@techreport{nguyen-sfc-security-architecture-00,
    number =    {draft-nguyen-sfc-security-architecture-00},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nguyen-sfc-security-architecture/00/},
    author =    {NGUYEN CANH THANG and Minho Park},
    title =     {{A Security Architecture Against Service Function Chaining Threats}},
    pagetotal = 9,
    year =      2019,
    month =     nov,
    day =       24,
    abstract =  {Service Function Chaining (SFC) provides a special capability that defines an ordered list of network services as a virtual chain and makes a network more flexible and manageable. However, SFC is vulnerable to various attacks caused by compromised switches, especially the middlebox-bypass attack. In this document, we propose a security architecture that can detect not only middlebox-bypass attacks but also other incorrect forwarding actions by compromised switches. The existing solutions to protect SFC against compromised switches and middlebox-bypass attacks can only solve individual problems. The proposed architecture uses both probe-based and statistics-based methods to check the probe packets with random pre- assigned keys and collect statistics from middleboxes for detecting any abnormal actions in SFC.},
}