@techreport{nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00, number = {draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00}, type = {Internet-Draft}, institution = {Internet Engineering Task Force}, publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force}, note = {Work in Progress}, url = {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains/00/}, author = {Suhas Nandakumar and Cullen Fluffy Jennings}, title = {{Delegator-Bound Delegation Chains for AI Agents}}, pagetotal = 15, year = 2026, month = nov, day = 16, abstract = {Attenuated delegation chains let a verifier check, without contacting any server, that no hop of a chain of AI agents holds more authority than the root granted. They do not show that each hop was granted by the agent before it: a child token can be signed by any key the verifier accepts. This document defines an extension that requires each child token to be signed with the key that its parent token confirms, so that every hop provably granted the next, with no authorization server in the path. The extension also defines a per- chain pseudonym for the principal, a rule that rejects chains in which an agent appears twice, a rule that keeps a child's audience within its parent's, and a claim that binds a chain to the dialog or transaction it was issued for. The extension builds on an existing attenuated delegation token format and can be mapped to other chained-token formats.}, }