Coordinating Attack Response at Internet Scale 2 (CARIS2) Workshop Report

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Internet Engineering Task Force                              K. Moriarty
Internet-Draft                                                   DellEMC
Intended status: Informational                              May 14, 2019
Expires: November 15, 2019

   Coordinating Attack Response at Internet Scale 2 (CARIS2) Workshop


   The Coordinating Attack Response at Internet Scale (CARIS) 2 workshop
   workshop [CARISEvent], sponsored by the Internet Society, took place
   28 February and 1 March 2019 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.
   Participants spanned regional, national, international, and
   enterprise CSIRTs, operators, service providers, network and security
   operators, transport operators and researchers, incident response
   researchers, vendors, and participants from standards communities.
   This workshop continued the work started at the first CARIS workshop,
   with a focus for CARIS 2 on scaling incident prevention and detection
   as the Internet industry moves to stronger and a more ubiquitous
   deployment of session encryption.

Status of This Memo

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   ( in effect on the date of
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Accepted Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  CARIS2 Goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Workshop Collaboration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.1.  Breakout 1 Results: Standardization and Adoption  . . . .   5
     5.2.  Breakout 2 Results:Preventative Protocols and Scaling
           Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.3.  Breakout 3 Results: Incident Response Coordination  . . .   8
     5.4.  Breakout 4 Results: Monitoring and Measurement  . . . . .  10
     5.5.  Taxonomy and Gaps Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Next Steps  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   10. Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     11.1.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     11.2.  URL References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Appendix A.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix B.  Open Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   The Coordinating Attack Response at Internet Scale (CARIS) 2
   workshop, sponsored by the Internet Society, took place 28 February ?
   1 March 2019 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.  Participants spanned
   regional, national, international, and enterprise CSIRTs, operators,
   service providers, network and security operators, transport
   operators and researchers, incident response researchers, vendors,
   and participants from standards communities.  This workshop continued
   the work started at the first CARIS workshop RFC8073 [RFC8073], with
   a focus for CARIS 2 on scaling incident prevention and detection as
   the Internet industry moves to stronger and a more ubiquitous
   deployment of session encryption.  Considering the related initiative
   to from a research group SMART [SMART] in the Internet Research Task
   Force (IRTF) the focus on prevention included consideration of

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   research opportunities to improve protocols and determine if there
   are ways to detect attacks using protocol design ideas that could
   later influence protocol development in the IETF.  This is one way to
   think about scaling response, through prevention and allowing for new
   methods to evolve for detection in a post-encrypted world.

2.  Conventions

3.  Accepted Papers

   Researchers from around the world submitted position and research
   papers summarizing key aspects of their work to help form the shared
   content of the workshop.  The accepted papers included:

      Visualizing Security Automation: Takeshi Takahashi, NICT, Japan

      Automating Severity Determination: Hideaki Kanehara, NICT, Japan

      OASIS's OpenC2, Draper and DoD

      Automated IoT Security (PASC and PAVA): Oscar Garcia-Morchon and
      Thorsten Dahm

      Taxonomies and Gaps: Kirsty P., UK NCSC

      FIRST: Thomas Schreck, Siemens

      NetSecWarriors: Tim April, Akamai

      Measured Approaches to IPv6 Address Anonymization and Identity
      Association: Dave Plonka and Arthur Berger, Akamai

   The program committee worked to fill in the agenda with meaningful
   and complementary sessions to round out the theme and encourage
   collaboration to advance research towards the goals of the workshop.
   These sessions included:

      Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) [RFC8520]: Eliot Lear, Cisco

      TF-CSIRT: Mirjam Kuhne, RIPE NCC

      M2M Sharing Revolution, Scott Pinkerton, DoE ANL

      Comparing OpenC2 with existing efforts, e.g.  I2NSF: Chris Inacio

      Alternate Sharing and Mitigation Models: Kathleen Moriarty,

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   The presentations provided interesting background to familiarize
   workshop attendees with current research work, challenges that
   require addressing for forward progress, and opportunities to
   collaborate in the desire to better scale attack response and

4.  CARIS2 Goals

   The goal of each CARIS workshop has been to focus on the challenge of
   scaling attack response because of the overall concern in industry on
   the lack of information security professionals to fill the job gap.
   Currently, there is a 2 million person deficit for security
   professionals worldwide and it's only expected to grow.  The chair's
   belief is that this gap cannot be filled through training, but the
   gap requires measures to reduce the number of information security
   professionals needed through new architectures and research towards
   attack prevention.  CARIS 2 was specifically focused on the industry
   shift towards the increased use of stronger session encryption
   (TLSv1.3, QUIC, TCPcrypt, etc.) and how prevention and detection can
   advance in this new paradigm.  As such the goals for this workshop

   o  Scale attack response, including ways to improve prevention, as
      the Internet shifts to use of stronger and more ubiquitous


      *  Determine research opportunities

      *  Consider methods to improve protocols/provide guidance toward
         goal.  For instance, are there ways to build detection of
         threats into protocols since they cannot be monitored on the
         wire in the future?

   o  Identify promising research ideas to seed a research agenda to
      input to the proposed IRTF SMART research group.

