Implicit IV for Counter-based Ciphers in IPsec

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (ipsecme WG)
Last updated 2017-11-11 (latest revision 2017-06-21)
Replaced by draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status (None)
Expired & archived
plain text pdf html bibtex
Stream WG state In WG Last Call (wg milestone: Feb 2017 - IETF Last Call on Im... )
Revised I-D Needed - Issue raised by WGLC
Document shepherd David Waltermire
IESG IESG state Replaced by draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to David Waltermire <>

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at


IPsec ESP sends an initialization vector (IV) or nonce in each packet, adding 8 or 16 octets. Some algorithms such as AES-GCM, AES- CCM, AES-CTR and ChaCha20-Poly1305 require a unique nonce but do not require an unpredictable nonce. When using such algorithms the packet counter value can be used to generate a nonce, saving 8 octets per packet. This document describes how to do this.


Daniel Migault (
Tobias Guggemos (
Yoav Nir (

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)