DNSSEC Validators Requirements
draft-mglt-dnsop-dnssec-validator-requirements-01

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DNSOP                                                    D. Migault (Ed)
Internet-Draft                                                    Orange
Intended status: Standards Track                         October 7, 2014
Expires: April 10, 2015

                     DNSSEC Validators Requirements
         draft-mglt-dnsop-dnssec-validator-requirements-01.txt

Abstract

   DNSSEC provides data integrity and authentication for DNSSEC
   validators.  However, without valid trust anchor(s) and an acceptable
   value for the current time, DNSSEC validation cannot be performed.
   This document lists the requirements to be addressed so resolvers can
   have DNSSEC validation can be always-on.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 10, 2015.

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   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Migault (Ed)             Expires April 10, 2015                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        DNSSEC Validator Requirements         October 2014

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Time derivation and absence of Real Time Clock  . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Unplugged devices during Trust Anchor KSKs roll over  . . . .   3
   6.  Emergency Key rollover  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.1.  Invalid cached ZSK  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.2.  Invalid cached RRSIG  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.3.  Invalid cached KSK  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.4.  Invalid DS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Invalid RRSIG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Private KSK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   12. Acknowledgment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     13.2.  Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix A.  Document Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Introduction

   DNSSEC [RFC4033], [RFC4034], [RFC4035] adds data authentication and
   integrity checks to DNS [RFC1034], [RFC1035].  For signature
   validation, DNSSEC requires a valid trust anchor such as the Key
   Signing Key (KSK) (the Root Zone KSK for example) and an appropriated
   time.

   Currently few efforts have been made to describe mechanisms that
   guarantee how a DNSSEC validator can be provisioned with the
   appropriated KSKs and time so that DNSSEC validation can always be
   activated.  A device that is badly configured or badly provisioned
   that performs DNSSEC validation may result in disabling the DNS
   service of the device, and then most of its communications.  As a
   result, non administrated devices that implement DNSSEC validation
   always need heuristics to disable the DNSSEC validation.  This
   results in an implicit rule that can be stated as: "if DNSSEC
   validation is performed correctly then do DNSSEC otherwise disable
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