Implicit IV for Counter-based Ciphers in IPsec
draft-mglt-ipsecme-implicit-iv-04

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (ipsecme WG)
Last updated 2017-11-11 (latest revision 2017-06-21)
Replaced by draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Expired & archived
plain text pdf html bibtex
Stream WG state In WG Last Call (wg milestone: Apr 2018 - IETF Last Call on Im... )
Revised I-D Needed - Issue raised by WGLC
Document shepherd David Waltermire
IESG IESG state Replaced by draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to David Waltermire <david.waltermire@nist.gov>

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mglt-ipsecme-implicit-iv-04.txt

Abstract

IPsec ESP sends an initialization vector (IV) or nonce in each packet, adding 8 or 16 octets. Some algorithms such as AES-GCM, AES- CCM, AES-CTR and ChaCha20-Poly1305 require a unique nonce but do not require an unpredictable nonce. When using such algorithms the packet counter value can be used to generate a nonce, saving 8 octets per packet. This document describes how to do this.

Authors

Daniel Migault (daniel.migault@ericsson.com)
Tobias Guggemos (guggemos@mnm-team.org)
Yoav Nir (ynir.ietf@gmail.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)