information.
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When routers use IP addresses that are dynamic, such as DHCP served
addresses or PPPoE network attachments, it's possible to be assigned
a new address. If this happens all existing sessions using that
Waypoint address must be updated to use the new address. For
existing sessions this can be performed in real time be reviewing the
sending address. If the address is changed, internal references to
the old address can be updated. For idle circuits, BFD with metadata
is used to detect address changes. See Section 5.1.3 for details.
2.5. Metadata removal
To prevent breaking any applications, there MUST be a 100% guarantee
that metadata inserted by a participating SVR device is removed prior
to the consumption of the data by the application service. If the
client and server support metadata, then SVR metadata can be sent
end-to-end. When a mid-stream packet router wants to insert SVR
metadata, it must guarantee that the packet is directed to a next hop
device that will understand and remove the metadata.
A router can be certain an SVR capable router is on the path when the
next-hop address returned from a FIB table exactly matches a known
peer Waypoint address. Before sending the packet with metadata to
the Waypoint address, the originating SVR router should determine the
Peer reachability as exemplified in Section 3 and Section 5.
If the next-hop is not a known reachable peer, SVR metadata insertion
MUST NOT be performed.
2.6. Modification of transport addresses
To guarantee that the packet will go to a specific router, the
destination address for the packet is changed to the Waypoint Address
of the chosen peer. The original addresses are stored in the forward
context (see Section 7.4.1) and can be recovered when needed. This
is similar to IPv6 segment routing (see [RFC8986]) or a LISP (see
[RFC9300]) RLOC with the exception that the original addresses are
stored in metadata within the payload portion of the packet, and not
the IP Network Header.
Selection of the Waypoint Address to direct sessions is
implementation specific. In the general case a standard FIB lookup
returns one or more IP Address(es) (Waypoints) of the next SVR peer.
When more than one Waypoint address is returned from the FIB,
additional logic can be applied to select the best Waypoint based on
observed peer pathway quality OR session layer load balancing. See
Section 3 for exemplary details.
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To provide a return path for the return flow the source SVR peer
changes the source address to be its own egress Waypoint address.
This provides a guarantee of a symmetric flow. The state of the
session MUST be held in both the source SVR router and the
destination SVR peer.
The address translation rules for the session become state
information that is processed on every packet after the metadata
handshake. All 5 tuples of addressing information are updated
bidirectionally for the session. This action replaces tunnel
encapsulation and decapsulation (tunnel compression), and is an order
of magnitude simpler computationally.
2.7. Optional use of Tenants and Service names for Routing
SVR metadata contains contextual IP Addresses (sources, destinations,
and Waypoints) along with textual service names (i.e., Zoom,
Office365, etc.). The SVR routers can apply policies and route
sessions based on the textual names if they have a route information
base that contains service names. When performing name based
routing, a destination NAT is often required when exiting the SVR
network. The primary use case for this is networking between public
clouds such as AWS and Azure.
With semantic based routing, the use of Dynamic DNS to locate a
service can be eliminated if clients support SVR. Clients can simply
request the service by name, and the SVR router can resolve the
route, and deliver the session to the best location. The last SVR
Router on egress performs a destination NAT for the chosen best
instance of a service.
A local DNS server resolving service addresses to a nearby SVR router
can also provide semantic based routing. This can eliminate the need
to use dynamic DNS for locating services inside data centers.
2.8. Unique 5-Tuples for Every Session
To avoid sharing a hash with all traffic, and to make sessions
completely independent on peer pathways, the source port and
destination port can be assigned any values that are unique by the
source router. When there are no NATs between the two router
interfaces, this permits 2^32 (4,294,967,296) different unique
sessions on a peer pathway. If there are source NATs, this will be
reduced to 2^16 (65,536) different unique sessions. Ports can be
reassigned if not in active use. It is also possible that middle
boxes will limit what destination ports are permissible, reducing the
number of possibilities. Due to all these reasons, range of ports
that can be used on a peer pathway are provisioned by an
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administrator.
The ingress SVR peer (client side) assigns both source and
destination ports, even ports for local (source port) and odd ports
for remote (destination port). This provides total uniqueness
between any two peers, with no negotiation or collision
possibilities. This reduces the number of sessions originating by a
router to half of the total sessions (or 2^30). Think of the two
ports as a Session Identification Tag. Even if a session traveling in
the opposite direction was allocated the same exact ports, because
the source address and destination addresses would be swapped, the
5-tuples on the wire remain unique.
This unique tuple per TCP/UDP session also allows any DSCP or QoS
scheme to work properly. Those fields in the original packet were
not modified and the underlay network routers will see those fields
on a session-by-session basis.
2.9. Session Packets Post Metadata Exchange
After the metadata handshake has been completed, all subsequent
packets are transformed (all 5-tuples, bidirectionally). Compared to
IPSec encapsulation, packet transformation is very efficient as it
does not require memory copies, new header creation, new packet
checksums, and mandatory encryption.
2.10. Session State Requirements
Each participant (peer) in secure vector routing must maintain state
for every active session. This includes the full set of original
addresses and translations required. This allows participants to
stop sending metadata once it has been received by the peer as well
as directing traffic through a network akin to segment routing.
There are three possible scenarios for how state could be, lost.
Loss of state can result in sessions that become stale.
* SVR Ingress Router Loses State: The session state at a router that
originated the SVR session loses state. This could happen during
a redundancy or power failure.
* SVR Peer Router Loses State: The session state is lost in an
intermediate (2nd to nth) router processing an SVR session.
* One or more middleboxes lose state between two SVR routers,
breaking or modifying the session.
Reacquiring State: In all cases, securely reacquiring and/or
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reestablishing the state from an SVR peer for a session is
necessary. If neither peer has session state, the session can be
considered a new session and treated like any first packet. See
Section 3.7.1. Detection of potential loss of state is performed
on every SVR router for every session at all times. Just prior to
transmitting a packet from an SVR router for a session, the
elapsed time since a packet was received from an SVR peer is
compared to an inactivity timeout. The inactivity timeout is
provisioned, and has a recommended value of 5 seconds. If the
inactivity timeout is exceeded, then a loss of session state MAY
be indicated. Note that this logic has no relationship with
session timers guarding session state against no activity.
Unicast Flows: For unicast flows, or asynchronous sessions,
consisting of packets in one direction, detection of potential
loss of state will occur frequently. This will result in this
inactivity timeout occuring on a routine basis for these types of
sessions.
Potential Loss of State: If a potential loss of session state is
indicated, then a Session Health Check metadata is inserted in the
packet being transmitted. When the SVR peer receives Session
Health Check metadata, if the session is valid, and simply idle, a
unicast flow, or an asynchronous session, the SVR peer will
respond with a generated packet that includes Forced Drop metadata
with a reason of 8 indicating the session health check is good.
For unicast and asymmetric flows, this bi-directional exchange of
metadata ensures the session is valid and any middleboxes between
the SVR routers have valid session state. This exchange only
occurs during normal packet transmittal, and as such does not
replace session keep alive. (see Section 2.11).
State not present: If a SVR peer receives a packet with Session
Health Check metadata and it has no session state for the session,
a generated packet that includes Forced Drop metadata with reason
2 indicating that full session set metadata should be sent in the
next packet. See Section 6.7 for an example. In certain cases,
where a middle box has lost state information, or arbitrarily
modified some aspect of the session (e.g., CGNAT), packets with
metadata may not transmit successfully. In cases where there is
no response to a Session Health Check, the next forward packet is
treated as a new session and is processed as such. See
Section 3.7.1.
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2.11. NATs and Session Keep Alive
Each SVR router (peer) must statefully remember the source address
that a session with metadata was received on. This may not be the
same address the router sent a packet from due to a NAT or firewall
in the pathway. Routers use both provisioned and learned Waypoint
Addresses. Routers MUST store the actual Waypoint Addresses received
on the wire from a peer.
When a firewall or middlebox is detected, the SVR router behind such
a device must send metadata packets periodically on idle sessions to
keep any firewall pinhole translations from being removed. For every
UDP and TCP session that has seen no packets after a programmable
length of time (20 seconds is recommended), then the SVR Peer should
send an SVR Control Message on the peer path with the source and dest
ports from the idle session's saved state. See Section 7.3.6 for
more information and see Section 6.3 for an example.
2.12. Use of BFD on Peer Pathways
BFD [RFC5880] is used to verify Peer Pathways. BFD is used to
determine reachability, presence of NATs, changes of Waypoint
Addresses, determination of MTU size, current quality on idle
circuits, authentication of peers, and maintenance of peer
cryptographic keys. Alternative methods can be used for each of
these if both peers agree. The use of BFD is included in this
specification as a preferred technique for Peer Pathway management.
BFD metadata is defined and required to measure quality, perform
authentication, and maintain security keys because standard BFD
authentication fields are insufficient. BFD metadata is different
than SVR metadata because it is inserted at the very end of a BFD
control packet, and not at the end of the layer 4 header. BFD
metadata is never encrypted. To make processing easy, protobufs are
used to transmit the BFD metadata instead of TLV's. The specifics of
BFD metadata can be found in Section 5.
3. SVR Multi-path Routing Example
The example below shows two SVR capable routers, peering with each
other over multiple pathways.
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Client
LAN
10.x.x.x
|
| +--------+ +---------+
| | | | |
| | | | |
+->] East [203.0.113.1<---MPLS---->203.0.113.89] West |
| SVR | | SVR |
| Router[198.51.80.2<--Inet-+--->198.51.80.8] Router |
| | | | |
| [192.0.2.1<-----LTE--+ | [<--+
| | | | |
+--------+ +---------+ |
<========= Peer Pathways ========> |
|
172.15.11.x
LAN
Servers
Figure 2
Note: The client, server, and MPLS network can support the private
routes in 10.x.x.x and 172.15.11.x address spaces natively, but the
internet and LTE networks do not. This is an example of using secure
vectors to join networks together.
3.1. Establishing SVR Peering
The first step in peering SVR routers is to apply any locally defined
static L3 routes and begin advertising and receiving routes using L3
networking protocols (BGP, OSPF, etc.) in order to build a forward
information base or FIB. This is required initially to ensure that
the Waypoints are reachable bidirectionally allowing SVR Peer Paths
to be established.
The second step is for both the East and West routers to establish
the authenticated peer pathways that make up the SVR Peer
relationship. It is recommended that each peer pathway must be
authenticated bi-directionally before the SVR pathway is used.
3.1.1. Reachability and Peer Authentication
Authentication of peers is recommended. It is technically possible
to send SVR metadata and determine a key for peers without
authentication, but this is discouraged. Either peer could require
authentication, and declare the peer relationship invalid should
authentication fail.
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Authentication is based on a certificate signature request created by
the router that contains its name and authority that is signed by a
trusted CA (The Router Certificate). The device registration,
creation, signing, and the secure installation of this certificate
are omitted from this specification. Please refer to [RFC4210].
Elliptical Curve encryption (see [RFC8422]) techniques are used in
SVR. These are more efficient, and have smaller footprints than RSA
which is necessary to efficiently operate inside the BFD protocol.
The SVR Curve that is to be used is defined globally by an
administrator. It is recommended that NIST Curve P-256 be used for
all SVR metadata cryptography. All participating routers in an SVR
network must use the same elliptic curve.
Each peer sends a BFD packet that contains BFD Metadata in clear text
that contains an X.509 Router Certificate in PEM format (see
[RFC5758]). See Section 5.1.7 for specifications. Upon receipt,
this certificate is verified like any other X.509 certificate. The
common name in the certificate provides the authenticated name of the
peer router. The router must verify that the name identified in the
certificate is a valid peer in its routing configuration. The
certificate should have a locally verifiable chain to a trusted
certificate authority.
In our example above, there are three pathways. The BFD message with
the X.509 certificate is sent by each side (East and West) on each
pathway. Each side verifies the certificate, and then determines if
the peer pathway is valid and should be used between peers. To
communicate that the peer has received the certificate, and to stop
sending it in subsequent BFD packets, a BFD packet without a
certificate is sent. This defines the handshake for the local and
remote peer. If a certificate is ever required (for example when a
router's IP address changes) a peer can request it be transmitted by
sending its certificate.
The public key of the router is stored and saved to verify signatures
used in subsequent keying procedures (see Section 3.1.2). If the
routers certificate is updated, this process must be repeated. Any
outstanding valid keys remain operational, preventing outages during
recertification.
3.1.2. Peer Cryptographic Key/Re-keying
In the above example Figure 2 there are three pathways that define
the peer relationship between East and West. Assuming that all three
pathways have been authenticated, the East West peer relationship has
three transport pathways that are authenticated.
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To securely send SVR that can't be intercepted by a man-in-the-
middle, an elliptical curve Peer Key needs to be determined that can
only be known to the authenticated peers. Elliptical curve method
requires each peer previously authenticated create a new key pair
(see Section 5.1.8) every time a key is required or needs updated.
The public keys for each side are signed by each router (ECDSA
signature using the same public key from the routers authentication
certificate above) and sent as BFD metadata inside BFD messages on
one of the authenticated peer paths. This is transmitted once per
second until a corresponding BFD message arrives without the BFD
metadata. This provides the handshake, guaranteeing delivery.
As soon as both sides have each other's public key, an ECDH based
peer key can be calculated that can be used bidirectionally to
encrypt all SVR metadata on any of the peer paths that represent the
peer relationship. See [RFC8422] for more information on ECDH and
ECDSA.
To rekey, at any time, either party can generate a new key pair, and
send a BFD message with a new public key. The peer will then respond
with a newly computed public key, and the SVR peer key can be
recomputed.
With each new key computed, the security ID TLV Section 7.3.2 sent in
SVR metadata is incremented to indicate which key version is to be
used for decryption. This solves transitory race conditions that are
theoretically possible.
The same SVR Peer Key is used for all pathways between peers. This
is beneficial when sessions move from one pathway to another during
multipath routing use cases.
3.1.3. Bring Peer Into Service
When a peer has at least one working authenticated pathway, and has
calculated an Elliptical Curve Peer Key (ECPK), the SVR Peer is
assumed ready for transport traffic bidirectionally, and the peer is
declared operational and in service.
3.1.4. Resulting Peer Relationship
When in service, East and West independently communicate using BFD to
each other's interfaces to ensure operational status and measure path
characteristics such as jitter, latency, and packet loss. In our
example, assuming 100 percent success, the resulting peer pathways
would be:
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PEER: East -> West Authenticated/In Service
Name Description Characteristics
MPLS 203.0.113.1->203.0.113.89 20ms Lat, 0 Loss, 2 Jit
Internet 198.51.80.2->198.51.80.8 30ms Lat, 0 Loss, 3 Jit
LTE 192.0.2.1->198.51.80.8 50ms Lat, 0 Loss, 15 Jit
PEER: West -> East Authenticated/In Service
Name Description Characteristics
MPLS 203.0.113.89->203.0.113.1 20ms Lat, 0 Loss, 2 Jit
Internet 198.51.80.8->198.51.80.2 30ms Lat, 0 Loss, 3 Jit
LTE 198.51.80.8->192.0.2.1 50ms Lat, 0 Loss, 15 Jit
Figure 3
BFD is also used on in service Peer Pathways to determine MTU size
and detect address changes, and monitor quality when idle.
3.2. CIDR based SVR Peer FIB Entries
To route packets and sessions of packets onto SVR Peer Pathways, a
route lookup must return an indication of either a SVR peer pathway,
or a SVR peer.
In the example shown below our assumption is that there are servers
that are located inside 172.15.11.0/24 at the West location. West
publishes or otherwise advertises this route to East on each path
available to it. Subsequently East's FIB will look like this:
East's Forward Information Base (FIB)
Route Next-Hop IP Addr
---------------- -----------------
172.15.11.0/24 203.0.113.89
172.15.11.0/24 198.51.80.8
....
[FIB Entries to reach Waypoints omitted]
Figure 4
Additionally, we will assume there exists a network policy created by
the authority "example" that defines a tenant "engineering" as
10.0.0.0/25 VLAN2, and "github.example" as 172.15.11.23 using TCP
port 22. The provisioning and/or discovery of this policy is outside
the scope of this protocol description.
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A first packet from an engineering client with github as a
destination received at the East SVR Router will result in a search
of the FIB and result in two possible next-hop IP Addresses. East
will consult its SVR Peer Pathway list and recognize that three of
its peer pathways have an exact match of this next-hop IP Address.
These represent the three possible pathways that may be used for
routing this session. The resulting potential routes are:
Possible Routes
MPLS 20ms Latency, 0 Loss, 2 Jitter
Internet 30ms Latency, 0 Loss, 3 Jitter
LTE 50ms Latency, 0 Loss, 15 Jitter
Figure 5
The East router can now choose which pathway (peer pathway) is
desired for the specific session. If the East router has quality
service levels to maintain, it can choose from any of the peer
pathways based on their current quality metrics. If all things are
equal, the East router could load balance using approaches like
"least busy" or other techniques. Once a peer pathway is chosen, the
first packet metadata is constructed, inserted into the first packet,
and sent down the chosen pathway to the West peer router.
