OCSP Nonce Extension
draft-msahni-lamps-ocsp-nonce-00
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Mohit Sahni | ||
| Last updated | 2020-03-02 | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce, RFC 8954 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-msahni-lamps-ocsp-nonce-00
LAMPS M. Sahni, Ed.
Internet-Draft Palo Alto Networks
Intended status: Standards Track March 1, 2020
Expires: September 2, 2020
OCSP Nonce Extension
draft-msahni-lamps-ocsp-nonce-00
Abstract
This document specifies the updated format of the nonce extension in
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) request and response
messages. OCSP is used to check the status of a certificate and the
Nonce extension is used in the OCSP request and response messages to
avoid replay attacks. This document updates the RFC 6960
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 2, 2020.
Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. OCSP Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1. Nonce Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction
This document updates the usage and format of the nonce extension
used in OCSP request and response messages. This extension was
previously defined in the section 4.1.1 of [RFC6960]. The [RFC6960]
does not mention any minimum and maximum length of the nonce
extension. Due to not having an upper or lower limit of the length
of the nonce extension, the OCSP responders that follow [RFC6960] may
be vulnerable to various attacks like Denial of Service attacks,
chosen prefix attacks to get desired signature of the OCSP responder
and other possible evasions which can use nonce extension data. This
document specifies a lower limit of 1 and upper limit of 32 to the
length of the Nonce extension. This document updates the [RFC6960].
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. OCSP Extensions
The message format for the OCSP request and response is defined in
the [RFC6960] [RFC5280]. It also defines the standard extensions for
OCSP messages based on the extension model employed in X.509 version
3 certificates (see [RFC5280]). Following is the list of standard
extensions that can be used in the OCSP messages by the OCSP
responder and OCSP client.
o Nonce
o CRL References
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o Acceptable Response Types
o Archive Cutoff
o CRL Entry Extensions
o Service Locator
o Preferred Signature Algorithms
o Extended Response Definition
This document only specifies the new format for Nonce extension and
does not change specification of any of the other standard
extensions.
2.1. Nonce Extension
The nonce cryptographically binds a request and a response to prevent
replay attacks. The nonce is included as one of the
requestExtensions in requests, while in responses it would be
included as one of the responseExtensions. In both the request and
the response, the nonce will be identified by the object identifier
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce, while the extnValue is the value of the nonce.
If nonce extension is present then the length of nonce MUST be
atleast 1 byte and can be upto 32 bytes.
id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..32))
3. Security Considerations
The security considerations of OCSP in general are described in the
[RFC6960]. The nonce extension is used to avoid replay attacks during
the interval in which the previous OCSP response for a certificate is
not expired but responder has a changed status for that certificate.
Including client's Nonce value in the OCSP response makes sure that
the response is a latest response from the server and not a old copy.
3.1 Replay Attack
The nonce extension is used to avoid replay attacks. Since the
OCSP responder may choose to not send the nonce extension in the
OCSP response even if the client has sent the nonce extension in
the request, a man in the middle (MITM) entity can intercept the
OCSP request and respond with a earlier response from the server
without the Nonce extension. This can be mitigated by server
using a closer nextUpdate value in the OCSP response.
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4. IANA Considerations
This document does not include any new media type registrations
for OCSP.
5. References
5.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, RFC 8174, BCP 14,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
5.2. Informative References
[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2560, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2560>.
[RFC4732] Handley, M., Ed., Rescorla, E., Ed., and IAB, "Internet
Denial-of-Service Considerations", RFC 4732,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4732, December 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4732>.
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[RFC5019] Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume
Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, September
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5019>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
Author's Address
Mohit Sahni (editor)
Palo Alto Networks
Email: msahni@paloaltonetworks.com
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