PKIX over Secure HTTP (POSH)
draft-miller-posh-03
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew A. Miller , Peter Saint-Andre | ||
| Last updated | 2014-02-14 (Latest revision 2013-11-12) | ||
| Replaces | draft-miller-xmpp-posh-prooftype | ||
| Replaced by | RFC 7711 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-xmpp-posh | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Experience has shown that it is extremely difficult to deploy proper PKIX certificates for TLS in multi-tenanted environments, since certification authorities will not issue certificates for hosted domains to hosting services, hosted domains do not want hosting services to hold their private keys, and hosting services wish to avoid liability for holding those keys. As a result, domains hosted in multi-tenanted environments often deploy non-HTTP applications such as email and instant messaging using certificates that identify the hosting service, not the hosted domain. Such deployments force end users and peer services to accept a certificate with an improper identifier, resulting in obvious security implications. This document defines two methods that make it easier to deploy certificates for proper server identity checking in non-HTTP application protocols. The first method enables the TLS client associated with a user agent or peer application server to obtain the end-entity certificate of a hosted domain over secure HTTP as an alternative to standard PKIX techniques. The second method enables a hosted domain to securely delegate a non-HTTP application to a hosting service using redirects provided by HTTPS itself or by a pointer in a file served over HTTPS at the hosted domain. While this approach is developed for use in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) as a Domain Name Association prooftype, it can be applied to any non-HTTP application protocol.
Authors
Matthew A. Miller
Peter Saint-Andre
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)