For this example, the private address space in the LAN supported by
the East Router is different. This is often the case with large
networks. This is illustrative of a branch router performing network
address translation (NAT) on a source address to solve overlapping
address problems.
In this specific case, assuming MPLS was chosen, East would perform
first packet processing resulting in the insertion of metadata in the
first packet (see Section 3.7.1) and send it out East's interface
with a source address of 203.0.113.1 and a destination address of
203.0.113.89. These are the exact addresses of the MPLS Peer
Pathway.
Both the East and West routers would use the same address pairs (only
reversed) for the bidirectional session, using the allocated source
and destination ports to recognize the specific session. All packets
from all sessions on a peer path will have the same exact IP
addresses, differentiated solely by their port numbers.
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3.3. Optional FIB Containing Service Names
SVR first packet metadata contains text strings that contain service
names. SVR routing can route traffic by these names if the FIB
contained text entries. There are some use cases where this is
preferred over CIDR lookups:
Avoiding Dynamic DNS: Dynamic DNS is used to augment network routing
protocols by answering the question: What best IP Address is
available and best for a session now? Dynamic DNS can be plagued
by delays in real time updates and additional complexity and cost.
In private networks, path service state may not be reflected in
Dynamic DNS responses.
Multi-Cloud Networking: Public clouds run service instances on
dynamically allocated private IP addresses. They provide very
accurate and responsive DNS updates to help find IP addresses for
networking. These DNS services are not available outside of the
cloud, making internetworking difficult. SVR Routers can use DNS
resolution to find IP Addresses for named services.
Below is an example FIB that contains named services and traditional
FIB entries. The FIB is now an SVR FIB containing service names,
protocols, and ports, with next-hop addresses changed to Waypoint
Addresses.
East's Extended SVR Forward Information Base (OPTIONAL)
Egress
Service Name Route Waypoint Action
-------------- ------------------ ------------ --------
github.example 172.15.11.23:TCP:22 203.0.113.89 FWD
github.example 172.15.11.23:TCP:22 198.51.80.8 FWD
logsvc.example 172.15.11.20:UDP:514 203.0.113.89 DNS
logsvc.example 172.15.11.20:UDP:514 198.51.80.8 DNS
https.example 172.15.11.24:TCP:443 203.0.113.89 DEST NAT
-196.168.1.1
-196.168.1.2
-196.168.1.3
[FIB Entries to reach Waypoints omitted]
Figure 6
Longest prefix matching (LPM), protocol and port will be used to
match Routes for packets intended for github on ingress to SVR. The
text string "github.example" will be used by all other SVR routers
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until egress from SVR. The SVR fib can be used to LPM match on IP
addresses and exactly match protocol and ports. In the above
illustrative example, only three protocols are supported (SSH,
Syslog, and HTTPs). All other packets will be denied by default.
The egress action in the SVR FIB can be used to support three
different egress actions:
Forward Packet (Default): Restore the IP Addresses and forward. If
a source NAT is provided in the metadata, NAT the source address.
DNS: Use DNS to resolve the service name locally. In this example
DNS resolution procedures would be used on egress to resolve
"logsvc.example".
DEST NAT: NAT the destination address to one (or load balance to a
pool of addresses). This is identical to load balancers.
These named routes can co-exist with traditional FIB entries shown
above. SVR will always match a named route first, and fall through
to the generic routes second.
3.4. SVR Security Definitions
For basic SVR functionality to work between peers, there must be a
Authority wide provisioned set of rules. These rules include:
HMAC Method: This describes the method/technique for signing SVR
packets. This could be SHA1, SHA256, or SHA256-128.
Use Time Based HMAC: This is either YES or NO.
HMAC Metadata or ALL: This is NONE, Metadata Only, ALL
Metadata Block Cipher: This is either NONE, AES128, AES256.
Elliptical Curve: This is the curve to use (defaults to Curve
P-256).
SVR does not limit the use of ciphers and techniques to those listed
above. The requirements for both signatures and encryption are to
use a cypher where the results are fixed, well-known, block sizes.
Security Policies are used during session setup to setup payload
encryption specifically for individual sessions. These are exchanged
in first packet metadata.
For this example will use the following SVR security definitions.
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HMAC: (On, time-based, SHA256-128, ALL Packets)
Metadata Encryption (On, AES256)
Elliptical Curve: Curve 256P (NIST)
Figure 7
3.5. Time Based HMAC Details
To positively authenticate and provide integrity for SVR session, SVR
peers use Time Based HMAC signatures. HMAC signatures are defined in
[RFC2104]. Please see Section 4.5.1.
In our example, we are using SHA256-128 with a size of 16 Bytes.
3.6. Security Keying/Rekeying Considerations
Every metadata transaction includes a security ID header TLV (see
Section 7.3.2).
Each SVR Peer will have its initial Peer Key (version 1) established
during the peering establishment. The key may be updated at any
time, and the key version will be incremented. The security key
version is always sent in metadata to ensure the peer knows which key
to use to decrypt the metadata just sent. If a peer only has version
1 of a key, and metadata arrives specifying it is now at version 2,
the SVR router must obtain the new key before it can process any
packets (see Section 3.1.2).
For networks that are large and actively performing key management,
there may be multiple versions of a key active for very brief moments
in time, and SVR routers MUST be able to utilize any key for a
reasonable amount of time.
3.7. New Session Initiation Detailed
The diagram below shows the example github TCP session flowing
between a client and server through the East and West routers in our
example network.
Ladder Diagram for SSH Example:
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Engineering Github
Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Server
| |
+ East Router West Router |
| | | |
+---SYN----->| | |
| |--SYN[w/MD]------------>| |
| | |--SYN----->|
| | | |
| | |<--SYN/ACK-|
| |<------SYN/ACK[w/RMD]---| |
|<--SYN/ACK--| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|<==== Session Packets Flow with No Metadata ====>|
The East Router MUST construct and insert metadata (MD) in the first
packet of the SSH session, which will be a TCP SYN packet. The West
Router must remove the metadata, and forward the SYN packet, and wait
for the server to respond with a SYN/ACK. Upon receipt of the SYN/
ACK, the West Router will create reverse metadata (RMD), and insert
it into the SYN/ACK. This will create the metadata handshake for the
SSH session. All forward and reverse metadata are inserted into
existing packets if possible.
When a client or router detects that a new session is being
established, the East Router will insert metadata into the first
packet to communicate intent to the West Router. At both East and
West Routers, the first packet will require specialized handling.
Detecting a first packet for a session is protocol specific. For
TCP, it's a new 5-Tuple packet (new flow) with the just the SYN flag
set. For UDP, it's simply a new 5-Tuple packet not currently in
active use.
3.7.1. East First Packet Processing
Utilizing the same example, assume that the packet shown below
arrives on the East Router from the Client LAN. The packet is the
result of an engineer attempting to access a github service via SSH.
Arriving Packet at East Router
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Packet received on LAN side East Router
Engineer using SSH to access Github
+---------+---------------------+--------------+----------+
|L2 HDR | IP Header | TCP Header | PAYLOAD |
| VLAN=2 | SRC=10.0.1.1 | Sport=6969 | Data |
| | DST=172.15.11.23 | Dport=22 | (N/A) |
+---------+---------------------+--------------+----------+
3.7.1.1. Determine Tenant
The tenant is a text name which describes the routes and policies
that are available for a group of source IP addresses. Tenants are
like security zones. In our example, the "engineer" is based upon
VLAN 2, and the tenant will be "engineer" as named by the authority
"example". The configuration and data models to map physical network
attributes to named tenants is implementation specific. Associating
a default tenant with every logical interface on a SVR Router is
recommended.
3.7.1.2. Determine Service
There are multiple ways to determine the associated service for a new
session. Application Identification technology is used that
understands all popular SaaS offerings. These techniques use
combinations of IP address ranges and ports, SNI fields in TLS,
Common Name from Certificates, and extraction of URLs from HTTP
requests. Most popular SaaS vendors today publish and update
frequently their CIDR blocks and ports used by their services. This
is out of scope for this document.
Longest prefix matching algorithms are used to extract the major and
key services at a site. If there is traffic which cannot be
identified accurately, often it will be placed into a "catch-all"
service called "internet".
We will assume for this document, that the address 172.15.11.23 is a
well-known address for git servers at authority "example", and port
22 is known to be SSH.
3.7.1.3. Determine Network Requirements
Once the tenant and service have been determined, a lookup for
network requirements can be determined.
Example Network Requirements
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SERVICE: github
Access Policies:
Tenants Allowed: engineering
Tenants Denied: release.engineering
Quality Policy: latency < 40ms
Security Policy:None
The above definition for github defines an example network
requirement. Access policies determine which tenants are allowed,
and if any specifically denied. The Quality policy defines the
service level experience requirements. Secure Vector Routing
exchanges tenants, services, and security policies using character
strings in metadata. Access and quality policies are defined and
used locally within a router and logically tied to the service. The
implementation of quality and access policy controls are site
specific. For example, VLAN based subnets may have different
meanings at various locations. Also, QoS management schemes may be
different for different network areas.
3.7.1.4. Picking a Peer Path
As stated previously, the East Router has three peer paths that can
reach the destination based on L3 reachability. The next step is to
apply the network requirements to see which of the peer paths remain.
Our policy requires latency to be less than 40 msecs, which
eliminates East's LTE pathway from consideration. The remaining two
pathways, MPLS and Internet, are both possible. We will choose MPLS
as it has the lowest latency, offering the user the best experience.
Many different criteria can be used in selecting a peer pathway. In
practice, how busy a peer path is and its capacity result in new
sessions routing to 2nd best options. Often simple load balancing is
used. In cases where there are higher costs (such as LTE or 5G
networking), these may be held in reserve for backup or disaster
recovery. The actual algorithms for picking peer pathways are
outside the scope of this protocol.
3.7.1.5. Allocate Source NAT if Necessary
In this github example, there is a source NAT at the East Router on
the MPLS interface to the datacenter. This by design, allows all of
the remote branch sites to use overlapping addresses, and is very
common in larger networks. Routers that perform source NAT have two
options: use the interface address and allocate a new source port, or
use an IP address pool and allocate full IP addresses for each
session. Either way, this allocated address only needs to be placed
into metadata, as the existing packet address will be translated to
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Waypoint Addresses shortly. The egress SVR router will apply the
source NAT.
3.7.1.6. Allocation of Ports
The next step is to allocate new ports for the SVR session. The
ports being allocated must not be in use, and should not have been
used recently to avoid any issues with middleboxes. See Section 4.2.
The range of ports that can be used may be site specific and tied to
policies that exist in upstream firewalls or middleboxes. For these
reasons, the actual pool of available addresses is provisioned on
every SVR router. The East router has ports 8000 to 24000 available
for both the source and destination ports. In this example we will
allocate an even source port of 8000, and an odd destination port of
8001.
3.7.1.7. Session State and Metadata Construction
The router now has reached a point where it can forward the packet.
It has valid network requirements, available peer paths, and has
available SVR ports. The next step is to create and save all session
state information for subsequent packet processing. A session UUID
is created for end-to-end tracking of sessions. The table below
refers to metadata TLVs and specific contents that are documented in
Section 7.
Session State Table Entry
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State Information & Mappings to Metadata Fields
Metadata TLV |------TLV------|
Category -Field VALUE Type Len Hdr
-------- ------------------ ----------------
Header 12
Header TLVs
Security ID 1 16 4 4
Path Metrics 26 10 4
-Tx Color 5
-Tx TimeValue 4200 MSecs
-Rx Color 3
-Rx TimeVlue 3950 MSecs
-Drop No
-Prev Color Count 950 Packets
--- ---
Total Header Length = 34 (26+8) 26 8
Payload TLVs
Forward Context 2 13 4
- Source IP Addr 10.0.0.1
- Dest IP Addr 172.15.11.23
- Protocol TCP
- Source Port 6969
- Dest Port 22
Tenant Name engineering 7 11 4
Service Name github 10 6 4
UUID ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP 6 16 4
Source Router Name East Router 14 11 4
Source NAT Address 203.0.113.1 25 4 4
Security Policy NONE 15 4 4
Peer Path 19 22 4
- Source Addr 203.0.113.1
- Dest Addr 203.0.113.89
--- ---
Total Payload Length = 119 (87+32) 87 32
To West Fr West
Allocated Ports Router Router
-Source Port 8000 8001
-Dest Port 8001 8000
Session HMAC Key [Peer Key at session start]
The required and optional metadata attributes that must be inserted
in a first packet of a new sessions are defined in Section 4.3.1.
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One optional metadata attribute is included in this example for the
pathway metrics. This is documented in Section 7.3.7.
The order of the TLVs is arbitrary, but header TLVs must be before
any payload TLVs. If a TLV is received that is unknown to a peer, it
MUST ignore it. In this example, the header length including the two
header TLVs is 34, and the 8 payload TLV's are 119 bytes long.
The Session HMAC Key is state information retained by the router.
The Session HMAC Key is set to the current Peer Key at session
initiation. This key is used for the life of a session.
3.7.1.8. Encryption of Metadata
The next step is to encrypt the metadata block as defined in
Section 4.4. In our example, our provisioned security definitions
include AES256 for metadata encryption. AES has a 128-bit block size
for all key lengths. In our example, the metadata payload TLVs are
119 bytes large. Padding will be added during encryption to make it
128 bytes (or 9 bytes of padding). In addition, to make the
encrypted data stateless, we must also include a 16 byte
initialization vector directly after the encrypted block. The
resultant encrypted metadata block is 178 bytes and looks like this:
Metadata Block
+--------------+--------------+---------+----------------+
| Metadata | Metadata | Padding | Initialization |
| Header | Payload TLVs | | Vector |
| (Unecrypted) | | | |
| 34 Bytes | 119 Bytes | 9 Bytes | 16 Bytes |
+--------------+--------------+---------+----------------+
|<---Clear---->|<---Encrypted Portion-->|
|<----------------178 Byte Metadata Block--------------->|
3.7.1.9. Insert Metadata
The metadata block is inserted into the packet directly after the L4
Header. The total length of this specific metadata block is 178
bytes, 34 of which are header bytes and 119 for payload TLVs. If
there is data in the payload portion of the IP Packet, the payload
data is moved down to make room for the metadata. The packet
structure will now look like:
Metadata Added
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Packet with metadata inserted
+---------------------+--------------+-----------+------------+
| IP Header | TCP Header | Metadata | PAYLOAD |
| SRC=10.0.1.1 | Sport=6969 | Block | Data |
| DST=172.15.11.23 | Dport=22 | 178 Bytes | (optional) |
+---------------------+--------------+-----------+------------+
The transport addresses in the packet are updated to use the selected
peer path.
Transport Addresses Updated
Final Transformed Packet with metadata inserted
+---------------------+--------------+-----------+------------+
| IP Header | TCP Header | Metadata | PAYLOAD |
| SRC=203.0.113.1 | Sport=8000 | Block | Data |
| DST=203.0.113.89 | Dport=8001 | 178 Bytes | (optional) |
+---------------------+--------------+-----------+------------+
3.7.1.10. Signing SVR Packet
The packet containing metadata is now signed with a HMAC signature
(See Section 3.5). The HMAC signature is placed at the very end of
the packet, extending the packet size by the signature's length. The
IP header is excluded from the signature. The current peer key is
used (see Section 5.1.8) for signing and verifying the authenticity
of the packet. In this case the HMAC is 16 bytes.
HMAC Signature Added
Packet with metadata inserted
+-------------------+--------------+-----------+---------+-------+
| IP Header | TCP Header | Encrypted | PAYLOAD | HMAC |
| SRC=203.0.113.1 | Sport=8000 | metadata | Data | 16 |
| DST=203.0.113.89 | Dport=8001 | | | Bytes |
+-------------------+--------------+-----------+---------+-------+
| |
|<=========HMAC Signed Data=========>|
3.7.1.11. Sending the First Packet
The packet length and checksum is corrected, and the packet is
transmitted. The sending side will include the same exact metadata
on every packet until a packet in the opposite direction (reverse
direction) arrives with reverse metadata indicating a complete
handshake. For TCP, the SYN packet contains metadata, and typically
a SYN-ACK from the server side responds with metadata, and there is
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no further metadata inserted in a session.
Client ----> TCP SYN w/Metadata ----> Server
Server <---- TCP SYN-ACK w/Metadata <---- Server
For UDP, metadata can be inserted in packets until there is a reverse
flow packet with metadata, except for unidirectional flows as noted
in Section 3.5.7.
3.7.2. West First Packet Processing
If a packet arrives at the West Router having the West Routers
Waypoint (interface address) as a destination address (i.e., the
packet was sent to the router, and not to a destination beyond the
router) the packet may likely contain metadata. When this occurs,
the following steps are taken.