5.  Workshop Collaboration

   Both CARIS workshops have brought together a unique set of
   individuals who have not previously had the chance to be in the same
   room or collaborate toward the goals of scaling attack response.
   This is important as the participants span various areas of Internet
   technology work, research, provide a global perspective, have access
   to varying data sets and infrastructure, and are influential in their
   area of expertise.  The specific goals of the CARIS 2 workshop,
   contributions, and the participants were all considered in the design

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   of the breakout sessions to both identify and advance research
   through collaboration.  The breakout sessions varied in format to
   keep attendees engaged and collaborating, involving the full set of
   attendees and breakout groups.

5.1.  Breakout 1 Results: Standardization and Adoption

   The goal of this session was to consider points raised in the talks
   that preceded the breakout on hurdles for automating security
   controls, detection, and response as the teams presenting noted
   several challenges they still face today.  The collaborative session
   worked toward identifying standard protocols and data formats that
   succeeded in achieving adoption and several that have failed or only
   achieved limited adoption.  The breakout teams selected protocols
   that failed and were successful for group discussion and the results
   from their evaluation were interesting and could help advance work in
   these or related areas if considered further.

   Wide adoption:

   Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), now replaced by Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) protocol.

   Observations: There was a clear need for session encryption at the
   transport layer to protect application data.  eCommerce was a driving
   force at the time with a downside to those who did not adopt.  Other
   positive attributes that aided adoption were modular design, clean
   interfaces, and being first to market.

   Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) enables configuration
   management of devices with extension points for private configuration
   and management settings.  SNMP is widely adopted and is only now
   after decades being replaced by a newer alternative, YANG.  SNMP was
   also first to market, with no competition.  The protocol facilitated
   an answer to a needed problem set: configuration, telemetry, and
   network management.  It's development considered the connection
   between the user, vendor, and developers.  Challenges did surface for
   adoption of SNMPv1.1 and 1.2, there was no compelling reason for
   adoption.  SNMPv3 gained adoption due to its resilience to attacks by
   providing protection through improved authentication and encryption.

   IP Flow Information Export (IPFix) was identified as achieving wide
   adoption for several reasons.  The low cost of entry, wide vendor
   support, diverse user base, and the wide set of use cases spanning
   multiple technology areas were some of the key drivers cited.

   X.509 was explored for its success in gaining adoption.  The solution
   being abstract from crypto, open, customizable, and extensible were

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   some of the reasons cited for its successful adoption.  The team
   deemed it a good solution to a good problem and observed that
   government adoption aided its success.

   Next each team evaluated solutions that have not enjoyed wide

   Although STIX and IODEF are somewhat similar in their goals, the
   standards were selected for evaluation by two separate groups with
   some common findings.

   STIX has had limited adoption by the financial sector, but no single,
   definitive end user.  The standard is still in development with the
   US government as the primary developer in partnership with OASIS.
   There is interest in using STIX to manage content, but users don't
   really care about what technology is used for the exchange.  The
   initial goals may not wind up matching the end result for STIX as
   managing content may be the primary use case.

   Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) was specified by
   NRENs and CSIRTs and formalized in the IETF.  The user is the
   Security Operations Center (SOC).  While there are several
   implementations, it is not widely adopted.  In terms of exchange,
   users are more interested in indicators than full event information
   and this applies to STIX as well.  Sharing and trust are additional
   hurdles as many are not willing to disclose information.

   DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) has DNSsec as a
   dependency, which is a hurdle towards adoption (too many
   dependencies).  It has a roll-your-own adoption model, which is
   risky.  While there are some large pockets of adoption, there is
   still much work to do to gain widespread adoption.  A regulatory
   requirement gave rise to partial adoption in Germany, which naturally
   resulted in production of documentation written in German - possibly
   giving rise to further adoption in German-speaking countries.  There
   has also been progress made in the Netherlands through the creation
   of a website,  The website allows you you to test your
   website for a number of standards (IPv6, DNSSEC, DANE etc.). is a collaboration of industry organizations, companies,
   and the government in the Netherlands, and is available for worldwide

   IP version 6 (IPv6) has struggled and the expense of running a dual
   stack was one of the highest concerns on the list.  The end user
   being everyone was too ambiguous.  Too many new requirements have
   been added over its 20 year life.  The scope of necessary adoption is
   large with many peripheral devices.  Government requirements for
   support have helped somewhat with improved interoperability and

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   adoption, but features like NAT being added to IPv4 slowed adoption.
   With no new features being added to IPv4 and lessons learned, there's
   still a possibility for success.

