Traffic peeking
draft-moonesamy-traffic-peeking-00
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S Moonesamy
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2013-11-24
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INTERNET-DRAFT S. Moonesamy
Intended Status: Informational
Expires: May 28, 2014 November 24, 2013
Traffic peeking
draft-moonesamy-traffic-peeking-00
Abstract
In June 2013, a news article revealed that the National Security
Agency obtained direct access to the systems of several service
providers from the United States through an undisclosed surveillance
programme called PRISM. This document discusses about traffic
peeking.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Copyright and License Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
S. Moonesamy Expires May 28, 2014 [Page 1]
INTERNET DRAFT Traffic peeking November 24, 2013
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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Table of Contents
1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Traffic peeking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Encrypting traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Appendix A: IETF Protocols without encryption . . . . . . . . . . 5
Author's Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
S. Moonesamy Expires May 28, 2014 [Page 2]
INTERNET DRAFT Traffic peeking November 24, 2013
1. Background
In June 2013, a news article [Guar1] revealed that the National
Security Agency obtained direct access to the systems of several
service providers from the United States through an undisclosed
surveillance programme called PRISM [Guar2]. The surveillance
programme intercepted traffic flowing through communication links
used throughout the world. According to a news article published in
October 2013, the National Security Agency had also been wiretapping
traffic flowing between the datacenters used by Google and Yahoo
[Wash1].
In 2007, Dan Shumow and Niels Ferguson discussed about the
possibility of a backdoor in a Dual Elliptic Curve pseudorandom
number generator [Rump]. In September, 2013, the National Institute
of Standards and Technology reported that concern has been expressed
about the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation
(Dual_EC_DRBG) algorithm published in one of its standards (SP 800-
90/90A) [NIST].
2. Traffic peeking
RFC 1958 [RFC1958] states that "it is highly desirable that Internet
carriers protect the privacy and authenticity of all traffic, but
this is not a requirement of the architecture. "Tussle in
Cyberspace: Defining Tomorrow's Internet" [Tussle] states that
"peeking is irresistible". Given that most Internet traffic is not
encrypted, there isn't any significant barrier to hamper an entity
with the available resources to peek on the traffic of Internet
carriers. As data storage is affordable the next step would be to go
beyond traffic peeking and collect all the data. [Tussle] argued
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