3.7.2.1. Verify Source Address is a Waypoint
Packets arriving on the routers must be verified to be valid before
they are processed (see Section 4.6.2). These simple checks can
eliminate any potential attack vectors. If the packet fails
authentication or validation the packet MAY be dropped or responded
to with an ICMP Destination Unreachable packet.
In the example case we are using, there are only three source
addresses that could be possible:
Possible Source Addresses
203.0.113.1 MPLS Peer Pathway
198.51.80.2 Internet Peer Pathway
169.254.231.106 LTE Peer Pathway
3.7.2.2. Verify Metadata Block
The very first and most efficient test is to verify that the metadata
is present is to look for header magic number (see Section 4.6.1).
The next verification step is to check the HMAC signature (see
Section 4.5.1). If the signature is invalid, the packet should be
dropped and a security event noted. If valid, processing continues.
The unencrypted portions of the metadata header should be verified
for reasonableness. The Header Length and Payload Length must be
less than the metadata block size.
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3.7.2.3. Parse Metadata and Save State and Translations
The next step is to decrypt the metadata (See Section 4.6.2.2). If
there are any reasons why the metadata block cannot be decrypted, or
the decryption fails, the packet is dropped.
The payload TLVs can now be parsed and the necessary state and
translations loaded into memory. If there is a failure to parse all
TLV's, the packet is dropped.
Next the metadata block and HMAC signatures are removed from the
packet.
3.7.2.4. Restore Addresses and Route Packet
The metadata information is used to restore the original context to
the packet. The packet is then recursively processed exactly like
the first packet described in Section 3.7.1 with a few differences.
The Context, Tenant, Service, Security Policy and Session UUID
strings are used from the metadata (as opposed to locally determining
them) eliminating these steps. These are then used for applying
policy and routing decisions locally. The end result is the packet
may go through another SVR Peer Pathway or be delivered via standard
networking techniques. In this example, the West Router delivers the
packet to the Server LAN.
When the packet is forwarded to another SVR Peer, there are some
differences. The Tenant, Service, Session UUID, Security Policy and
the original 5-tuple addresses are all cloned. This provides
consistent data across a multi-hop SVR network. It should be noted
that the metadata must be decrypted at every SVR Router and then re-
encrypted because the Waypoint addresses are different for each
selected peer pathway. Payload decryption however, is only encrypted
at the first SVR router and decrypted at the last SVR router.
3.7.2.5. Detection of a Looping Session
Because every hop between SVR Routers utilizes the same session UUID,
a looping first packet is easy to detect. There MUST never be two
sessions with the same UUID. Any session that loops must be dropped.
By detecting looping packets during the first packet transmitted,
subsequent packets can be dropped on ingress by the SVR Router that
detected the looping behavior. SVR routers must also decrement the
TTL and operate in all ways like a traditional router to prevent
looping packets that are not detected by SVR.
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When a packet arrives with metadata after the metadata handshake has
been completed, it is assumed to be an update and not classified as
looping. Updates can be used to change any attribute, but most
commonly to change a peer pathway for a session. See Section 6.1.
3.7.3. Return Packet Path Pre-Established
After processing the first forward packet at both East and West
routers, both the East and West routers have established packet
forwarding rules and translations for both directions. This means
that eastbound rules and westbound rules are all established and
installed. The router is thus capable now of recognizing 5-tuples in
either direction and acting on the packets without consulting routing
tables. This is known as fast path processing.
3.7.4. Sending Reverse Metadata
On a session-by-session basis, SVR Routers must know the status of a
metadata handshake. If a packet for a session arrives and the
metadata handshake is not complete, the SVR Router must insert
metadata for the session. This will continue until there is
verification that the SVR Peer has received the information. As
stated previously, for TCP SYN this is normally the first reverse
packet which is a TCP SYN/ACK. The purpose of reverse metadata is:
* To indicate to the sender that it can stop sending metadata
(Completion of the metadata handshake).
* Provide backward information about the service for routing of
future instances.
In this example, the reverse metadata includes:
Reverse Metadata Response
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Reverse Metadata Response
State Information & Mappings to Metadata Fields
Metadata TLV |------TLV------|
Category -Field VALUE Type Len Hdr
-------- ------------------ ----------------
Header 12
Header TLVs
Security ID 1 16 4 4
Path Metrics 26 10 4
-Tx Color 3
-Tx TimeValue 4100 MSecs
-Rx Color 5
-Rx TimeVlue 4050 MSecs
-Drop No
-Prev Color Count 1950 Packets
--- ---
Total Header Length = 34 (26+8) 26 8
Payload TLVs
Reverse Context 4 13 4
- Source IP Addr 203.0.113.1
- Dest IP Addr 172.15.11.23
- Protocol TCP
- Source Port 7891
- Dest Port 6969
Peer Path 19 22 4
- Source Addr 203.0.113.89
- Dest Addr 203.0.113.1
--- ---
Total Payload Length = 43 (35+8) 35 8
To East From East
Allocated Ports Router Router
- Source Port 8001 8000
- Dest Port 8000 8001
Session HMAC Key [Peer key used by remote peer]
See Section 4.3 for required and optional TLVs in reverse metadata.
One optional metadata attribute is included in this example for the
pathway metrics. This is documented in Section 7.3.7.
The Session HMAC Key is state information retained by the router.
The Session HMAC Key is set to the Peer Key version specified in the
SVR Metadata (Security ID). This is most like the current Peer Key
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but it is possible re-keying could create a race condition. To solve
this problem, the Session State for routers terminating SVR sessions
uses the Peer Key indicated by the initiator. This key is used for
the life of a session.
One of the benefits of SVR is the complete tracking of sessions end-
to-end. In this example, the metadata state located in the SVR
router contains all addresses used. The forward context provides the
egress SVR router with the addresses being used pre-NAT, and the
source NAT information. The reverse context would likewise supply
the ingress SVR destination NAT addresses. Knowing the Waypoint
Addresses used along with the ports used provides complete end-to-end
visibility of each session.
This metadata will be encrypted, inserted, and an HMAC checksum will
be computed and attached as per the previous example. The reverse
packet in this example will have 34 bytes of header data, and 43
bytes of payload data, 5 bytes of padding, and a 16 byte
initialization vector resulting in a metadata block that is 98 bytes
long.
3.7.5. Subsequent Packet Processing
As soon as an SVR peer receives a packet of a session from another
SVR peer and there is no metadata, the SVR Handshake is complete, and
it can stop sending metadata. This work for both the East Router and
the West Router. Both will transmit metadata until they receive a
packet without metadata.
3.7.6. Session Termination
No metadata is sent upon normal session termination. The router can
monitor the TCP state machine and have a guard timer after seeing a
FIN/ACK or RST exchange. After the guard timer, the session can be
removed from the system. If a new session arrives during this period
(a TCP SYN), then it will cause immediate termination of the existing
session. In addition, all protocols also have an associated
inactivity timeout, after which the session gets terminated if no
packets flow in either direction. Should an existing session send a
packet after the inactivity timeout, it will be processed as a new
session.
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3.7.7. Unidirectional/Asymmetric Flows
When there are unidirectional flows, or path asymmetry (e.g. TCP
sequence numbers advance with no reverse packets observed), and there
is end-to-end communication, one can stop sending metadata. For UDP
asymmetry, the sending router will send a maximum of 20 packets with
metadata; if no reverse packets are seen during that time, the
receiving peer router generates and sends a disable metadata packet
to the originating router to complete the metadata handshake. (Note:
The total number of packets sent with metadata without receiving a
reverse packet is an implementation detail and is not a strict
requirement.
3.7.8. Multi-Hop Session Ladder Diagram
The diagram below shows a typical normal TCP session flowing between
a client and server through routers in a network.
Ladder Diagram for Session Initiation with Metadata:
Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Server
| |
+ RouterA RouterB RouterC |
| | | | |
+----SYN---->| | | |
| |--SYN[MD1]-->| | |
| | |--SYN[MD2]->| |
| | | |----SYN--->|
| | | | |
| | | |<--SYN/ACK-|
| | |<--SYN/ACK--| |
| |<--SYN/ACK---| [RMD2] | |
|<--SYN/ACK--| [RMD1] | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
|<===== Session Packets Flow with No Metadata =====>|
Note that each router constructs metadata for the next chosen peer in
the routed pathway as depicted by MD1 and MD2 in the above diagram.
Upon receipt of first reverse packet, reverse metadata RMD2 and RMD1
is inserted. Each router allocates its own transport addresses
(Waypoints) for each session. The context, service name, tenant
name, and session UUID sent are unchanged between all routers, and
can be used for determining routing policies to apply. The session
UUID is the same in MD1, MD2, RMD1, and RMD2 in the above diagram.
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Likewise, the diagram below shows a session teardown sequence for a
typical TCP session.
Ladder Diagram for Session Teardown Metadata:
Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Server
| |
+ RouterA RouterB RouterC |
| | | | |
+---FIN----->| | | |
| |-----FIN---->| | |
| | |----FIN---->| |
| | | |-----FIN-->|
| | | | |
| | | |<--FIN/ACK-|
| | |<--FIN/ACK--| |
| |<--FIN/ACK---| | |
|<--FIN/ACK--| | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
No metadata is sent or required when sessions terminate. Each router
keeps its state information for a programmed length of time in case a
FIN/ACK is delayed or dropped, then the state information is removed.
4. SVR Protocol Definition
This section provides the normative requirements for SVR Metadata to
achieve interoperability.
4.1. SVR Session Definitions and Types
SVR implementations MUST support TCP, UDP, and ICMP. SVR
implementations SHOULD support UDP Unicast. Sessions are
characterized by having an initial first packet that is a unique to
an SVR router. Often this is described as a unique 5-tuples as seen
by the router. Sessions start when the first packet is processed,
and end when either the L4 protocol indicates the session is
completed (TCP FIN/FIN ACK, RST) or there has been no activity for a
length of time (UDP, ICMP, UDP Unicast, point-to-point ethernet).
SVR is always OPTIONAL. SVR implementations can choose when to use
SVR on a session-by-session basis. SVR implementations MUST support
non-SVR traffic.
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4.2. SVR Metadata Insertion
4.2.1. Metadata Packet Location
SVR implementations MUST insert metadata into packets directly after
the L4 header, even if the resulting increase in packet size would
cause the packet to require fragmentation. For Ethernet point-to-
point and ICMP error messages, IP Headers and L4 headers MUST be
created, and if associated with an existing session, MUST share the
exact transport 5-tuples (SVR Waypoints and Ports) as the session the
ICMP error message relates to. The metadata MUST be in the very
first packet of a new session (TCP or UDP bidirectional flow) to have
any role in path selection or security. Metadata SHALL be sent in
any subsequent packet in any direction to change or update the
networking requirements. The metadata is inserted into the payload
portion of a packet to guarantee it makes it unchanged through the
network. Packet lengths and checksums MUST be adjusted accordingly.
TCP sequence numbers MUST NOT be adjusted.
4.2.2. Metadata Prerequisites
A prerequisite for SVR metadata insertion is that a Peer Pathway MUST
be selected relating to a specific session. This is similar to
choosing a tunnel between two networks. This Peer Pathway has IP
addresses on either side (Waypoint Addresses), and these addresses
will always be the transport IP addresses for packets containing SVR
metadata.
4.2.3. Metadata Port Allocation for Sessions
The SVR peer originating the session (client side) MUST allocate both
source and destination ports. The ingress side MUST choose even
ports for local (source port) and odd ports for remote (destination
port). This provides total uniqueness between any two peers, with no
negotiation or collision possibilities. The range of ports to use
for allocation is provisioned. Ports in use MUST be excluded from
allocation. Ports MUST be unallocated when session state is removed.
Ports MUST have a 60 second guard time before being reallocated
4.2.4. Metadata on Idle Session
SVR implementations MAY need to send metadata to a peer at a time
when there are no existing packets. In these cases an IP packet MUST
be created and inserted into the appropriate existing session with an
indication the packet should be dropped. See Section 6.3 for an
example. The packet MUST be processed, interpreted, and dropped by
the directly adjacent peer and not forwarded to any other SVR peer.
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4.2.5. Metadata Packet Structure
Existing IP Packet with metadata inserted
+------------------+-----------------+----------+----------+----+
| Existing IP Hdr | Existing L4 Hdr | Metadata | PAYLOAD |HMAC|
| Source IP Addr | Source Port | Block | Data | |
| Dest IP Addr | Dest Port | |(optional)| |
+------------------+-----------------+----------+----------+----+
Generated IP Packet with metadata inserted
+-------------------+------------------+----------+----+
| Created IP Hdr | Created L4 Hdr | Metadata |HMAC|
| Source IP Addr | Source Port | Block | |
| Dest IP Addr | Dest Port | | |
+-------------------+------------------+----------+----+
ICMP Packet with metadata inserted
+-----------------+-----------------+----------+--------+----+
| Created IP Hdr | Created UDP Hdr | Metadata | ICMP |HMAC|
| Source IP Addr | Source Port | Block | MSG | |
| Dest IP Addr | Dest Port | | | |
+-----------------+-----------------+----------+--------+----+
Ethernet Packet with metadata inserted
+-----------------+-----------------+----------+----------+----+
| Created IP Hdr | Created UDP Hdr | Metadata | Ethernet |HMAC|
| Source IP Addr | Source Port | Block | MSG | |
| Dest IP Addr | Dest Port | | | |
+-----------------+-----------------+----------+----------+----+
If UDP protocol, the UDP Header MUST be updated to have the correct
packet length.
The Layer 4 header (TCP/UDP) MUST have its checksum recalculated per
the appropriate procedures.
The IP Packet length field MUST be updated to reflect the number of
bytes added for the metadata block AND the HMAC signature.
The IP Header Checksum MUST be updated after the IP Packet length is
adjusted.
If TCP protocol, the TCP Sequence numbers MUST NOT be changed.
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4.2.6. Prevention of False Positives
Metadata is sent inside the payload portion of TCP and UDP packets.
Given that no byte sequence is truly unique in the payload of a
packet, in the scenario where the original payload after the L4
header contained the same byte sequence as the SVR magic number,
false positive logic is enacted on the packet. This guarantees
downstream SVR routers will not confuse metadata magic number
signatures.
False positives SHALL NOT occur when first packets are processed,
since valid metadata will always be inserted regardless of the
contents of the first 8 bytes of the payload. False positive can
only occur during existing valid SVR sessions between peers.
To implement false positive logic, SVR implementations MUST insert an
empty metadata header (12 byte header with 0 TLVs). This creates a
contract with downstream SVR routers that if the magic number is
present, there MUST be valid metadata that requires processing and
removal.
The structure of a false positive metadata includes just a header of
length 12 bytes, with zero header TLVs and zero payload TLVs. The
SVR router receiving a packet with false positive metadata will strip
out the metadata header and any TLV's as is normally expected. The
inserted metadata header has no TLV's and is not encrypted.
Metadata Location
Received Midstream SVR Packet matching SVR Magic Number
+-------+--------+-------------------------+
|IP Hdr | L4 Hdr |0x4c48dbc6ddf6670c ..... |
+-------+--------+-------------------------+
Midstream SVR Packet with False Positive metadata inserted
+--------+--------+--------+---------------------------+
| IP Hdr | L4 Hdr |Metadata| 0x4c48dbc6ddf6670c ...... |
| | | HDR | |
+--------+--------+--------+---------------------------+
Insertion of header or payload TLV's is OPTIONAL and at the
discretion of the implementation. If adding TLV's, standard
procedures MUST be applied including encryption if payload TLV's are
added.
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4.2.7. TCP to UDP Transformation
TCP to UDP transformation is required when a middlebox blocks certain
TCP packets that contain metadata. SVR implementations typically
test Peer Pathways to ensure metadata insertion into TCP SYN packets
will pass through any middleboxes. If TCP SYN packets with metadata
are dropped by a middle box, then TCP packets are transformed to UDP
for SVR processing, and restored when exiting SVR processing. The
steps to transform TCP to UDP are:
The protocol field in the IP header MUST be changed from 0x06 (TCP)
to 0x11 (UDP).
The UDP checksum will write over the sequence number. To save the
sequence number, it is copied to the 32-bit checksum/urgent pointer
location of the TCP header.
To positively communicate that TCP to UDP transformation has
occurred, one must add TLV 12 to the metadata being transmitted. See
Section 7.4.9.
The UDP transformation is for every packet in a session, not just the
packets with metadata. The restoration process is depicted in
Section 4.6.3.
4.3. Required and Optional TLVs
4.3.1. New and Moved IP Sessions TLVs
The metadata TLVs that MUST be inserted in a first forward metadata
packet of a new sessions includes:
* Header: Security Identifier: see Section 7.3.2.
