Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Curves for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-merkle-tls-brainpool-04
Yes
(Sean Turner)
No Objection
(Adrian Farrel)
(Barry Leiba)
(Brian Haberman)
(Jari Arkko)
(Joel Jaeggli)
(Martin Stiemerling)
(Pete Resnick)
(Richard Barnes)
(Spencer Dawkins)
(Ted Lemon)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 04 and is now closed.
Sean Turner Former IESG member
(was No Objection, Discuss, Yes)
Yes
Yes
()
Unknown
Adrian Farrel Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Barry Leiba Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Brian Haberman Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Joel Jaeggli Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Martin Stiemerling Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Pete Resnick Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Richard Barnes Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Spencer Dawkins Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Stephen Farrell Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2013-08-15)
Unknown
Sigh... More knobs to turn for TLS. Personally I really hope TLS1.3 dramatically cuts down this ciphersuite parameter explosion, but in the meantime this is only making the status quo very marginally worse and the specific ciphers seem ok. For the authors: that's not actionable, and not a dig at you, but more at how we (the IETF as a whole) have allowed this situation to develop over the last decade. I do understand that your use-case is as real as many others. Nit: I'd suggest using BSI on the title page for Manfred's affiliation.
Ted Lemon Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown