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The DRIP DET public Key Infrastructure
draft-moskowitz-drip-dki-00

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This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
Authors Robert Moskowitz , Stuart W. Card
Last updated 2023-05-18
Replaced by draft-ietf-drip-dki
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draft-moskowitz-drip-dki-00
INTAREA                                                     R. Moskowitz
Internet-Draft                                            HTT Consulting
Intended status: Standards Track                                 S. Card
Expires: 19 November 2023                             AX Enterprize, LLC
                                                             18 May 2023

                 The DRIP DET public Key Infrastructure
                      draft-moskowitz-drip-dki-00

Abstract

   The DRIP Entity Tag (DET) public Key Infrastructure (DKI) is a
   specific variant of classic Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) where
   the orginization is around the DET, in place of X.520 Distinguished
   Names.  Further, the DKI uses DRIP Endorsements in place of X.509
   certificates for establishing trust within the DKI.

   There is a shadow PKI behind the DKI, with many of its X.509 fields
   mirroring content in the DRIP Endorsements.  This PKI can at times be
   used where X.509 is expected and non-constrained communication links
   are available that can handle their larger size.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 November 2023.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.

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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  The DKI Levels  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  The Apex  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  The RAAs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  The HDAs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  DNS view of DKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  The Offline cache of HDA Endorsements . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  RAAs set aside for Testing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  The DKI's Shadow PKI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   A DRIP Entity Tag (DET, [RFC9374]) public Key Infrastructure (DKI) is
   a strict hierarchy, governed by the administrator of the DET prefix
   [IPv6-SPECIAL] and having the authority to authorize RAAs.  RAAs in
   turn authorize HDAs within their domain.  This authorization is
   managed via a set of DETs whose sole use is to define the DKI.  The
   RAA Authorization DETs MUST reside in HID = RAA#|0 (Apex
   Authorization DET in HID = 0|0).

   There are three main classifications/types of DETs:

      Authorization DETs
         Used to assert the authorization of a DKI level.

      Endorsing DETs
         Used to assert operations within DKI level.

      Operational DETs
         Used by operational entities within DKI level

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   All DETs exist in DET-Endorsements (Appendix B of [drip-registries]).
   These DET-Endorsements provide the proof of registration and thus
   trust.  These DETs, through chained Endorsements define the DKI as
   follows:

                          +----------+
                          |   Auth   |
                          +-o------o-+
                            |      |
                            |    +-o-----+
           Apex             |   +--o----+|
                            |   |Endorse|+
                            |   +---o---+
                            |      |
                            |    +-o-----+
                            |   +--o----+|
                            |   |CRL,Srv|+
                            |   +-------+
                            |
          ******************|************************************
                          +-o--------+
                         +-o--------+|
                         |   Auth   |+
                         +--o-----o-+
                            |     |
                            |   +-o-----+
           RAAs             |  +--o----+|
                            |  |Endorse|+
                            |  +---o---+
                            |     |
                            |   +-o-----+
                            |  +--o----+|
                            |  |CRL,Srv|+
                            |  +-------+
                            |
          ******************|************************************
                          +-o--------+
                         +-o--------+|
                         |   Auth   |+
                         +----o-----+
                              |
                            +-o-----+
           HDAs            +--o----+|
                           |Endorse|+
                           +---o---+
                               |
                             +-o-----+
                            +--o----+|

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                            |CRL,Srv||
                            |UAS    |+
                            +-------+

          *******************************************************

                       Figure 1: The DKI Endorsements

   The Authorization DETs exist in a set of DET-Authorization-
   Endorsements.  The lifetime of these endorsements SHOULD be no less
   than 1 year, recommended 5 years, and should not exceed 10 years.
   Endorsements SHOULD be reissued prior to expiry (may be for a new
   DET).  DETs used to define this authorization are replaced per
   undetermined policy (note these DETs do very little signing, see
   section...).

   This separation of DET type roles reduce the risk of private key loss
   for the critical Authentication DETs by making them infrequently
   used.  It does make the chain of trust for a HDA customers'
   Operational DETs to be 4 Endorsements.

2.  Terms and Definitions

2.1.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.2.  Definitions

   This document uses the terms defined in Section 2.2 of [RFC9153] and
   in Section 2 of [drip-architecture].  The following new terms are
   used in the document:

   DKI
      A DRIP Entity Tag (DET) public Key Infrastructure.

3.  The DKI Levels

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3.1.  The Apex

   The Apex Authorization DET is used to endorse RAA Authorization DETs
   and its own Apex Endorsing DETs; it has no other use.  This is the
   case for all Authorization DETs.  Apex Endorsing DETs are used to
   endorse DETs, with HID= 0|0, used by Apex services.

3.2.  The RAAs

   Each RAA use its Authorization DET (HID = RAA#|0) to endorse its RAA
   Endorsing DET(s) (also HID = RAA#|0) and for endorsing its HDA
   Authorization DETs (HID = RAA#|HDA#).

   An RAA may have multiple Endorsing DETs (HID = RAA#|0), each for a
   different use (e.g.  CRL signing, RAA server signing).  It is
   expected that, over time, an RAA will rollover its Endorsing DETs,
   thus at times there will be more than ONE Endorsing DET per role in
   use.