* Payload: Forward Context: see Section 7.4.1, Section 7.4.2.
* Payload: Tenant Name: see Section 7.4.6.
* Payload: Service Name: see Section 7.4.7.
* Payload: Session UUID: see Section 7.4.5.
* Payload: Source Router Name: see Section 7.4.10.
* Payload: Security Policy: see Section 7.4.11.
* Payload: Peer Pathway ID: see Section 7.4.12.
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Optional metadata TLV's that MAY be included in forward metadata are:
* Header: Path Metrics: see Section 7.3.7.
* Header: SVR Control Message: see Section 7.3.6.
* Payload: Session Encrypted: see Section 7.4.8.
* Payload: TCP Syn Packet: see Section 7.4.9.
* Payload: IPv4 Source NAT Address: see Section 7.4.13.
* Payload: Remaining Session Time: see Section 7.4.14.
The order of the TLVs is arbitrary, but header TLVs must be before
any payload TLVs. If a TLV is received that is unknown to a peer, it
MUST ignore it.
The metadata TLVs that MUST be inserted in a first reverse packet of
a new sessions include:
* Header: Security Identifier: see Section 7.3.2.
* Payload: Reverse Context: see Section 7.4.3, Section 7.4.4.
* Payload: Peer Pathway ID: see Section 7.4.12.
Optional metadata TLV's that MAY be included reverse metadata are:
* Payload: Path Metrics: see Section 7.3.7.
4.3.2. ICMP TLVs
The metadata TLVs that MUST be inserted when returning an ICMP Error
include:
* Header: ICMP Error Location Address: see Section 7.3.4,
Section 7.3.5.
Optional metadata TLV's that MAY be included reverse metadata are:
* Header: Path Metrics: see Section 7.3.7.
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4.4. Metadata Encryption
Encryption of metadata utilizes block mode ciphers. Cipher's MUST
have a consistent block size. The cipher to use and its block size
MUST be provisioned and known to peers in advance. The provisioning
methodology is outside the scope of this document. The Peer Key used
for encryption is specific to all Peer Pathways between any two peers
and is obtained using BFD with metadata (see Section 5.1.8). When
data is encrypted with block mode ciphers, the block will be padded
with zeros (0x0's) to equal an increment of the block size used by
the cipher. An initialization vector allows the decryption to be
performed without any state.
Metadata Block
Cipher Block Size IV Size
------- ----------------- --------
AES256 128 Bits(16 Bytes) 16 Bytes
AES128 128 Bits(16 Bytes) 16 Bytes
+----------+--------+---------+---------+----------------+
| Metadata | Header | Payload | Padding | Initialization |
| Header | TLVs | TLVs | | Vector |
+----------+--------+---------+---------+----------------+
|<------Clear------>|<--- Encrypted --->|
|<---------------------- Metadata Block ---------------->|
The padding can be computed as the length of the metadata payload
TLVs MOD block size.
4.5. SVR Packet Authentication
4.5.1. HMAC Signatures
Through provisioning (outside the scope of this document), an SVR
Authority MUST define if HMAC signatures are to be used. An SVR
Authority MUST also define if Time Based HMAC is to be used. AN SVR
Authority MUST determine if ALL packets are signed, or just packets
containing metadata. Due to the possibility of replay attacks, it is
RECOMMENDED that Time Based HMAC signatures be used on ALL SVR
packets. The Session HMAC Key is determined at session
initialization and defaults to the Peer Key (see Section 5.1.8).
SVR Peers SHOULD sign all packets with HMAC signatures defined in
[RFC2104]. The Session HMAC Key should be used when creating an HMAC
signature. When present there MUST be only one HMAC signature in an
IP packet even if it fragments across multiple physical IP packets.
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Time-based HMAC signatures are RECOMMENDED. For time-based HMAC
signatures, SVR routers append the current time since epoch (measured
in seconds) divided by 2 to the data being signed. SVR routers MUST
have clocks synchronized accurately. Methods for synchronizing
clocks and measuring any differences or drifts are outside the scope
of this document. Minimally NTP [RFC5905] should be implemented. In
cases where the current time cannot be relied on, one may need to
disable the time based HMAC and use a standard HMAC, but this is NOT
RECOMMENDED.
The HMAC signature is always added to the very end of a packet. The
size of the HMAC signature depends on which signature is used. Well
known HMAC types are used with SVR including SHA1, SHA256-128, and
SHA256.
SVR Packet with metadata inserted
+-----------+--------------+---------+----------+-------+
|IP Header | L4 Header |Metadata | PAYLOAD | HMAC |
| | | |(optional)| |
+-----------+--------------+---------+----------+-------+
| |
|<======= HMAC Signed Data ========>|
Subsequent SVR Packet
+-----------+--------------+---------+-------+
|IP Header | L4 Header |Payload | HMAC |
| | | | |
+-----------+--------------+---------+-------+
| |
|<== HMAC Signed Data ==>|
HMAC TYPE LENGTH OF SIGNATURE
------------------ ----------------------
SHA1 20 Bytes
SHA256-128 16 Bytes
SHA256 32 Bytes
4.5.2. HMAC Verification
If HMAC signatures are present in an SVR implementation, SVR
implementations MUST verify and remove the signature. Verification
provides both authentication of the SVR router that sent the packet,
and integrity that the packet has not been modified in any way
intentionally, or through transmission errors between two SVR
routers.
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Through provisioning (outside the scope of this document), an SVR
Authority MUST define if HMAC signatures are present. An SVR
Authority MUST also define if Time Based HMAC is to be used. AN SVR
Authority MUST determine if ALL packets are signed, or just packets
containing metadata. Due to the possibility of replay attacks, it is
RECOMMENDED that Time Based HMAC signatures be used on ALL SVR
packets. The Session HMAC Key associated with the session state is
used for all HMAC signatures and verification.
To verify the HMAC signature, a new signature is generated on the
packet and bytewise compared to the signature transmitted in the
packet.
SVR Packet with HMAC Signature
+-----------+--------------+----------+-------+
|IP Header | L4 Header | PAYLOAD | HMAC |
| | |(optional)| |
+-----------+--------------+----------+-------+
| |
|<== Signed Data ========>|
SVR Packet with HMAC Signature removed
+-----------+--------------+----------+
|IP Header | L4 Header | PAYLOAD |
| | |(optional)|
+-----------+--------------+----------+
For efficiency reasons, when verifying an Time Based HMAC signature,
implementers SHOULD compute the HMAC on the packet (not including the
IP header) and save the preliminary result. Then try updating the
HMAC signature with the current window value. If this fails to match
the signature, one must try updating the preliminary result using the
next time window by adding 2 seconds (or previous by subtracting 2).
If the time window is determined to be the next time window; it will
remain that way for all packets received from a particular peer until
it advances with clock time. Keeping an active time window per peer
can make this process much more efficient.
If the signature does not match after checking adjacent time windows
and newly issued keys, then the packet is dropped and a security
event noted.
If the signature matches exactly the signature in the packet, then
the packet has been authenticated as being sent by the previous SVR
router, and assured that the packets integrity between the two
routers is good. The HMAC signature MUST be removed from the packet.
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The IP Packet length field MUST be updated to reflect the number of
bytes removed.
The IP Header Checksum MUST be updated after the IP Packet length is
adjusted.
4.6. Processing SVR Packets with Potential Metadata
Routers MUST process SVR traffic and non-SVR traffic. SVR Routers
MUST keep track of sessions that are using SVR. Only sessions setup
with SVR may use the procedures described below. Traffic that is
using SVR will always originate and terminate on Waypoint addresses
(known peer pathways). This provides efficient separation of non-SVR
traffic and SVR traffic.
Packets received on known Peer Pathways MUST be assumed to either
have metadata or be packets associated with existing SVR sessions.
4.6.1. Detection of Potential Metadata in Packets
Any packet could arrive at any time with metadata. DPI MUST be used
to scan for the presence of metadata on every packet. Metadata MAY
be expected and required for first packet processing, and the absence
of metadata will result in dropped packets.
The HMAC verification step (defined above) MUST be performed prior to
performing any other metadata verification steps. This prevents
attacks by modifying packet on the wire.
If the first 8 bytes of the payload (TCP or UDP) exactly matches the
SVR magic number (0x4c48dbc6ddf6670c) it indicates that packet MUST
have metadata. If the first 8 bytes do not match, the packet does
not contain metadata. If metadata is not present, the packet SHOULD
be routed if part of an existing session (see Section 4.6.4). If not
part of an existing session the packet MUST be dropped and a security
event noted.
4.6.2. Verification of Metadata in Packets
4.6.2.1. TLV Parsing
The metadata header is parsed (see Section 7.1). If the header
length and payload length are both zero, the metadata is simply
removed and the packet is forwarded. Please see Section 4.2.6 for
description of false positive metadata header insertion. The next
step is to walk the header TLV's to ensure they are reasonable. If
the payload length is zero, then the metadata can be accepted and
processed. Decryption of metadata is only required when there are
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payload TLV's.
If a TLV is sent that is unknown to the implementation, the TLV
SHOULD be skipped and the TLV MUST be forwarded.
If the metadata TLVs are not reasonable, the packet MUST be dropped
and security events noted.
4.6.2.2. Decryption of Metadata Blocks
If the peers have been provisioned to encrypt metadata with a
specific cipher AND the payload length in the header is non-zero,
then the SVR implementation MUST assume that an encrypted metadata
block was transmitted.
To decrypt the encrypted metadata block, an SVR implementation MUST
have the pre-provisioned cipher, block size, and initialization
vector size. Once these are known, it is possible based on the
payload length in the metadata header to determine the exact
structure of the packet, and how to decrypt it.
Encrypted Metadata Block
Known in advice: Cipher, Block Size, IV size
From Metadata Header: Payload TLV size
+----------+--------+-------+-------+----------------+--~~~
| Metadata | Header |Payload|Padding| Initialization | Rest...
| Header | TLVs |TLVs | | Vector (IV) | of ...
| | | | | | Pkt ...
+----------+--------+-------+-------+----------------+--~~~
|<------Clear------>|<- Encrypted ->|
|<------------------ Metadata Block ---------------->|
The padding is equal to the payload length from the header MOD cipher
block size. The "block" is then decrypted assuming that the IV size
bytes following the "block" is the Initialization vector.
If the decryption fails, then the packet MUST be assumed invalid and
dropped. When this happens a security event is noted.
After the decryption succeeds, the payload TLV's MUST be reviewed for
reasonableness and completeness. See Section 4.3 for minimum
required TLV's. If there are insufficient TLV's present for the SVR
implementation, the packets MUST be dropped and errors noted.
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After review of the TLV's, the metadata is considered valid and
accepted by the SVR implementation. The metadata block is removed
from the packet, and the IP header length and checksum MUST be
corrected. The packet signatures and decryption provide a very high
degree of assurance that the metadata is authentic and has integrity.
4.6.3. UDP to TCP Transformation
If the received metadata block contains a TCP SYN Packet TLV (see
Section 7.4.9) then the following procedures MUST be performed on
EVERY packet of the session. This also signals to the SVR Router
that packets flowing in the opposite direction MUST also be UDP
transformed. See Section 4.2.7. The steps performed are:
The protocol field in the IP header MUST be changed from 0x11 (UDP)
to 0x06 (TCP).
Copy the 32-bit integer in the checksum/urgent pointer location of
the TCP header to the sequence number, effectively restoring it.
The TCP Checksum MUST be recalculated.
4.6.4. SVR Session Packets
Any packet that is has a source and destination IP address that maps
to a Peer Pathway is an SVR packet. SVR Packets that do not have
metadata are SVR session packets. Each of these MUST have
corresponding known session state. If no session state exists, these
packets MUST be dropped, or there must be an attempt to restore
session state (see Section 2.10).
Packets ingressing to a peer pathway that are part of existing SVR
sessions that do not contain metadata MUST be translated (all
5-tuples, bidirectionally). The source address MUST be replaced with
the local Waypoint address associated with the peer pathway. The
destination address MUST be replaced with the Waypoint of the SVR
Peer chosen. The protocol either remains the same, or is modified if
UDP Transformation is required (See Section 4.2.7). The source and
destination port fields MUST be replaced with the ports allocated for
this SVR session. For efficiency, implementors SHOULD save a single
checksum delta as part of the session state because the
address/protocol/port modifications will always be identical for each
packet of a session.
Packets egressing from a peer pathway must have their addresses
restored. SVR session state MUST contain the original packet context
5-tuples for every SVR session. The original Source IP Address MUST
be restored. The original Destination IP Address MUST be restored.
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The original protocol must be restored, and if it is changes from UDP
to TCP then one MUST follow the procedures defined in Section 4.6.3.
The source port MUST be restored. The destination port MUST be
restored.
4.6.5. Tenant/Service Overview
A provisioned SVR Policy SHOULD include both a tenant and service.
Absence of an applicable SVR policy SHOULD prevent SVR sessions from
being established. Traditional IP routing can be used when SVR
policies do not apply.
4.6.5.1. Interpretation of the Service
Services are textual names for sets of CIDR blocks, protocols, and
ports. Services map directly to our human understanding of a network
use case. Examples include "Zoom" or "Office365".
Service Definition
svc_name
protocol: TCP/UDP
port ranges[]
CIDR Blocks[]
When a packet arrives with metadata at an SVR Router the name of the
service MUST be in first packet metadata.
When a first packet arrives without metadata, the service must be
determined through a lookup of the IP destination address, port, and
protocol. The resultant string becomes the service name. If this
fails to result in a service, the name of the service can be
determined by using application recognition techniques. These are
omitted from this document, but include HTTP Request Analysis, TLS
SNI, and Common Names in certificates.
Services can have associated quality policies and security policies
associated with them via provisioning. This is outside the scope of
this document.
When egressing an SVR Peer Pathway, the service name can be used to
route the packet to another SVR Peer, or to the final destination.
If another SVR peer is chosen, the service name MUST be used as
provided by the previous SVR peer. When exiting SVR and returning to
traditional network routing, the textual service name MUST be
resolved to an IP address. SVR supports several options:
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Use Destination from Context: This is the default action. The
original destination address will be restored and the packet will
be forwarded to the destination.
Destination NAT Based on Local Configuration: Some provisioned
service configurations locally (nearest the destination SVR
router) will map the service to one or more local IP addresses
through implementation of a destination NAT. This effectively
becomes a load balancing algorithm to destination service
instances, and is very useful in public clouds.
Resolve Destination using Local DNS: DNS resolution can be
provisioned for services when the IP address is not known. This
if often the case with services in private clouds.
Services SHOULD be provisioned to have lists of Tenants that are
permitted to use a Service, and tenants that are denied using a
service. These access controls are RECOMMENDED.
4.6.5.2. Determination and Interpretation of the Tenant
Tenant is a text string hierarchy delimited by periods. Tenants are
logically similar to VLANs, CIDR block subnets, and Security Zones.
The entire text string, including the full hierarchy is used to
define a tenant, and for policy application, the tenant MAY match
right to left in full segments (delimited by periods). The longest
match will always be used (the most segments).
Tenants SHOULD be referenced and associated with Services to create a
from-to vector. This has the benefits of associating ACLs directly
with Destinations. A provisioned SVR Policy SHOULD include both a
tenant and service. Absence of a applicable SVR policy prevents SVR
sessions from being established. The deny by default approach is
RECOMMENDED.
It is RECOMMENDED that a tenant be associated with physical
interfaces and logical interfaces (VLANs) as a default for arriving
sessions. CIDR block-based tenants SHOULD override these defaults.
Tenant definitions directly from clients that self-assert their
tenancy SHOULD override all other tenant definitions.
All network interface-based tenant definitions are local to an SVR
router. The tenant definitions on ingress to SVR MAY not match those
on egress from SVR. This permits the use of different segmentation
techniques in different networks.
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4.6.6. Security Policy and Payload Encryption
If payload encryption is required, a Security Policy is used to
describe all aspects of the agreed upon methods. The Security Policy
meaning must be valid and equal at the point of encryption and
decryption in multi-hop use cases. The current Peer Key is the
default key used for encryption. The security policy may require a
new key be created for every session, replacing the Peer Key. Either
way, the Security KEY TLV (see Section 7.4.15) contains the key for
encryption/decryption in the first packet. This allows the key for
decryption to go end-to-end in multi-hop router cases. The key is
safe because metadata is encrypted hop-by-hop through the network.
Thus each payload encrypted packet is decrypted once at the end of
the SVR route. Using a semantically named Security Policy permits
implementations to use whatever ciphers and techniques they wish, as
long as they can be named.
If a router that has originated an SVR session that required payload
encryption rekeys with the peer handling the session (see
Section 5.1.8) it can send the new key in metadata in the very first
packet encrypted with the new key. Packets coming from the remote
peer will continue to arrive encrypted with the old key. When the
remote router responsible for decryption receives the new key, it
begins using it for the session. The key is included in reverse
metadata when the first packet is encrypted with this new key in the
reverse direction.