5.2.  Breakout 2 Results:Preventative Protocols and Scaling Defense

   This next breakout followed the sessions on MUD, PAVA (Protocol for
   Automated Vulnerability Assessment), and PASC (Protocol for Automatic
   Security Configuration) which have themes of automation at scale.
   MUD was designed for IoT and as such, scaling was a major
   consideration.  The PAVA and PASC work builds off of MUD and
   maintains some of the same themes.  This next breakout was focused on
   groups brainstorming on preventative measures and enabling vendors to
   deploy mitigations.

   One group dove a bit deeper into MUD and layer 2 (L2) discovery.
   While the overall value of MUD, shifting the majority of control
   management to the vendor for a predictable platform scales well, the
   use of MUD and what traffic is expected for a particular device is
   sensitive information as it could be used to exploit a device.  MUD
   has an option of using L2 discovery to share MUD files.  L2
   discovery, like the dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) is not
   encrypted from the local client to the DHCP server at this point in
   time (there is some interest to correct this, but it hasn't received
   enough support yet).  As a result, it is possible to leak information
   and reveal data about the devices for which the MUD files would be
   applied.  This could multicast out information such as network
   characteristics, firmware versions, manufacturer, etc.  There was
   some discussion on the use of 802.11 to improve connections.  Several
   participants from this group planned to research this further and
   identify options to prevent information leakage while achieving the
   stated goals of MUD.

   The next group discussed a proposal one of the participants had
   already begun developing, namely privacy for rendezvous service.  The
   basic idea was to encrypt SNI using DNS to obtain public keys.  The
   suffix on server IPv6 would be unique to a TLS session (Information
   missing).  The discussion on this proposal was fruitful as the full
   set of attendees engaged, with special interest from the incident
   responders to be involved in early review cycles.  Incident
   responders are very interested to understand how protocols will
   change and to assess the overall impact of changes on privacy and
   security operations.  Even if there are no changes to the protocol
   proposals stemming from this review, the group discussion landed on
   this being a valuable exchange to understand early the impacts of
   changes for incident detection and mitigation, to devise new
   strategies and to provide assessments on the impact of protocol
   changes on security in the round.

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   The third group reported back on trust exchanges relying heavily on
   relationships between individuals.  They were concerned with scaling
   the trust model and finding ways to do that better.  The third
   breakout dove deeper into this topic.

   The forth breakout group discussed useful data for incident
   responders.  This built on the first breakout session.  The group
   determined that indicators of compromise (IOCs) are what most
   organizations and groups are able to successfully exchange.  Ideally,
   these would be fixed and programmable.  They discussed developing a
   richer event threat sharing format.  When reporting back to the
   group, a successful solution used in the EU was mentioned, Malware
   Information Sharing Platform (MISP) [MISP].  This will be considered
   in their review of existing efforts to determine if anything new is

5.3.  Breakout 3 Results: Incident Response Coordination

   Incident response coordination currently does not scale.  This
   breakout session focused on brainstorming on incident response and
   coordination, looking specifically at what works well for teams
   today, what is holding them back, and what risks loom ahead.  Output
   from this session could be used to generate research and to dive
   deeper in a dedicated workshop on these topics.


   o  Trust in incident response teams

   o  Volume of strong signals and automated discovery

   o  Need to protect network as a forcing function

   o  Law and legal catalyst, motivator to stay on top

   o  Current efforts supported by profit and company interests, but
      those may shift

   o  FEAR provides an initially a burst of wind, but eventually leads
      to complacency

