Using Client Puzzles to Protect TLS Servers From Denial of Service Attacks
draft-nir-tls-puzzles-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Yoav Nir | ||
| Last updated | 2014-11-10 (Latest revision 2014-04-30) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document proposes a mechanism for mitigating denial of service (DoS) and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on TLS servers. Attackers are limited in their ability to cause resource waste on the server by requiring proof of work by the client before these CPU resources are expended.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)