If the security policy agreed open has an alternative key
methodology, the initial and subsequent keys are treated the same
way. The responsibility for the key is always the source of the SVR
session, and communication of the key is always using SVR metadata.
5. BFD for Peer Pathways
Peer Pathways are similar to Tunnels. They represent virtual
transport pathways between routers. BFD is an excellent way to
determine reachability, measure quality of a pathway, and to perform
authentication and key management.
5.1. SVR Peering and use of BFD
It is RECOMMENDED for every configured or discovered SVR Peer
pathway, A UDP BFD session be used to monitor the state of the
pathway, and through extensions, measure path quality.
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BFD Control messages are sent by each router on each peer path. The
BFD message is constructed with appropriate timers for the Peer
Pathway which are administratively determined. BFD as defined in
[RFC5880] does not support certificates or exchange of public keys.
To overcome this, BFD metadata is used.
BFD Metadata is inserted into existing BFD messages for the following
purposes:
* To determine the Peer Received IP Address.
* To determine there are NATs on a Peer Pathway.
* To determine if a routers Peer Received IP Address has changed.
* To determine MTU size on a pathway.
* Measure path quality when idle (see Section 7.3.7 for measuring
quality on active circuits).
* Determine if a Peer Pathway has failed to another redundant
physical link.
* To authenticate a peer through certificate exchange.
* To determine a cryptography key using Elliptic-curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH).
BFD Metadata is added to the end of the BFD packet when required. If
BFD metadata is added, the length field in the IP Header, UDP Header,
and BFD Control message are all adjusted to be accurate.
BFD Metadata Location:
BFD Control Packet with Metadata
+-----------+--------+---------+----------+
|IP Header | UDP | BFD | protobuf |
| | Header | Control | BFD |
| | | Packet | Metadata |
+-----------+--------+---------+----------+
| |
|<== BFD Pkt Len ==>|
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In all cases, BFD packets will be defined as BFD Control Packets.
When sending MeasureData messages which behave like BFD Echo packets,
the Required Min Echo RX Interval (see [RFC5880]) must be greater
than zero.
BFD metadata is described as follows:
BFD Metadata Protobuf Definition:
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syntax = "proto2";
package pb.bfd;
import "ip.proto";
message PeerAuth {
required string certificate = 1;
}
message PeerPublicKey {
required string signed_key = 1;
}
message SessionData {
required ip.Tuple original_ipTuple = 1;
required ip.Tuple received_ipTuple = 2;
optional string peername = 3;
optional string routername = 4;
}
message MeasureData {
message Request {
required uint32 transId = 1;
}
message Response {
required uint32 request_transId = 1;
required uint32 response_transId = 2;
}
oneof type {
Request request = 1;
Response response = 2;
}
optional bool mtu_discovery = 3;
}
message NodeInfo {
required uint32 id = 1;
required uint64 create_timestamp = 2;
optional uint64 time_value = 3;
}
message Metadata {
optional SessionData sessionData = 1;
optional MeasureData measure = 2;
optional NodeInfo nodeInfo = 3;
optional PeerAuth peerAuth = 4;
optional PeerKey peerKey = 5;
}
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5.1.1. Peer Determination of Received Peer IP Address
The SessionData message can be used to determine the source address
of a remote peer router on a Peer Pathway. This is required to
establish a peer path. Configuration will be tied to a router
hostname, and not a dynamic address associated with a hostname.
Remote Peers will create a local address resolution table (i.e. /etc/
hosts) to resolve the hostname in configuration to the dynamic IP
address. This action can be performed simultaneously with detection
of NAT between Peers below.
Determination of Peer Received Address:
Router-A Router-B Local
[Addr-A -> -Addr-B] DNS
| | |
|BFD ------------------>| |
| original_ipTuple=A | |
| hostname="Router-A" | |
| |DNS Update------------>|
| | Router-A: Address A |
| | |
| | |
Router-B has hostname lookup for Router-A
5.1.2. Detection of NAT between Peers using BFD
The SessionData message can optionally be used to detect NATs between
two routing peers. Typically this is performed during initial peer
pathway establishment and often grouped together with sending Peer
Authorization certificates. Similarly to STUN, the IP address of the
originating interface is stored in the field
SessionData.original_ipTuple. If the router has received any BFD
packets from its peer router, it will store the IP address of the
received BFD packet in this field. When sending the SessionData BFD
metadata, a router OPTIONALLY places its own name in the peername
field. Through the process of comparing addresses within the IP
header with addresses used by the routers interfaces, one can detect
when there is a NAT on a Peer Pathway.
BFD NAT Detection on Pathway:
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Router-A NAT Router-B
Addr-A Addr-N Addr-B
| | |
|BFD ------------------>| |
| original_ipTuple=A | |
| | |
| |BFD ------------------>|
| | original_ipTuple=N |
| | |
| | |
NAT Detected
Router-B gets N
address on the wire
and it doesn't match
original_ipTuple
| | |
| | |
| |<-------------------BFD|
| | original_ipTuple=B |
| | received_ipTuple=N |
|<-------------------BFD| |
| original_ipTuple=B | |
| received_ipTuple=N | |
| | |
No NAT detected
Router-A gets B's address
on the wire which matches
the original_ipTuple
If a NAT is detected in a Peer Pathway, care must be taken to
associate address N with the Peer Pathway to Router-A. Sessions that
are traversing this Peer Pathway may require NAT Keep Alive
processing. See Section 6.3.
5.1.3. Detection of Routers Address Changes using BFD
Often branch data routers are connected to networks and receive their
IP Address dynamically from DHCP, LTE or PPPoE procedures. Although
it is rare, sometimes these addresses change unexpectedly. This may
be the result of a lease running out, or a router reestablishing
connectivity after a failure. When this happens, any peer that was
using the old address will lose connectivity to this peer. By
including SessionData BFD metadata, learning the address of the peer
and recovery occur very quickly.
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BFD Detection on Router Address Change:
Router-A DHCP Router-B
[Addr-A -> Server <-Addr-B]
| | |
|BFD -------------------------------------->|
| original_ipTuple=A | |
| received_ipTuple="" | |
| | |
|<---------------------------------------BFD|
| | original_ipTuple=B |
| | received_ipTuple=A |
|BFD -------------------------------------->|
| original_ipTuple=A | |
| received_ipTuple=B | |
Both routers have learned each other's IP Address
and have determined there are no NAT's between them
|DHCP Lease Exp ----->| |
|<-------New Address C| |
| | |
|BFD -------------------------------------->|
| original_ipTuple=C | |
| received_ipTuple=B | |
|<-------------------------------------- BFD|
| | original_ipTuple=B |
| | received_ipTuple=C |
Both routers have the correct IP Address and
have determined there are no NATs between them
5.1.4. Determining MTU Size with BFD
Knowing the MTU size on a path is important for routers so they can
fragment packets when necessary. After a peer pathway is
established, a series of BFD MeasureData packets that increase in
size can help us find the limit of packet size between peers. To
make the BFD packet larger, the lengths are adjusted in the IP
header, UDP header, and BFD header. A peer receiving a fragmented
BFD request with the MTU Discovery field equal to TRUE simply does
not respond.
Often there is an entire network between peers. As such, the MTU
size may change over time. It is recommended that MTU be measured
routinely and updated, should it change.
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BFD MeasureData for Determining Pathway MTU:
Router-A Router-B
[Addr-A -> <-Addr-B]
| |
|BFD MeasureData (id=1, size 1200)-------------->|
|BFD MeasureData (id=2, size 1250)-------------->|
|BFD MeasureData (id=3, size 1300)-------------->|
|BFD MeasureData (id=4, size 1350)-------------->|
|BFD MeasureData (id=5, size 1400)-------------->|
|BFD MeasureData (id=6, size 1450)-------------->|
|BFD MeasureData (id=7, size 1500)-{fragmented}->|
| |
|<----(req_id=1, resp_id=1)-------BFD MeasureData|
|<----(req_id=2, resp_id=2)-------BFD MeasureData|
|<----(req_id=3, resp_id=3)-------BFD MeasureData|
|<----(req_id=4, resp_id=4)-------BFD MeasureData|
|<----(req_id=5, resp_id=5)-------BFD MeasureData|
|<----(req_id=6, resp_id=6)-------BFD MeasureData|
MTU Size = 1450
5.1.5. Measuring Peer Pathway quality using BFD
After a Peer Pathway is authenticated and ready for use, BFD can be
used to measure latency and packet loss. This is performed by
sending BFD packets with BFD MeasureData metadata. Both sides of a
Peer Pathway can test for quality if desired. The number of packets
in a burst is determined by configuration. The frequency of quality
tests is also determined by configuration. Quite often routers with
a large number of Peer Pathways (such as a data center hub router)
may never perform quality tests, and rely solely on observations made
by its peer spoke routers.
These quality measurements are only required when circuits are idle.
When sessions are traversing a peer path, quality measurements can
made for existing sessions using SVR Path Metrics (See
Section 7.3.7).
The receiving side generates a response message by re-writing the BFD
metadata request and supplies information if requested. Each
"request" generates a "response". Each request has a transaction ID,
and so does each response. This solves a problem of exact symmetry
where by a peer may not know if a message is a response or a request
from a peer.
BFD MeasureData for Measuring Pathway Quality:
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Router-A Router-B
[Addr-A -> <-Addr-B]
| |
|BFD MeasureData (req_id=1)------------------>|
|BFD MeasureData (req_id=2)------------------>|
|BFD MeasureData (req_id=3)------------------>|
.......
|BFD MeasureData (req_id=n)------------------>|
| |
|<----(req_id=1, resp_id=1)----BFD MeasureData|
|<----(req_id=3, resp_id=2)----BFD MeasureData|
|<----(req_id=1, resp_id=3)----BFD MeasureData|
......
|<----(req_id=N, resp_id=N-1)--BFD MeasureData|
Latency = Sum of RTT(pkt 1-n)/(2*n)
Jitter = Std Dev RTT(pkt 1-n)
Packet Loss = 1-((Pcks_Sent - Pcks_recv)/Pkts_Sent)
Router-B responds to each BFD MeasureData message it receives by
responding to the original message and adding a serialized resp_id.
To measure latency, the sending (measuring) side (Router-A in this
case) can measure the elapsed time between each req_id sent, and its
response. Absence of a response counts as a packet lost. The
variability in latency provides a method of calculating jitter, and
MoS scores can be computed once latency, packet loss, and jitter are
known.
Both Router-A and Router-B must send their own BFD MeasureData
messages to produce their own quality measurements from their own
specific point of view. The actual network quality between these two
routers can vary based on direction.
5.1.6. Detection of Path Failover using BFD
If one side of a Peer Pathway fails and there exists a policy to
choose an alternate path, BFD NodeInfo metadata can be used to detect
this event. Knowledge of a Peer Pathway failover may be required by
routers in certain scenarios.
For redundancy, routers are often grouped into a cluster of active/
active nodes. Responsibility for a Peer Pathway may change from one
member of a cluster to another. When sending BFD with Metadata, by
including the Node ID (instance number in a cluster) and a timestamp
of when the Peer router started, one can detect redundancy events at
the far end side of a Peer Pathway.
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Inclusion of this information is optional. This data can be used by
a remote peer to trigger actions where redundancy events impact them.
5.1.7. Peer Authentication Procedures
SVR Routers will authenticate with each other using their textual
names. This is similar to how servers authentic using their domain
names. In SVR, Authorities have name space control over router
names, and as such SVR Router names for authentication will consist
of "name/authority". For example, if an authority named "example"
created a router named "router1", the name used for authentication
will be "router1/example". All configuration referencing this
specific router would use this name.
Names are used for authentication because router IP Addresses often
change. This is true when transport addresses of branch routers are
established using DHCP and leases expire. Names are also used for
authentication between routers to avoid duplicate certificate
verification for multiple pathways for a single router peering
relationship.
When a router is initialized, if it does not have a signed
authentication certificate that is valid, it must obtain one from a
certificate authority. The router will create an elliptic-curve
public/private key pair (see [RFC8422]). The public key is used to
create an X.509 certificate signing request (CSR) with the common
name field set to the router's name. Elliptic-curve is used to
ensure the X.509 certificate is as small as possible. A certificate
signing request is initiated to a known and trusted CA through a
secure connection. The CA will digitally sign (ECDSA) the the CSR
and return it to the requesting router. The specific details of this
process is omitted from this specification, but it is recommended
that it follow the procedures and guidelines defined in [RFC4210].
Certificates and Public Keys are stored locally on each router in PEM
format defined by [RFC7468].
Creating Router Authentication Certificate:
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RouterA
Certificate
RouterA Authority
| |
+------+------+ |
|Cert Missing,| |
| Invalid | |
| or Expiring | |
+-------------+ |
| |
+-----+------+ |
| Create | |
| Curve-P256 | |
| Pub/Priv | |
| Key Pair | |
+------------+ |
| |
+-----+------+ |
| Create | |
| X.509 Cert | |
| CN=RouterA | |
+------------+ |
| |
+------CSR------>|
| |
|<-X.509 Signed--|
The certificate is stored on the router persistently in PEM format.
The private key associated with the certificate should be created and
stored in a secure non-volatile storage, such as a Trusted Platform
Module (TPM).
When establishing a peer pathway, The routers authentication
certificate (encoded in PEM format is inserted as BFD Metadata into a
BFD message and the BFD message is sent to a peer. The certificate
MUST be included in all BFD messages until the remote peer
successfully sends its certificate in response and the certificate
has been validated. This provides a handshake guaranteeing delivery
for both local and remote peers.
The diagram below shows two routers, with two peer pathways. The
certificates are sent by both routers on both pathways, but only need
to be validated one time for each router peer.
Router Authentication:
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RouterA RouterA RouterB RouterB
Peerpath1 Peerpath2 Peerpath1 Peerpath2
| | | |
=============ALL PEER PATHS ARE DISCONNECTED==========
| | | |
|--BFD w/X.509 Cert----->| |
| |--BFD w/X.509 Cert------>|
| | | |
....Delay between retransmissions .......
| | | |
|--BFD w/X.509 Cert----->| |
| | RouterA |
| | Validated |
| | | |
| |--BFD w/X.509 Cert------>|
| | | |
|<----BFD w/X.509 Cert---| |
RouterB | | |
Validated | | |
| |<-----BFD w/X.509 Cert---|
| | | |
=============ALL PEER PATHS ARE OPERATIONAL==========
| | | |
....Delay between retransmissions .......
| | | |
|----BFD---------------->| |
| |-------BFD-------------->|
|<-------------BFD-------| |
| |<-------------BFD--------|
When a certificate is received from a peer, it must be validated.
The validation includes the following checks:
* Verify the dates are valid.
* Verify the signature of the Certificate Authority.
* If revocation list available, verify the certificate has not been
revoked.
* Verify the router name is supported in configuration.
Administrative revocation is a primary means of control.
The validation for a peer only needs to be done one time. When a
certificate is received from a peer on multiple peer paths, if the
certificate is identical to a previously validated certificate, a
cached validation response can be used.
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When receiving a certificate from a peer router, after validation,
the receiving router must extract the peer router's public key and
save it. This will be used for validating Peer Key/rekey request's
authenticity.
Each router should update its authentication certificate before the
current certificate expires utilizing the same exact steps identified
herein.
5.1.8. Peer Key/Rekey Procedures
Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman is used between two peers to compute a
key for cryptography. See [ECDH_Key_Exchange] for details on key
calculation, and see [RFC8422] for examples on how ECDH is used in
TLS. For example, a 256 Bit key can be computed from the public key
exchange for a peer relationship between two routers.
A single key is used for all paths between two routers. The key is
kept and considered valid until a new key is accepted as a
replacement. This includes across network outages and path failures.
If a key is lost, or doesn't appear to function correctly, a new key
must be obtained before processing of traffic with SVR metadata can
occur.
Anytime a key is needed, a new public/private key pair is generated
locally for the peer relationship. The public key is signed, and
stored locally as a PEM formatted text string. The PEM string is
inserted as BFD metadata and transmitted to the peer UDP BFD Control
packet. Upon receipt, the remote peer will respond by creating a new
public/private key pair for the same peer relationship, and then
return its public key, signed with its router public key formatted as
a PEM string.
The key is shared on all peer paths between two peers. Once
calculated on one peer path, it can be used immediately on all other
paths with the same remote peer.
When both local and remote peers have their newly created public
keys, then a new shared peer key can be computed using Elliptic-Curve
Diffie-Hellman techniques. The key can be immediately used for
encrypting metadata after incrementing the Security ID (see
Section 7.3.2).