   Creating Drag:

   o  Lack of clear KPIs

   o  Too many standards

   o  Regional border impact data flows

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   o  Ease of use for end users

   o  Speed to market without security considerations

   o  Legal framework slow to adapt

   o  Disconnect in actual/perceived risk

   o  Regulatory requirements preventing data sharing

   o  Lack of clarity in shared information

   o  Behind the problem/reactionary

   o  Lack of resources/participation

   o  Monoculture narrows focus

   Looming problems:

   o  Dynamic threat landscape

   o  Liability

   o  Vocabulary collision

   o  Lack of target/adversary clarity

   o  Bifurcation of Internet

   o  Government regulation

   o  Confusion around metrics

   o  Sensitivity of intelligence (trust)

   o  Lack of skilled analysts

   o  Lack of "fraud loss" data sharing

   o  Stakeholder/leader confusion

   o  Unknown impact of emerging technologies

   o  Over-centralization of the Internet

   o  New technologies and protocols

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   o  Changes in application layer configurations (e.g. browser

5.4.  Breakout 4 Results: Monitoring and Measurement

   The fourth breakout followed Dave Plonka's talk on IPv6 aggregation
   to provide privacy for IPv6 sessions.  Essentially, IPv6 provides
   additional capabilities for monitoring sessions end-to-end.  Dave and
   his co-author Arthur Berger primarily focus on measurement research,
   but found a way to aggregate sessions to assist with maintaining user
   privacy.  If you can devise methods to perform management and
   measurement, or even perform security functions, while accommodating
   methods to protect privacy, a stronger result is likely.  This also
   precludes the need for additional pro-privacy work to defeat
   measurement objectives.

   This breakout was focused on devising methods to perform monitoring
   and measurement, coupled with advancing privacy considerations.  The
   full group listed out options for protocols to explore and ranked
   them, with the 4 highest then explored by the breakout groups.
   Groups agreed to work further on the proposed ideas, hopefully
   bringing ongoing work into the proposed SMART [SMART] research group

   IP Reputation

   This idea would be based on IP reputation for IPv6 addresses, where
   you could have end-to-end visibility.  Although the team agreed this
   idea is complicated, it is one they wanted to pursue.  One
   participant had an identified need for this service, which is needed
   to drive the idea forward.  They also have access to data to help
   make this possible.  There are clear gaps in visibility that present
   challenges, some include mobile networks and blocked regions such as
   China.  An audit requirement and ability to correct entries would be
   necessary.  BGP rankings could be part of this solution.  This is an
   early idea, the lead to contact if interested to help develop this
   further is Dave Plonka.

   Server Name Authentication Reputation C (SNARC)

   SNARC is a mechanism to assign value to trust indicators, used to
   make decisions about good or bad actors.  The mechanism would be able
   to distinguish between client and server in connections, would be
   human readable, builds on zero trust networking, and avoids
   consolidation supporting legitimate new players.  The group planned
   to research visual aspects and underlying principles as they begin
   work on this idea.  SNARC has a similar theme to the IP reputation/
   BGP ranking idea mentioned above.  An RFC would help customers and

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   design team on existing solutions.  They planned to begin work in
   several stages, researching "trust" indicators, "trust" value
   calculations, and research actions to apply to "trust".  The
   overarching goal is to address blind trust, one of the challenges
   identified with information/incident exchanges.  If interested to
   work further with this team, the lead contact is: Trent Adams.


   The breakout group presented the possibility of injecting logging
   capabilities at compile time for applications, resulting in a more
   consistent set of logs, covering an agreed set of conditions.  If the
   log-injecting compiler were used this would increase logging for
   those applications and improve the uniformity of logged activity.
   Increasing logging capabilities at the endpoint is necessary as the
   shift towards increased use of encrypted transport continues.  The
   lead for contact if interested to develop this further is Nalini


   Fingerprinting has been used for numerous applications on the web,
   including security, and will become of increasing importance with the
   deployment of stronger encryption.  This provides a method to
   identify traffic without using decryption.  The group discussed
   privacy considerations and balancing how you achieve the security
   benefits (identifying malicious traffic, information leakage, threat
   indicators, etc.).  They are interested to derive methods to validate
   the authenticity without identifying the source of traffic.  They are
   also concerned with scaling issues.  If interested to work further
   with this team, the lead contact is: William Weinstein.

5.5.  Taxonomy and Gaps Session

   At the start of day 2, Kirsty Paine and Mirjam Kuhne prepared and
   Kirsty led a workshop style session to discuss taxonomies used in
   incident response, attacks, and threat detection, comparing solutions
   and identifying gaps.  The primary objective was to determine a path
   forward selecting language to be used in the proposed SMART group.
   Several taxonomies were presented for review and discussion.  The
   topic remains open, the following key points were highlighted by

   o  A single taxonomy might not be the way to go, because which
      taxonomy you use depends on what problem you are trying to solve;
      e.g. attribution of the attack, mitigation steps, technical
      features or organizational impact measurements.

