Traffic peeking
draft-moonesamy-traffic-peeking-02

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author S Moonesamy 
Last updated 2014-05-04
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INTERNET-DRAFT                                              S. Moonesamy
Intended Status: Informational                                          
Expires: November 5, 2014                                    May 4, 2014

                            Traffic peeking 
                   draft-moonesamy-traffic-peeking-02

Abstract

   In June 2013, a news article revealed that the National Security
   Agency obtained direct access to the systems of several service
   providers from the United States through an undisclosed surveillance
   programme called PRISM.  This document discusses about traffic
   peeking.  

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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   publication of this document. Please review these documents
 

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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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Table of Contents

   1. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2. Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3. Traffic peeking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     3.1. IETF Protocols without encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.2. Encrypting traffic  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   5. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   7. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     7.1.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   Appendix A: Electronic Surveillance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   Appendix B: Implementation of the Dual Elliptic Curve DRBG . . . .  9
   Author's Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

 

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1. Acknowledgements

   The author would like to thank Iain Ross Learmonth for his review.

2. Background

   In June 2013, a news article [Guar1] revealed that the (United
   States) National Security Agency obtained direct access to the
   systems of several service providers from the United States through
   an undisclosed surveillance programme called PRISM [Guar2][Europa]. 
   The surveillance programme intercepted traffic flowing through
   communication links used throughout the world.  According to a news
   article published in October 2013, the National Security Agency had
   also been wiretapping traffic flowing between the datacenters used by
   Google and Yahoo [Wash1].

   In 2007, Dan Shumow and Niels Ferguson discussed about the
   possibility of a backdoor in a Dual Elliptic Curve pseudorandom
   number generator [Rump] (see Appendix B for more information). In
   September 2013, the (United States) National Institute of Standards
   and Technology reported that concern has been expressed about the
   Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation
   (Dual_EC_DRBG) algorithm published in one of its standards (SP 800-
   90/90A) [NIST].  ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 recommended [JTC] that users of
   the ISO/IEC 18031:2011 standard [ISO8031] take note of the concerns
   relating to the default application specific parameters that are
   provided in Annex D of that international standard.  According to a
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