BGP Security Protections
draft-murphy-bgp-protect-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Sandra L. Murphy | ||
| Last updated | 2002-10-28 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
BGP, along with a host of other infrastructure protocols designed before the Internet environment became perilous, is designed with little consideration for protection of the information it carries. There are no mechanisms in BGP to protect against attacks that modify, delete, forge, or replay data, any of which has the potential to disrupt overall network routing behavior. This internet draft discusses some of the security issues with BGP routing data dissemination, and possible security solutions and the costs of those solutions. This internet draft does not discuss security issues with forwarding of packets.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)