Implicit IV for Counter-based Ciphers in IPsec
draft-mglt-ipsecme-implicit-iv-02
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
Expired & archived
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|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Migault , Tobias Guggemos , Yoav Nir | ||
| Last updated | 2017-05-18 (Latest revision 2016-11-14) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv, RFC 8750 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Call For Adoption By WG Issued | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
IPsec ESP sends an initialization vector (IV) or nonce in each packet, adding 8 or 16 octets. Some algorithms such as AES-GCM, AES- CCM, AES-CTR and ChaCha20-Poly1305 require a unique nonce but do not require an unpredictable nonce. When using such algorithms the packet counter value can be used to generate a nonce, saving 8 octets per packet. This document describes how to do this.
Authors
Daniel Migault
Tobias Guggemos
Yoav Nir
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)