Peer Path Key/Rekeying:
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RouterA RouterA RouterB RouterB
Peerpath1 Peerpath2 Peerpath1 Peerpath2
| | | |
........NO Current Key Exists...............
| | | |
|--BFD w/KEY Req-------->| |
| | | |
|<----BFD w/KEY Req------| |
| | | |
Key | Key |
Computed | Computed |
| | | |
......Security ID=1, 1st Key Exists........
| | | |
...........At Rekeying Interval............
| | | |
| |--BFD w/Key Req--------->|
| |<---BFD w/Key Req--------|
| | | |
........... 2nd Key Exists.................
| | | |
..........Transition Guard Time.............
| | | |
.......Security ID=2, 2nd Key used..........
SVR Payload Metadata uses encryption. During the rekeying period
prior to both sides exchanging new public keys, and computing their
new peer key, the old key is used. A reasonable guard time should be
added post key computation to prevent any retransmitted packets,
delayed packets or long latency packets not having a key ready for
use.
If a peer sends BFD with Key Request to a peer for which there is no
valid key, and there is no response, then the peer path remains out
of service until there is a valid response.
If a peer sends a BFD with Key Request to a peer, and there is no
response, the peer continues to resend it at periodic intervals. If
there is no response after a very long period of time, the peer path
can be declared not valid, and removed from service based on
administrative timers.
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5.1.9. Certificate Revocation/Replacement Procedures
In the event that a router's certificate is about to expire, or needs
to be replaced, a new certificate can be added to the system. Once a
new certificate file has been loaded into the system, an event is
triggered to restart the peer authentication Section 5.1.7 procedure
again. The method of loading the certificate is out of the scope of
this document.
In the event that a system has become compromised, it may be
desirable to revoke its certificate so that it can no longer
authenticate with its peers. The management platform of the router
is responsible for periodically checking the CRL for any revocations.
A notification is sent to any router that has its certificate
revoked. Upon receiving this revocation, the router will check its
configuration to determine the appropriate behavior.
There SHOULD exist a policy to define the system behavior in the
event that a certificate has expired or has been revoked. The
default behavior SHOULD be to fail-soft (i.e., providing indication
that the certificate is no longer valid and action needs to be
taken). Alternatively, if the system is configured to fail-hard, it
would remove all of its peering relationships and subsequently would
no longer be able to participate in SVR.
6. Additional SVR Metadata Exchanges and Use Cases
Metadata can be inserted and used to share network intent between
routers. Below are examples for specific use cases. These examples
are illustrative and the use of metadata is not limited to these use
cases alone.
6.1. Moving a Session
To change the pathway of a session between two routers, any SVR
Router will reinsert the metadata described in section
Section 3.7.1.7 and transmits the packet on a different peer path,
but retains the same Session UUID of the existing session that is
being moved.
* Simultaneously it will update its fast path forwarding tables to
reflect the new IP addresses and ports (Waypoints) for the
transport. All other aspects of the session remain the same. The
presence of middle boxes means that routers on both sides must
once again perform NATP detection and update real transmit
addresses/ports to ensure that sessions will continue.
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After 5 seconds the old path state entries can be removed. By
keeping the old and new fast path entries during this 5 second
transition, no packets in flight will be dropped. The diagram below
shows the sequence for moving sessions around a failed mid-pathway
router.
Ladder Diagram for Existing Session Reroute with Metadata:
RTR-A RTR-B RTR-C RTR-D
Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Server
| | | | | |
|--PUSH--->| | | | |
| |--PUSH-------------->| | |
| | | |--PUSH--->| |
| | | | |--PUSH--->|
| | | | |<---ACK---|
| | | |<---ACK---| |
| |<--------------ACK---| | |
|<---ACK---| | | | |
| | | | | |
......................RTR-C Fails.......................
|--PUSH--->| | | | |
| |--PUSH--->| | | |
| | [MD1] | | | |
| | |--PUSH[MD2]--------->| |
| | | | |--PUSH--->|
| | | | |<--ACK----|
| | |<-----ACK[RMD2]------| |
| |<--ACK----| | | |
|<--ACK----| [RMD1] | | | |
| | | | | |
|<======== Session Packets Flow without Metadata =====>|
When router C fails, metadata MD1, MD2 can be included in the very
next packet being sent in either direction. Confirmation that the
move was completed is confirmed with reverse metadata RMD2, RMD1.
For established TCP sessions, this is either a PUSH (as shown) or an
ACK (Not shown). This can reestablish the SVR session state into a
new router (Router B in this example) that previously did not have
any involvement in the session. This technique can also be used to
modify paths between two routers effectively moving TCP sessions from
one transport (MPLS for example) to another (LTE). A session move
can be initiated by any router at any time.
Ladder Diagram for Session Reroute Between Peers with Metadata:
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+-------+ +--------+
| +-----MPLS-----+ |
Client--| Rtr-A | | Rtr-B +----Server
| +------LTE-----+ |
+-------+ +--------+
Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Server
| |
| RouterA RouterB |
| | | |
|---PUSH---->| | |
| |---PUSH over MPLS-------->| |
| | |---PUSH--->|
................MPLS has Poor Quality ................
| | | |
|---PUSH---->| | |
| |---PUSH over LTE[MD]----->| |
| | |---PUSH--->|
| | |<---ACK----|
| |<---ACK over LTE[RMD]-----| |
|<---ACK-----| | |
| | | |
|<===== Session Packets Flow without Metadata =====>|
The diagram shows moving an active TCP session from one transport
network to another by injecting metadata (MD) into any packet that is
part of the transport in either direction. Reverse metadata is sent
on any packet going in the reverse direction to confirm that the move
was successful (RMD).
6.2. Moving Sessions that are Quiescent or One-Way Flows
Certain sessions may be idle or packets may create a one-way
information flow (TCP Pushes) with one way acknowledgement (TCP
ACKS). In these scenarios, insertion of metadata into existing
packets may not be possible.
After moving a session, if an SVR router determines no packets are
received or sent for an active session over an elapsed time of 1
second, the SVR router will generate an SVR Control Message to the
peer.
Ladder Diagram for One Way Media Move with Metadata:
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+-------+ +--------+
| +-----MPLS-----+ |
Client--| Rtr-A | | Rtr-B +----Server
| +------LTE-----+ |
+-------+ +--------+
Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Server
| |
| RouterA RouterB |
| | | |
| | |<---PUSH---|
| |<---PUSH over MPLS------->| |
|<---PUSH----| | |
|----ACK---->| | |
| |------ACK over MPLS------>| |
| | |---ACK---->|
| X RouterA MPLS FAILS | |
| X RouterB MPLS OK| |
| X | |
..............RouterA Moves Session to LTE..........
| | |<---PUSH---|
| X<---PUSH over MPLS------->| |
| | |<---PUSH---|
| X<---PUSH over MPLS------->| |
| | | |
.......NO Packets at Router A for Moved Session......
| | | |
| |-----[MD over LTE]------->| |
...............RouterB Moves Session to LTE..........
| | |<---PUSH---|
| |<--PUSH over LTE [RMD]--->| |
|<---PUSH----| | |
|----ACK---->| | |
| |------ACK over LTE------->| |
| | |---ACK---->|
|<======== Session Packets Continue flowing =======>|
The SVR Control Message uses the new SVR router interface addresses
(Waypoints) and contains the standard first packet metadata fields
with the SVR Control Message TLV added to the header with drop reason
"FLOW MOVED". Also added is a TLV attribute with the remaining
session time. This is essential to ensure mid-stream routers remove
sessions from their tables roughly at the same time. This message
will be transmitted once every second for 5 seconds OR reverse
metadata has been received. If no reverse metadata has been received
in 5 seconds the session is torn down. For a quiescent flow, the RMD
is a generated SVR Control Message as well as shown below:
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Ladder Diagram for Quiescent Moved Session with Metadata:
+-------+ +--------+
| +-----MPLS-----+ |
Client--| Rtr-A | | Rtr-B +----Server
| +------LTE-----+ |
+-------+ +--------+
Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Server
| |
| RouterA RouterB |
| | | |
|<========== Quiescent Session Established ========>|
| | | |
| X RouterA MPLS FAILS | |
| X RouterB MPLS OK| |
| X | |
..............RouterA Moves Session to LTE..........
| | | |
| |-----[MD over LTE]------->| |
| | | |
...............RouterB Moves Session to LTE..........
| | | |
| |<-----[RMD over LTE]----->| |
| | | |
|<=========== Quiescent Session Continues =========>|
6.3. NAT Keep Alive
If an SVR Router determines there is one or more NATs on a peer
pathway (See Section 2.4, the SVR Peer must maintain the NAT bindings
for each active session by sending keep alive metadata in the
direction of the NAT. For keep alive, SVR utilizes a packet that
matches the L4 header of the idle session that includes metadata type
24 with the drop reason set to Keep Alive.
Ladder Diagram for NAT Keep Alive with Metadata:
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RTR-A NAT RTR-B
Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Server
| | | | |
...................Existing SVR Session......
|--PUSH--->| | | |
| |--PUSH--->| | |
| | |---PUSH-->| |
| | | |--PUSH--->|
| | | |<---ACK---|
| | |<---ACK---| |
| |<--PUSH---| | |
|<--PUSH---| | | |
.........NO PACKETS EITHER DIRECTION FOR 20 SECS........
| | | | |
| |--[MD1]-->| | |
| | |--[MD1]-->| |
| | | | |
.........NO PACKETS EITHER DIRECTION FOR 20 SECS........
| | | | |
| |--[MD1]-->| | |
| | |--[MD1]-->| |
| | | | |
The metadata attributes that MUST be inserted in a keep alive for
existing packet sessions includes:
* Header: SVR Control Message: see Section 7.3.6.
* Header: Security Identifier: see Section 7.3.2.
* Payload: Session UUID: see Section 7.4.5.
* Payload: Source Router Name: see Section 7.4.10.
* Payload: Peer Pathway ID: see Section 7.4.12.
With this minimum set of information, the receiver of this message
can verify and update any modifications in a session NAT state. The
Session UUID is used to verify all information positively.
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6.4. Adaptive Encryption
Unlike a tunnel where all packets must be encrypted, each session in
SVR is unique and independent. Most of the modern applications
sessions are already using TLS or DTLS. SVR Routers have the
capability of encrypting only sessions that are not already
encrypted. Below is an example of adaptive encryption. With
adaptive encryption, every session begins unencrypted. By analyzing
the first 4 packets, the router can determine that encryption is
required or not. If the fourth packet in a TLS Client hello message,
encryption is NOT required. Any sequence of packets that does not
indicate TLS or DTLS setup would immediately toggle encryption on.
Ladder Diagram of Adaptive Encryption with Client Hello:
Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Server
| |
+ RouterA RouterB |
+---SYN----->| | |
| |----SYN[MD1]----->| |
| | |--SYN----->|
| | |<--SYN/ACK-|
| |<----SYN/ACK------| |
|<--SYN/ACK--| [RMD1] | |
|---ACK----->| | |
| |------ACK-------->| |
| | |--ACK----->|
|--Client--->| | |
| Hello |<== ENCRYPTION===>| |
| | Not Required | |
| | | |
| |-----Client------>| |
| | Hello |--Client-->|
| | | |
If the fourth packet is not an indication that encryption will be
performed by the transport layer, then the ingress SVR Routers must
encrypt and the egress SVR router must decrypt the session
bidirectionally. This ensures that any data between the SVR Routers
is encrypted.
Ladder Diagram of Adaptive Encryption with data:
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Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Server
| |
+ RouterA RouterB |
+---SYN----->| | |
| |--SYN[MD1]--->| |
| | |--SYN----->|
| | |<--SYN/ACK-|
| |<--SYN/ACK----| |
|<--SYN/ACK--| [RMD1] | |
|---ACK----->| | |
| |----ACK------>| |
| | |--ACK----->|
|---Data---->| | |
| |<==ENCRYPT===>| |
| | Required | |
| | | |
| |--Encrypted-->| |
| | Data |---Data--->|
Adaptive encryption is part of the security provisioning. Security
policies are associated with services, and as such certain
applications can mandate encryption; others may allow adaptive
encryption, and still others may specify no encryption.
6.5. Packet Fragmentation
When a fragmented packet is presented to a SVR Router, the packet
must be completely assembled to be processed. The SVR Router routes
IP packets, and as all SVR actions require the entire packet. As
such, the HMAC must be applied to the entire packet, and the entire
packet must be routed as a whole. Each resulting fragment must be
turned into an IP packet with 5-tuples that match the corresponding
session to ingress and pass through an SVR. The SVR Router will
simply use the same L4 header on all fragments from the session state
table (peer pathway and transit ports). a time based HMAC signature
is created for the entire packet and appended to the last fragment.
Each fragment must also have metadata inserted that clearly
identifies the fragment to the SVR routing peer.
Ladder Diagram Fragmented Packets:
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Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Server
| |
| RouterA RouterB |
| | | |
|--Frag 1--->| | |
|--Frag 3--->| | |
|--Frag 2--->| | |
| +---+----+ | |
| |Assemble| | |
| +---+----+ | |
| |----Frag 1[L4/MD]-------->| |
| | | |
| |----Frag 2[L4/MD]-------->| |
| | | |
| |----Frag 3[L4/MD]-------->| |
| | +--------+ |
| | |Assemble| |
| | +--------+ |
| | |--Frag 1-->|
| | |--Frag 2-->|
| | |--Frag 3-->|
In the diagram above, Router A collects all the fragments 1 2, and 3.
Reassembly is performed. Router A records two things from the
inbound fragments: The Original ID, and the largest fragment size
received. Router A then proceeds to send the jumbo packet by
fragmenting it again, but this time sending each piece inside a
packet with a newly created L4 which maps exactly to the peer pathway
chosen with ports assigned from the session state table. The
fragment size will be the lesser of the smallest MTU on the path OR
the largest fragment seen, whichever is smaller. The Metadata header
and header TLV's are not encrypted. The packet construction looks
like this:
SVR Packet Layout
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Fragment 1
+-----+-----+----------+----------+---------+
|Peer |Peer | Metadata | Header | First |
|IP |L4 | Header | TLV-1,16 | Fragment|
|HDR |HDR | 12 Bytes | 22 Bytes | |
+-----+-----+----------+----------+---------+
Fragment 2
+-----+-----+----------+----------+---------+
|Peer |Peer | Metadata | Header | Second |
|IP |L4 | Header | TLV-1 | Fragment|
|HDR |HDR | 12 Bytes | 14 Bytes | |
+-----+-----+----------+----------+---------+
Fragment 3
+-----+-----+----------+----------+---------+----------+
|Peer |Peer | Metadata | Header | Third | PKT |
|IP |L4 | Header | TLV-1 | Fragment| HMAC |
|HDR |HDR | 12 Bytes | 14 Bytes | | SIGNATURE|
+-----+-----+----------+----------+---------+----------+
The metadata type 1 inside the SVR fragment will have its own
extended ID assigned. This allows a different number of fragments to
be between router A and B than the Client and Server have. It also
allows independent fragmentation by SVR should it be required.
Router B will process the fragments from router A. Router B will
look at its egress MTU size, and the largest fragment seen recorded
by RouterA and transmitted in Metadata to determine the proper size
fragments to send, and the packet is fragmented and sent.
There are no other metadata fields required. All information about
the session state is tied to the 5-tuple peer pathway and transports
ports.
The details on packet fragmentation are identical to what is
standardly performed in IP fragmentation, exception for the full L4
headers and metadata insertion.
If a packet traversing an SVR needs to be fragmented by the router
for an SVR segment for any reason, including the insertion of
metadata, the initiating router inserts metadata on the first packet
and duplicates the L4 header (either TCP or UDP) on subsequent
fragments and inserts metadata. In this case the Largest Fragment
Seen and Original ID field in the metadata is left blank.
Ladder Diagram Fragmented Packets:
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Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Server
| |
| RouterA RouterB |
| | | |
|--Lg Pkt--->| | |
| |--------Frag 1[MD]------->| |
| | | |
| |----Frag 2[L4 Hdr|MD]---->| |
| | |--Lg Pkt-->|
| | | |
6.6. ICMP and SVR
There are two types of ICMP messages. There are messages associated
with specific packet delivery network errors. This includes:
* Type 3: Destination Unreachable
* Type 11: Time Exceeded (TTL)
These messages have information from the packet that generated the
error by including the IP header + 8 bytes in the ICMP message (See
[RFC0792]. It is important to deliver the ICMP message back to the
origin. For these ICMP messages, the router MUST determine what
active session the ICMP message belongs to by parsing the IP header
information inside the ICMP message. Once a session is found, the
ICMP message is transported across the SVR and reverse metadata is
applied by having its destination address changed to the Waypoint
Addresses of the routers.
Metadata type 20 and 21 are used to send the source of the ICMP error
backward through the networks. See Section 7.3.4 and Section 7.3.5
for information about these metadata formats. This repeats until the
ICMP packet arrives at the initial SVR router. At this point the
ICMP packet is recreated and the source address is changed to the
address communicated through metadata type 20 and 21.
