Security for 5G
draft-naresh-3gpp-ietf-coord-security-for-5g-00

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INTERNET-DRAFT                                            Naresh Kumar
Intended Status: Standards Track                          NIT Delhi
Expires: February 15, 2019                                K.Verma
                                                          NIT Delhi
                                                        
                                                        August 15, 2018

                             Security for 5G
               draft-naresh-3gpp-ietf-coord-security-for-5g-00.txt

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Naresh Kumar, K.Verma  Expires February 15,2019                 [Page 1]
INTERNET DRAFT             Security for 5G               August 15, 2018

   Abstract

   This document proposes a new method which provides the capability to
   resolve issue of attack over Mobile Communication System.  This
   document assumes that the reader is familiar with some concepts and
   details regarding Authentication and Encryption in generations of
   Mobile Telephony.
  

Table of Contents

   1  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2  Vulnerability Desription . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   4  General Scenario       . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   5  Solutions of these issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   6  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   7  Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   8  Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   9  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   10 Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7

 

Naresh Kumar, K.Verma  Expires February 15,2019                 [Page 2]
INTERNET DRAFT             Security for 5G               August 15, 2018

1  Introduction
In Mobile Communication,IMSI catching is the major issue today. 
In order to encrypt or decrypt data between Mobile Station and Base
Station,various algorithms are implemented by generating keys required 
to provide confidentiality and integrity.

2 Vulnerability
Initially whenever UE attaches for the first time[3], it sends the IMSI
to MME in clear text which is sent from MME to eNodeBs and from eNodeBs 
to UEs.An attacker can request without awareness of the user by using
various social engineering tools and then trace messages between eNodeB
and UE to decode them and fetch the IMSI . There is also another Fault
that occurs whenever re-synchronisation occurs at the time of handover 
because at that time also, IMSI is sent in plaintext that can easily 
be sniffed by attacker.

                   +------------+ +----------------------+   +--------+
+------+           |Fake Station| | Base Station(Actual) |   |Network |
|      |           +------------+ +----------------------+   +--------+
|Mobile|   IMSI    |    IMSI      |     IMSI                 |
|Statio| --------> |------------> |------------->            |        
|n     | AUTN,RAND |              |                          |
|      |<--------- |              |   AUTN,RAND              |
|      |    RES    |    RES       |<--------------
+------+------->   |------------> |                 
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