3.3.  The HDAs

   Each HDA use its Authorization DET to endorse its HDA Endorsing DETs
   (e.g.  RAA=267, HDA=567).

   An HDA Endorsing DET is used to endorse Operational DETs; those used
   by the HDA for its services (e.g.  USS) and for Devices (e.g.  UA,
   GCS, ground infrastructure) partaking in the HDA's services.

4.  DNS view of DKI

   The primary view of the DKI is within DNS.  There are two main DNS
   structures, one for DETs and one for DKI entities.

   In the DET DNS structure, only the Apex and RAA levels MUST be DNSSEC
   signed.  The HDA level may be too dynamic for DNSSEC signing (e.g.
   hundreds of new EE Operational DETs per hour); trust in the EE
   Operational DETs within the HDA level comes through inclusion of the
   HDA Endorsement of EE object.  A slow-churn HDA MAY use DNSSEC.  The
   RAA and HDA levels MUST contain their Endorsement by higher object;
   this provides the needed trust in the Endorsement of EE objects.  The
   Apex level Endorsement is self-signed, thus trust in it is only
   possible via DNSSEC.  Other RR within these levels will vary.  There
   may be HIP, TLSA, URI RR.

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   Each level needs FQDNs for its Authorization DET and Endorsing DET(s)
   (e.g.  PTR to DETs?).  FQDNs for services offered may also be
   present, or a URI for the commercial FQDN for the DKI Entity.  TLSA
   RR of DET SPKI may be directly included here.  Same with HIP RR.  The
   Authorization Endorsement SHOULD be present, as SHOULD be Endorsing
   Endorsements.

5.  The Offline cache of HDA Endorsements

   The Offline cache of HDA Endorsements, used to verify various EE
   signed objects without needing DNS access, SHOULD consist of the HDA
   Authentication DET Endorsements of the HDA Endorsement DETs.  Thus
   the receiver has a trusted source of the HDA Endorsement DET Public
   Key (HI) in a DRIP standard object (136 bytes).  If the DKI DNS tree
   includes GEO location data and coverage, a receiver could query some
   service for a trusted cache within some radius of its location.  Such
   as, please tell me of all HDAs within 100KM of...

   This cache MAY contain the full chain up to the Apex.  This could be
   helpful in limited connectivity environments when encountering an
   Endorsing HDA DET under a know Authenticated HDA or RAA.  The needed
   trust chain could be shorter.

6.  RAAs set aside for Testing

   The RAA range of 16376 - 16383 are reserved for testing.  It test DET
   DNS structure under drip-testing.org will use these.  RAAs 16376 -
   16389 are preallocated in this test DNS with 16390 - 16383 available
   for testing setting up RAAs.  Within RAAs 16376 - 16383, HDAs 16376 -
   16383 will be preset for testing of Operational DETs.  Other HDAs
   within RAAs 16376 - 16383 additional HDAs can be made available for
   testing of HDA setup and running said HDAs.

   It is anticipated that once a production DNS is established, these
   test RAAs and HDAs will carry forward.  The migration could be as
   simple as the production Apex Endorsing the test RAA Authorization
   DETs and moving the various test DNS structures to the production
   structure.

7.  The DKI's Shadow PKI

   TBD

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   In development is an X.509 PKI to shadow the DKI.  The X.509
   certificates are minimalistic (less than 400 bytes for DER).  Any
   DRIP specific OIDs should come from the ICAO arc (e.g.  1.3.27.16.2).
   Important X.509 fields like issuerKeyIdentifier will have DETs rather
   than public key hashes, so software will need to specifically handle
   them.

   Distiguished Names will follow DET hierarchy and not map well into
   traditional PKI usage.

   This is a work in progress.

8.  IANA Considerations

   TBD

9.  Security Considerations

   TBD

   Needs description of risk to Authorization DET private keys for broad
   trees (e.g. lots of RAAs).

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [drip-architecture]
              Card, S. W., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., Zhao, S.,
              and A. Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol
              (DRIP) Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-drip-arch-31, 6 March 2023,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-drip-
              arch-31>.

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   [drip-registries]
              Wiethuechter, A. and J. Reid, "DRIP Entity Tag (DET)
              Identity Management Architecture", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-drip-registries-09, 28 March
              2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
              drip-registries-09>.

   [IPv6-SPECIAL]
              IANA, "IANA IPv6 Special-Purpose Address Registry",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv6-special-
              registry/>.

   [RFC9153]  Card, S., Ed., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A.
              Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP)
              Requirements and Terminology", RFC 9153,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9153, February 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9153>.

   [RFC9374]  Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
              "DRIP Entity Tag (DET) for Unmanned Aircraft System Remote
              ID (UAS RID)", RFC 9374, DOI 10.17487/RFC9374, March 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9374>.

Acknowledgments

   TBD

Authors' Addresses

   Robert Moskowitz
   HTT Consulting
   Oak Park, MI 48237
   United States of America
   Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com

   Stuart W. Card
   AX Enterprize, LLC
   4947 Commercial Drive
   Yorkville, NY 13495
   United States of America
   Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com

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