SVR Fragment Packet Layout
+------------+------------+----------------+--------------+
| IP HEADER | UDP HEADER | Metadata 20/21 | ICMP Packet |
+------------+------------+----------------+--------------+
ICMP over SVR for Network Failures
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Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .No Network
| Found
| RouterA RouterB |
| | | |
|----PKT---->| | |
| |------PKT[MD]------------>| |
| | |<--ICMP------|
| | | (Router B) |
| |<--UDP[ICMP[RMD]]---------| |
|<--ICMP-----| | |
| (Client) | | |
| | | |
The first ICMP message is directed to Router B. Router B examines
the ICMP error to find the session, and forwards backwards to the
correct Waypoint for Router A. Router A recreates the ICMP message,
and sends to the Client. The address of where the error was detected
is in
The second type of ICMP message is not related to any specific
sessions. These types of messages include ICMP ECHO for example.
These are always encapsulated as UDP, and a session is created for
the ICMP message. The identifier field in ICMP and the IP addresses
are used as the 5-tuple session key. This includes:
* Type 8:ECHO Request (Ping)
ICMP over SVR for Information
Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Target
| |
| RouterA RouterB |
| | | |
|--ICMP ECHO---->| | |
| |---UDP[ICMP ECHO]->| |
| | [MD1] | |
| | |---ICMP ECHO--->|
| | |<--ECHO RESP----|
| |<--UDP[ECHO RESP]--| |
| | [RMD1] | |
|<--ECHO RESP----| | |
The ICMP message creates a session on Router A directed towards
Router B. Metadata MD1 is inserted just like any UDP session to
establish the return pathway for the response. Reverse metadata is
inserted into the ECHO Response, effectively creating an ICMP
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session. Subsequent identical ICMP messages will utilize this path
without metadata being inserted. This session state MUST be guarded
with an inactivity timer and the state deleted.
6.7. State Recovery Examples
It is exceedingly rare, but there are cases where session state can
be lost. Well written applications generally self correct for any
networking changes or interruptions. There are however applications
with long lived nearly idle sessions (for example Session Initiation
Protocol on idle handsets). In these situations recovering state is
required.
Every SVR session has one or more SVR routers that have the full
session state. Below is a set of techniques to reobtain the session
state either from a peer or through regeneration and replacement.
The simplest scenario is when the Ingress SVR router loses state. In
this scenario, it simple creates a new session for the old existing
session but has the exact parameters of the original session. When
this packet with first packet metadata reaches the egress SVR, the
session state tables are updated, allowing two way end-to-end packet
processing.
This is secured against attack because the first packet metadata is
both signed and encrypted.
State Recovering Ingress Router with Active Session
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Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Server
| |
| Ingress Middle Egress |
| SVR BOX SVR |
| | | | |
<================Existing Bi-Directional Session=========>
| | | | |
| State | | |
| Lost | | |
| | | | |
|---PKT---->| | |
| Create | | |
| New | | |
| Session | | |
| |--PKT[MD]->| | |
| | |--PKT[MD]--->| |
| | | Update |
| | | Existing |
| | | Session |
| | | |----PKT------->|
The next scenario is when the Ingress SVR loses session state, and
the client application is idle. There is data from the server that
can't be delivered. If a packet arrives from the server at the
Egress SVR the length of time the client has been inactive is
reviewed. If longer than the defined inactivity timer (provisioned,
but defaults to 5 seconds), Session Health Check (see Section 7.3.8.)
metadata will be inserted into the packet. The Ingress SVR responds
by generating a packet (UDP) with the same L3 and L4 information as
the session, and adds SVR Control Message to respond (see
Section 7.3.6). If the Ingress SVR needs state for the session, it
sets the drop reason in metadata to type=6, delete session. This
causes the very next packet from the server to include first packet
metadata. The session will be treated as a new session. This data
is used to restore all aspects of the session.
State Recovering Ingress Router Client Inactive
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Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Server
| |
| Ingress Middle Egress |
| SVR BOX SVR |
| | | | |
<================Existing Bi-Directional Session=======>
| | | | |
| State | | |
| Lost | | |
| | | |<----PKT-----|
| | | | |
| | | Client Inactivity |
| | | Timer Exceeded |
| | | | |
<---<--< SEND SESSION HEALTH CHECK METADATA <---<---<-
| | | | |
| | |<---PKT[MD]--| |
| |<--PKT[MD]---| | |
| No State | | |
| | | | |
>---->---> SEND SVR Control Metadata Drop=6 >--->---->-
| | | | |
| |-GenPKT[MD]->| | |
| | |-GenPKT[MD]->| |
| | | | |
| | | Clear State |
| | | | |
| | | Send First |
| | | PKT Metadata |
| | | Next PKT |
| | | | |
<--<- ON NEXT PACKET SEND FIRST PACKET METADATA <---<-
| | | | |
| | | |<---PKT------|
| | |<--PKT[MD]---| |
| |<--PKT[MD]---| | |
| | | | |
| New Session State | | |
| | | | |
=======Treat as a new session from this point =========
If an Egress router loses state for a session, it must reobtain the
state from a peer. In the example shown below the Ingress SVR
detects upon receipt of a packet that the server has not responded
for more than the inactivity timer. The packet that arrived is then
augmented with Session Health Check metadata (see Section 7.3.8). If
the egress router MUST reply to the session health check by
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generating a UDP packet with SVR Control Message metadata (see
Section 7.3.6). If it requires state, it must set the drop reason to
a type=2, indicating metadata needs to be sent. The next packet from
the client will include all of the first packet metadata which is
used to restore the mission state information.
State Recovering Egress Router
Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Server
| |
| Ingress Middle Egress |
| SVR BOX SVR |
| | | | |
<================Existing Bi-Directional Session=======>
| | | | |
| | | State |
| | | Lost |
| | | | |
|--PKT----->| | |<---PKT------|
| |----PKT----->| | |
| | |----PKT----->| |
| | | | |
| | | Pkts Dropped |
|--PKT----->| | | |
| Inactivity | | |
| Exceeded | | |
| | | | |
>--->---> SEND SESSION HEALTH CHECK METADATA >--->---->
| | | | |
| |---PKT[MD]-->| | |
| | |--PKT[MD]--->| |
| | | No State |
| | | | |
<----<---- SEND SVR CONTROL MESSAGE TYPE=2 <----<----<-
| | | | |
| | |<-GenPKT[MD]-| |
| |<-GenPKT[MD]-| | |
|--PKT----->| | | |
| | | | |
-->---> SEND FIRST PACKET METADATA IN NEXT PACKET ---->
| | | | |
| |---PKT[MD]-->| | |
| | |--PKT[MD]--->| |
| | | Session |
| | | State Restored |
| | | |---PKT------>|
| | | | |
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The most likely loss of state occurs in middle boxes. Often the
middle box will either stop routing packets in one direction, both
directions, or modify the UDP or TCP ports without notice.
In this instance, we do not know for certain where the state was
lost, so we attempt to recover it from our SVR peer by including
Session Health Check metadata in a packet of the session. SVR Peers
must respond to this packet, so no response indicates there is a
middle box or network problem.
To restore the session, the session state is cleared and the next
packet is treated as a first packet. A full metadata exchange
between peers is completed as documented in Section 3.7.1. Both
Ingress and Egress SVRs can detect that there is an existing session
with the exact same addresses and ports and simply replace the
session state.
State Recovering of Middlebox
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Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Server
| |
| Ingress Middle Egress |
| SVR BOX SVR |
| | | | |
<================Existing Bi-Directional Session=======>
| | | | |
| | State | |
| | Lost | |
| | | | |
|--PKT----->| | |<---PKT------|
| |----PKT----->| | |
| | |<---PKT------| |
| | Packets | |
| | Dropped | |
| Inactivty | | |
| Exceeded | | |
| | | | |
|---PKT---->| | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| |---PKT[MD]-->| | |
| | | | |
| No Response | | |
| | | | |
| Re Allocate Ports | | |
| Update Session State | | |
| | | | |
|--PKT----->| | | |
| | | | |
---> SEND FIRST PACKET METADATA, KEEP OLD SESSIONID--->
| | | | |
| |--PKT[MD]--->| | |
| | |--PKT[MD]--->| |
| | | Update |
| | | Session |
| | | |---PKT------>|
| | | | |
7. SVR Metadata Format and Composition
The format of metadata has both Header attributes as well as Payload
attributes. Header attributes are always guaranteed to be
unencrypted. These headers may be inspected by intermediate network
elements but can't be changed. Header attributes do not have a
forward or reverse direction. Header attributes are used for router
and peer pathway controls.
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Payload attributes optionally can be encrypted by the sender.
Payload attributes are associated with sessions, and as such have a
forward and reverse direction. For encryption, the pre-existing
security association and key sharing is outside the scope of this
document. Each SVR attribute defined will indicate whether it is a
header attribute (unencrypted) or payload attribute (optionally
encrypted). There are no attributes that can exist in both sections.
7.1. Metadata Header
The metadata header is shown below. A well-known "cookie"
(0x4c48dbc6ddf6670c in network byte order byte order) is built into
the header which is used in concert with contextual awareness of the
packet itself to determine the presence of metadata within a packet.
This is an eight-byte pattern that immediately follows the L4 header
and is an indicator to a receiving router that a packet contains
metadata. NOTE: Normal IP traffic will never have the Waypoint
Address as its destination. If a packet arrives at a SVR Router
Waypoint it has to have Metadata or be associated with an active SVR
session. Please see Section 2.10 for a discussion of state recovery
techniques.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ Cookie +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version| Header Length | Payload Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Header TLVs ... | Payload TLVs ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 8
Cookie (8 bytes): The fingerprint of metadata. This value is used
to determine the existence of metadata within a packet.
Version (4-bits): Field representing the version of the metadata
header. The current version of metadata is 0x1.
Header Length (12-bits): Length of the metadata header including any
added Header TLV attributes that are guaranteed to be unencrypted.
When there are no Header TLVs, the value Header Length is 12 Bytes
or OxC.
Payload Length (2 bytes): Length of data following the metadata
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header, not including the size of the header. This data could be
encrypted. The value of this field is the number of bytes in the
Payload TLV's. If there are no TLV's the value is zero.
7.1.1. False Positives
Given that no byte sequence is truly unique in the payload of a
packet, in the scenario where the original payload after the L4
header contained the same byte sequence as the cookie, false positive
logic is enacted on the packet. If the metadata HMAC signature can't
verify that the metadata is valid, then a false positive metadata
header is added to the packet to indicate that the first eight bytes
of the payload matches the cookie.
The structure of a false positive metadata includes just a header of
length 12 bytes, with zero header TLVs and zero payload TLVs. The
receiving side of a packet with false positive metadata will strip
out the metadata header.
In the scenario where a router receives a false positive metadata
header but intends to add metadata to the packet, the false positive
metadata header is modified to contain the newly added attributes.
Once attributes are added, the metadata header is no longer
considered to be false positive.
7.1.2. Forward and Reverse Attributes
Payload metadata attributes may be valid in the forward direction,
the reverse direction, or both. If not valid, it is ignored quietly
by the receiving side.
7.2. TLVs for Attributes
All metadata attributes are expressed as Tag Length Values or TLV's.
This includes Header and Payload TLVs. It is recommended that
Payload TLVs be encrypted, but not mandatory. When debugging
networks, or if mid-stream routers need to consult the TLV's, they
can be transmitted in clear text. The entire metadata block is
signed, and thus the integrity of the data can be verified. No
midstream router or middlebox can modify any aspect of the metadata.
Doing so will invalidate the signature, and the metadata will be
dropped.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Variable Length Values ..... |
\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
Figure 9
Type (2 bytes): Type of data that follows. Each of different Header
and Payload TLV's are defined below.
Length (2 bytes): Number of bytes associated with the length of the
value (not including the 4 bytes associated with the type and
length fields).
7.3. Header Attributes
7.3.1. Fragment
When a packet is fragmented to insert metadata, a new fragmentation
mechanism must be added to prevent fragmentation attacks and to
support reassembly (which requires protocol and port information).
If a packet is received that IS a fragment, and it must transit
through a metadata signaled pathway, it must also have this metadata
attached to properly bind the fragment with the correct session.
All fragments will have a metadata header and the fragment TLV added
to the guaranteed unencrypted portion of the metadata header. If the
original packet already has a metadata header on it, the fragment TLV
will be added to it. See [RFC0791] for information about IP
Fragmentation. For a detailed example of packet fragmentation in SVR
please see Section 6.5
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 1 | Length = 10 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Extended ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Original ID |Flags| Fragment Offset |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Largest Seen Fragment |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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Figure 10
TLV: Type 1, Length 10.
Extended ID (4 bytes): Uniquely identifies a packet that is broken
into fragments This ID is assigned by the SVR that is processing
fragmented packets. IPv6 uses a 32-bit Extended ID, and IPv4 uses
a 16-bit ID. We use the same algorithm for fragmenting packets
for both IPv6 and IPv4, therefore we chose a 32-Bit Extended ID.
.
Original ID (2 bytes): Original identification value of the L3
header of a received packet that is already fragmented.
Flags (3-bits): Field used for identifying fragment attributes.
They are (in order, from most significant to least significant):
bit 0: Reserved; must be zero.
bit 1: Don't fragment (DF).
bit 2: More fragments (MF).
Fragment Offset (13-bits): Field associated with the number of
eight-byte segments the fragment payload contains.
Largest Seen Fragment (2 bytes): Each SVR router keeps track of the
largest fragment processed from each interface. This allows the
router to make inferences about the MTU size when fragmenting
packets in the opposite direction. This information is used along
with a given egress network interface MTU to determine the
fragment size of a reassembled packet.
7.3.2. Security Identifier
A versioning identifier used to determine which security key version
should be used when handling features dealing with security and
authenticity of a packet.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 16 | Length = 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Security Key Version |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 11
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TLV: Type 16, Length 4.
Security Key Version (4 bytes): This is a four-byte security key
version identifier. This is used to identify the algorithmic
version used for metadata authentication and encryption.
7.3.3. Disable Forward Metadata
An indication that forward metadata should be disabled. This is sent
in the reverse metadata to acknowledge receipt of the metadata. This
is the second part of the metadata handshake.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 18 | Length = 0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 12
TLV: Type 18, Length 0.
No other data is required. The specific session that is being
referred to is looked up based on the 5-tuple address of the packet.
See metadata handshake in Section 2.3.
7.3.4. IPv4 ICMP Error Location Address
This is exclusively used to implement ICMP messages that need to
travel backwards through SVR pathways. See Section 6.6 for more
information. The IPv4 address of the source of the ICMP message is
placed into metadata. This metadata travels in the reverse direction
backwards to the originating SVR, which restores the information and
sends an ICMP message to the originator of the packet.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 20 | Length = 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 13
TLV: Type 20, Length 4.
Source Address (4 bytes): Original IPv4 source address of the
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originating router.
7.3.5. IPv6 ICMP Error Location Address
This is exclusively used to implement ICMP messages that need to
travel backwards through SVR pathways. See Section 6.6 for more
information. The IPv6 address of the source of the ICMP message is
placed into metadata. This metadata travels in the reverse direction
backwards to the originating SVR, which restores the information and
sends an ICMP message to the originator of the packet.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 21 | Length = 16 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Source Address +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 14
TLV: Type 21, Length 16.
Source Address (16 bytes): Original IPv6 source address of the
originating router.
7.3.6. SVR Control Message
The SVR Control Message is used for protocol specific purposes that
are limited to a single peer pathway. This message is sent by an SVR
router to a peer. This metadata is always sent in a UDP message
originating by the SVR control plane.
Keep Alive: When an SVR peer is behind a NAT device and the SVR peer
has active sessions, the SVR peer will generate a "Keep Alive"
often enough (i.e., 20 seconds) to prevent the firewall from
closing a pinhole. This message is generated completely by the
SVR router, and directed to the SVR peer for a session. The UDP
address and ports fields must exactly match the session that has
been idle longer than the provisioned time.
Turn On Metadata: When a packet is received, and there is missing
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SVR Session State, the correction procedure may involve sending
this request to a peer SVR router that has the information.
Please see Section 2.10 for more information.
Turn Off Metadata: Disable Metadata on a specific 5-tuple. In
certain cases, the SVR peer may continue so send metadata because
there are no reverse flow packets or because metadata was enabled
to recover from a loss of state. This message is not part of the
normal metadata handshake and only has a scope of a single peer
pathway.
Delete Session: The session associated with the flow spec used by
this generated packet should be deleted. This provides an
administrative and error correcting capability to remove a session
when required.
Session State Exists: In response to a Session Health Check request
(see Section 7.3.8 to indicate that state for a session exists.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 24 | Length = 1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Drop Reason |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 15
TLV: Type 24, Length 1.
Drop Reason (1 byte): Reason why this packet should be dropped.
