BGP Security Analysis
draft-murphy-bgp-secr-04
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Sandra L. Murphy | ||
| Last updated | 2001-11-30 | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
plain text
htmlized
pdfized
bibtex
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of
the expired Internet-Draft can be found at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-murphy-bgp-secr-04.txt
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-murphy-bgp-secr-04.txt
Abstract
BGP, along with a host of other infrastructure protocols designed before the Internet environment became perilous, is designed with little consideration for protection of the information it carries. There are no mechanisms in BGP to protect against attacks that modify, delete, forge, or replay data, any of which has the potential to disrupt overall network routing behavior.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)