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   o  A tool to map between taxonomies should be automated as there are
      requirements within groups or nations to use specific taxonomies.

   o  The level of detail needed for reporting to management and for the
      analyst investigating the incident can be very different.  At the
      workshop, one attendee mentioned that for management reporting
      they only use 8 categories to lighten the load on analysts,
      whereas some of the taxonomies contain 52 categories.

   o  How you plan to use the taxonomy matters and may vary between use
      cases.  Take for instance sharing data with external entities
      versus internal only.  The taxonomy selected depends on what you
      plan to do with it.  Some stated a need for attribute-based
      dynamic anthologies as opposed to rigid taxonomies used by others.
      A rigid taxonomy did not work for many from feedback in the

   o  RFC4949 was briefly discussed as a possibility, however there is a
      clear need to update terminology in this publication around this
      space in particular.  This is likely to be raised in SAAG,
      hopefully with proposed new definitions to demonstrate the issue
      and evolution of terms over time.

   o  Within a taxonomy, prioritization matters to understand the impact
      of threats or an attack.  How do you map that between differing
      taxonomies? (problem to be solved; possible tooling required)

   o  Attack attribution had varying degrees of interest.  Some felt the
      public sector cared more about attribution; not about individuals,
      but the possible motivations behind an attack and likely other
      victims based on these motivations.  Understanding if the source
      was an individual actor, organized crime, or a nation state

   The result of this discussion was not to narrow down to one taxonomy,
   but to think about mappings between taxonomies and the use cases for
   exchanging or sharing information, eventually giving rise to a common
   method to discuss threats and attacks.  Researchers need a common
   vocabulary, not necessarily a common taxonomy.

6.  Next Steps

   The next steps from the CARIS workshop are twofold.  The research
   initiatives spawned from the second CARIS require further exploration
   and development.  Fostering this development and creating communities
   around each proposed project is the first step, with reports back out
   to the IRTF SMART mailing list and in a proposed research group.

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   The second initiative will be planning for the next CARIS workshop.
   This is likely to be coupled with the FIRST Conference in 2020 geared
   around a topic important to incident responders to assist with scale
   as it relates directly to problems of interest to that community.

7.  Summary

   Wrapping up the workshop, we reviewed the list of agreed projects to
   get a feel for actual interest in follow up now that a larger set had
   been generated, giving participants a chance to reassess commitments
   to better have them match actual outcomes.  The highest ranking
   projects in terms of interest to drive the ideas forward included the

   o  Traffic fingerprinting

   o  SNARC

   o  Attack coordination solutions/automated security

   o  Cryptographic Rendezvous

   o  L2 discovery

8.  Security Considerations

   There are no security considerations as this is an informational
   workshop summary report.

9.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

10.  Contributors

   Thank you to each of the CARIS participants who brought their ideas,
   energy and willingness to collaborate to advance attack response at
   Internet scale.

   A big thank you to each member of the program committee for your
   review of program materials, papers, and guidance on the workshop
   format: Mat Ford, Internet Society, UK, Jamie Gillespie, APNIC, AU,
   Chris Inacio, CERT/CC, US, Mirja Kuhlewind, ETH Zurich, CH, Mirjam
   Kuhne, RIPE NCC, NL, Carlos Martinez, LACNIC, UY, Kathleen M.
   Moriarty, Dell EMC (Chair), Kirsty Paine, NCSC, UK, and Takeshi
   Takahashi, NICT, JP.

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   Thank you to Megan Hyland, DellEMC, for her review and guidance on
   the breakout session format and tools to enable successful

   Thank you to the minute takers, Akashaya Khare and Thinh Nguyen,
   DellEMC OCTO Cambridge Dojo team.

11.  References

11.1.  Informative References

   [RFC8073]  Moriarty, K. and M. Ford, "Coordinating Attack Response at
              Internet Scale (CARIS) Workshop Report", RFC 8073,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8073, March 2017,

   [RFC8520]  Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
              Description Specification", RFC 8520,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8520, March 2019,

11.2.  URL References

              Internet Society, "CARIS Event Information and Accepted

   [MISP], "Malware Information Sharing Platform

   [SMART]    IRTF, "Stopping Malware and Researching Threats
    ", 2019.

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Appendix A.  Change Log

   Note to RFC Editor: if this document does not obsolete an existing
   RFC, please remove this appendix before publication as an RFC.

Appendix B.  Open Issues

   Note to RFC Editor: please remove this appendix before publication as
   an RFC.

Author's Address

   Kathleen M Moriarty
   176 South Street
   United States


Moriarty                Expires November 15, 2019              [Page 15]