* 0 = Unknown. This value is reserved and used for backwards
compatibility.
* 1 = Keep Alive. A packet that is dropped by the receiving
node. Used only to keep NAT pinholes alive on middleboxes.
* 2 = Enable Metadata. Begin sending metadata on the peer
pathway for the 5-tuple matching this control packet.
* 3 = Disable Metadata. Stop sending metadata on the peer
pathway for a 5-tuple matching this control packet.
* 6 = Delete Session. Delete any state for the session
associated with this metadata.
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* 8 = Session Health Check indicates state exists, and is valid.
7.3.7. Path Metrics
This metadata type is used to allows peers to measure and compute
inline flow metrics for a specific peer pathway and a chosen subset
of traffic. class. The flow metrics can include jitter, latency and
packet loss. This is an optional metadata type.
When a peer sends this metadata, it provides the information for the
period of time to the peer.
When a peer receives this metadata type 26, it responds with metadata
type 26.
After several exchanges, each side can compute accurate path metrics
for the traffic included. This metadata can be sent at any time, but
is normally sent when metadata is being sent for other reasons. The
metadata includes "colors" which represent blocks of packets. Packet
loss and latency can be determined between routers using this in line
method. Using colors to measure inline flow performance is outside
the scope of this document. Please refer to [RFC9341]
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 26 | Length = 10 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Tx Co | Transmit TimeValue |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Rx Co | Received TimeValue |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|D| Previous Rx Color Count |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 16
TLV: Type 26, Length 10.
Transmit Color (4-bits): Current color of a transmitting node.
Transmit Time Value (28-bits): Current time value in milliseconds at
time of marking. This time value represents the amount of time
which has elapsed since the start of a transmit color.
Received Color (4-bits): Most recently received color from a remote
node. This represents the color last received from a specific
peer.
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Receive Time Value (28-bits): Cached time value in milliseconds from
adjacent node adjusted by the elapsed time between caching of the
value and current time. This time value is associated with the
received color.
Drop Bit (1-bit): Should this packet be dropped. This is required
if a packet is being sent solely to measure quality on an
otherwise idle link.
Previous Rx Color Count (15-bits): Number of packets received from
the previous color block. This count is in reference to the color
previous to the current RX color which is defined above.
7.3.8. Session Health Check
This metadata is used to request a session state check by a peer.
The peer responds upon receipt with a generated packet with metadata
confirming presense of metadata. This metadata type can be included
in an existing packet to check that the peer has session state. The
peer will always respond with a generated packet that includes a
forced drop metadata attribute. See Section 6.7 for an example.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 46 | Length = 1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 17
TLV: Type 46, Length 1.
TYPE: (1=Request, 2=Request/Timeout) Request to verify session state
with backward metadata. Type 1 indicates session state is
available, Type 2 indicates session state is available but will be
cleared and replaced upon receipt of state from a peer. Type 2 is
used when a middle box closes pinholes that must be recovered.
7.4. Payload Attributes
Payload attributes are used for session establishment and SHOULD be
encrypted to provide privacy. Encryption can be disabled for
debugging.
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7.4.1. Forward Context IPv4
The context contains a five-tuple associated with the original
addresses, ports, and protocol of the packet. This is also known as
the Forward Session Key.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 2 | Length = 13 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Destination Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Port | Destination Port |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Protocol |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 18
TLV: Type 2, Length 13.
Source Address (4 bytes): Original IPv4 source address of the
packet.
Destination Address (4 bytes): Original IPv4 destination address of
the packet.
Source Port (2 bytes): Original source port of the packet.
Destination Port (2 bytes): Original destination port of the packet.
Protocol (1 byte): Original protocol of the packet.
7.4.2. Forward Context IPv6
A five-tuple associated with the original addresses, ports, and
protocol of the packet for IPv6.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 3 | Length = 37 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Source Address +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Destination Address +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Port | Destination Port |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Protocol |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 19
TLV: Type 3, Length 37.
Source Address (16 bytes): Original IPv6 source address of the
packet.
Destination Address (16 bytes): Original IPv6 destination address of
the packet.
Source Port (2 bytes): Original source port of the packet.
Destination Port (2 bytes): Original destination port of the packet.
Protocol (1 byte): Original protocol of the packet.
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7.4.3. Reverse Context IPv4
Five-tuple associated with the egress (router) addresses, ports, and
protocol of the packet. Forward context and reverse context session
keys are not guaranteed to be symmetrical due to functions which
apply source NAT, destination NAT, or both to a packet before leaving
the router.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 4 | Length = 13 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Destination Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Port | Destination Port |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Protocol |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 20
TLV: Type 4, Length 13.
Source Address (4 bytes): Egress IPv4 source address of the packet.
Destination Address (4 bytes): Egress IPv4 destination address of
the packet.
Source Port (2 bytes): Egress source port of the packet.
Destination Port (2 bytes): Egress destination port of the packet.
Protocol (1 byte): Original protocol of the packet.
7.4.4. Reverse Context IPv6
Five-tuple associated with the egress (router) addresses, ports, and
protocol of the packet. Forward and reverse session keys are not
guaranteed to be symmetrical due to functions which apply source NAT,
destination NAT, or both to a packet before leaving the router.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 5 | Length = 37 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Source Address +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Destination Address +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Port | Destination Port |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Protocol |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 21
TLV: Type 5, Length 37.
Source Address (16 bytes): Egress IPv6 source address of the packet.
Destination Address (16 bytes): Egress IPv6 destination address of
the packet.
Source Port (2 bytes): Egress source port of the packet.
Destination Port (2 bytes): Egress destination port of the packet.
Protocol (1 byte): Original protocol of the packet.
7.4.5. Session UUID
Unique identifier of a session. The UUID MUST be conformant to
[RFC4122]This is assigned by the peer that is initiating a session.
Once assigned, it is maintained through all participating routers
end-to-end.
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The UUID is used to track sessions across multiple routers. The UUID
also can be used to detect a looping session. The UUID metadata
field is required for all session establishment.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 6 | Length = 16 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ UUID +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 22
TLV: Type 6, Length 16.
UUID (16 bytes): Unique identifier of a session.
7.4.6. Tenant Name
An alphanumeric ASCII string which dictates what tenancy the session
belongs to.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 7 | Length = variable |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Name (1 - n bytes) .... |
\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
Figure 23
TLV: Type 7, Length variable.
Name (variable length): The tenant name represented as a string.
7.4.7. Service Name
An alphanumeric string which dictates what service the session
belongs to.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 10 | Length = variable |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Service Name (1-n bytes) ..... |
\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
Figure 24
TLV: Type 10, Length variable.
Name (variable length): The service name represented as a string.
7.4.8. Session Encrypted
Indicates if the session is having its payload encrypted by the SVR
router. This is different from having the metadata encrypted. The
keys used for payload encryption are dependent on the Security Policy
defined for a session.
This field is necessary because often traffic is already encrypted
before arriving at an SVR router (making DPI a poor choice). Also in
certain use cases, re-encryption may be required. This metadata TLV
is always added when SVR encrypts the payload.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 11 | Length = 0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 25
TLV: Type 11, Length 0.
7.4.9. TCP SYN Packet
Indicates if the session is being converted from TCP to UDP to enable
passing through middle boxes that are TCP session stateful. A SVR
implementation must verify that metadata can be sent inside TCP
packets through testing the Peer Pathway. If the data is blocked,
then all TCP sessions must be converted to UDP sessions, and restored
on the destination peer.
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Although this may seem redundant with the Forward Context that also
has the same originating protocol, this refers to a specific peer
pathway. In a multi-hop network, the TCP conversion to UDP could
occur at the second hop. It's important to restore the TCP session
as soon as possible after passing through the obstructive middlebox.
When TCP to UDP conversion occurs, no bytes are changed other than
the protocol value (TCP->UDP). Because the UDP message length and
checksum sit directly on top of the TCP Sequence Number, the Sequence
number is overwritten. The Sequence number is saved by copying it to
the TCP Checksum. The Checksum is recalculated upon restoration of
the packet. The packet integrity against bit loss or malicious
activity is provided through the HMAC signature.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 12 | Length = 0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 26
TLV: Type 12, Length 0.
Note: This type does not contain any value as its existence in
metadata indicates a value.
7.4.10. Source Router Name
An alphanumeric string which dictates which source router the packet
is originating from. This attribute may be present in all forward
metadata packets if needed.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 14 | Length = variable |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Router Name (1-n bytes) .... |
\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
Figure 27
TLV: Type 14, Length variable.
Name (variable length): The router name represented as a string.
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7.4.11. Security Policy
An alphanumeric string containing the Security Policy to use for a
particular session. This is used only when payload encryption is
being performed. The Security Policy describes the specifics about
Ciphers used for payload encryption.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 15 | Length = variable |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SECURITY POLICY |
\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
Figure 28
TLV: Type 15, Length variable.
KEY (variable length): The session key to use for encryption/
decryption for this packet and future packets in a session.
7.4.12. Peer Pathway ID
An ASCII string which dictates which router peer pathway has been
chosen for a packet. This name is the hostname or IP address of the
egress interface of the originating router. This can be used to
determine the peer pathway used exactly when there may be multiple
possibilities. This enables association of policies with specific
paths.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 19 | Length = variable |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Peer Pathway Name (1-n bytes) .... |
\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
Figure 29
TLV: Type 19, Length variable.
Name (variable length): The peer pathway name which is represented
as a string.
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7.4.13. IPv4 Source NAT Address
Routers may be provisioned to perform source NAT functions while
routing packets. When a source NAT is performed by an SVR Peer, this
metadata TLV MUST be included. When the far end router reconstructs
the packet, it will use this address as the source address for
packets exiting the SVR.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 25 | Length = 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IPv4 Source Nat Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 30
TLV: Type 25, Length 4.
Source Address (4 bytes): Source NAT address of the packet.
7.4.14. Remaining Session Time
After a path failure, it may become necessary to transmit a SVR
Control Message when there are one-way flows waiting for a packet to
be transmitted. In these cases, the metadata includes an attribute
defining the remaining session time so intermediate routers creating
new session entries will expire the session at the correct time.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 42 | Length = 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Remaining Session Time (seconds) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 31
TLV: Type 42, Length 4.
Remaining Session Time (4 bytes): Number of seconds remaining on a
session packet guard time. This ensures accurate guarding of
sessions that have been moved.
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7.4.15. Security Encryption Key
An alphanumeric string containing the cryptographic key to use for a
payload encryption of a particular session. This is used only when
payload encryption is being performed. Unless statically specified
in the Security Policy, the initial key value defaults to the Peer
Key (see Section 5.1.8). The key is encrypted in SVR metadata hop-
by-hop through a network, preventing any party from obtaining the
key. The router terminating the session utilizes this key to decrypt
payload portions of packets. This prevents re-encryption penalties
associated with multi-hop routing scenarios. To support the widest
array of keys, the key is sent in PEM format.
To rekey a session, this SVR metadata can be included in any
subsequent packet with the new key to use. When rekeying, the SVR
that initiated the encrypted session must compute a new key, and
include the key as SVR metadata. Upon receipt, the terminating
router must create a reverse metadata packet containing the same key
to indicate when to switch to the new key for decryption. This
solves race conditions with packets in flight.
The algorithm for generating security keys may be different from peer
key generation. Similarly the rekey interval for peer keys may be
different from security rekey interval. Each are governed by their
own Security Policy, but the same Security Policy can be shared for
both.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 46 | Length = variable |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SECURITY KEY |
\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
Figure 32
TLV: Type 46, Length variable.
KEY (variable length): The session key to use for encryption/
decryption for this packet and future packets in a session.
8. Security Considerations
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8.1. HMAC Authentication
HMAC signatures are REQUIRED for the packets that contain metadata to
guarantee the contents were not changed, and that the router sending
it is known to the receiver. Any HMAC algorithm can be used, from
SHA128, or SHA256 as long as both sides agree. HMAC is always
performed on the layer 4 payload of the packet. The signature is
placed at the end of the existing packet.
8.2. Replay Prevention
Optional HMAC signatures are RECOMMENDED for every packet. This
prevents any mid-stream attempts to corrupt or impact sessions that
are ongoing. This also helps detect and correct lost state at egress
SVR routers. See Section 2.10. The signature must include all of
the packet after Layer 4, and include a current time of day to
prevent replay attacks. The signature is placed at the end of the
existing packet.
Both the sending and receiving routers must agree on these optional
HMAC signatures, details of which are outside the scope of this
document.
8.3. Payload Encryption
Payload encryption can use AES-CBC-128 or AES-CBC-256 ciphers which
can be configured. Since these are block-ciphers, the payload should
be divisible by 16. If the actual payload length is divisible by 16,
then the last 16 bytes will be all 0s. If the actual payload is not
divisible by 16, then the remaining data will be padded and the last
byte will indicate the length.
8.4. DDoS and Unexpected Traffic on Waypoint Addresses
Waypoint addresses could be addressed by any client at any time. IP
packets that arrive on the router's interface will be processed with
the assumption that they MUST contain metadata OR be part of an
existing established routing protocol.
Routers will only accept metadata from routers that they are
provisioned to speak with. As such an ACL on incoming source
addresses is limited to routers provisioned to communicate. All
other packets are dropped.
When a packet is received the "cookie" in the metadata header is
reviewed first. If the cookie isn't correct, the packet is dropped.
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The HMAC signature is checked. If the signature validates, the
packet is assumed to be good, and processing continues. If the HMAC
fails, the packet is dropped.
These methods prevent distributed denial of service attacks on the
Waypoint Addresses of routers.
9. IANA Considerations
This document does not require any IANA involvement.
10. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Anya Yungelson, Scott McCulley, and
Chao Zhao for their input into this document.
The authors would like to thank Tony Li for his extensive support and
help with all aspects of this document.
The authors want to thank Ron Bonica, Kireeti Kompella, and other
IETFers at Juniper Networks for their support and guidance.
11. Normative References
[ECDH_Key_Exchange]
Nakov, S., "Practical Cryptography for Developers",
ISBN 978-619-00-0870-5, Publisher Sofia, November 2018,
<https://cryptobook.nakov.com/asymmetric-key-ciphers/ecdh-
key-exchange>.
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.
[RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 792,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0792, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc792>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.
[RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.
[RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>.
[RFC5758] Dang, Q., Santesson, S., Moriarty, K., Brown, D., and T.
Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and ECDSA",
RFC 5758, DOI 10.17487/RFC5758, January 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5758>.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
[RFC6062] Perreault, S., Ed. and J. Rosenberg, "Traversal Using
Relays around NAT (TURN) Extensions for TCP Allocations",
RFC 6062, DOI 10.17487/RFC6062, November 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6062>.
[RFC9300] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "The
Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", RFC 9300,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9300, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9300>.
[RFC7468] Josefsson, S. and S. Leonard, "Textual Encodings of PKIX,
PKCS, and CMS Structures", RFC 7468, DOI 10.17487/RFC7468,
April 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7468>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
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Internet-Draft Secure Vector Routing (SVR) March 2024
[RFC9341] Fioccola, G., Ed., Capello, A., Cociglio, M., Castaldelli,
L., Chen, M., Zheng, L., Mirsky, G., and T. Mizrahi,
"Alternate-Marking Method for Passive and Hybrid
Performance Monitoring", RFC 9341, DOI 10.17487/RFC9341,
January 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9341>.
[RFC8422] Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>.
[RFC8445] Keranen, A., Holmberg, C., and J. Rosenberg, "Interactive
Connectivity Establishment (ICE): A Protocol for Network
Address Translator (NAT) Traversal", RFC 8445,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8445, July 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8445>.
[RFC8489] Petit-Huguenin, M., Salgueiro, G., Rosenberg, J., Wing,
D., Mahy, R., and P. Matthews, "Session Traversal
Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 8489, DOI 10.17487/RFC8489,
February 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8489>.
[RFC8986] Filsfils, C., Ed., Camarillo, P., Ed., Leddy, J., Voyer,
D., Matsushima, S., and Z. Li, "Segment Routing over IPv6
(SRv6) Network Programming", RFC 8986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8986, February 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8986>.
Authors' Addresses
Abilash Menon
Juniper Networks
10 Technology Part Dr.
Westford, MA 01886
United States of America
Email: abilashm@juniper.net
Patrick MeLampy
Juniper Networks
10 Technology Part Dr.
Westford, MA 01886
United States of America
Email: pmelampy@juniper.net
Menon, et al. Expires 19 September 2024 [Page 106]
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Michael Baj
Juniper Networks
10 Technology Part Dr.
Westford, MA 01886
United States of America
Email: mbaj@juniper.net
Patrick Timmons
Juniper Networks
10 Technology Part Dr.
Westford, MA 01886
United States of America
Email: ptimmons@gmail.com
Hadriel Kaplan
Juniper Networks
10 Technology Park Dr.
Westford, MA 01886
United States of America
Email: hkaplan@juniper.net
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