Controlling Filtering Rules Using DOTS Signal Channel
draft-nishizuka-dots-signal-control-filtering-02

DOTS                                                        K. Nishizuka
Internet-Draft                                        NTT Communications
Intended status: Standards Track                               T. Nagata
Expires: July 25, 2019                                           Lepidum
                                                                T. Reddy
                                                                  McAfee
                                                            M. Boucadair
                                                                  Orange
                                                        January 21, 2019

         Controlling Filtering Rules Using DOTS Signal Channel
            draft-nishizuka-dots-signal-control-filtering-02

Abstract

   This document specifies an extension to the DOTS signal channel to
   control the filtering rules when an attack mitigation is active.

   Particularly, this extension allows a DOTS client to activate or de-
   activate filtering rules during a DDoS attack.  The characterization
   of these filtering rules is supposed to be conveyed by a DOTS client
   during peace time by means of DOTS data channel.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

   Please update these statements within the document with the RFC
   number to be assigned to this document:

   o  "This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;"

   o  "RFC XXXX: Controlling Filtering Rules Using DOTS Signal Channel";

   o  reference: RFC XXXX

   o  [RFCXXXX]

   Please update these statements with the RFC number to be assigned to
   the following documents:

   o  "RFC SSSS: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
      (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification" (used to be
      [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel])

   o  "RFC DDDD: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
      (DOTS) Data Channel Specification" (used to be
      [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel])

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   Please update the "revision" date of the YANG module.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 25, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  The Solution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Notational Conventions and Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Controlling Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Binding of the Data Channel and Signal Channel  . . . . .   4
     3.2.  DOTS Signal Channel Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.2.1.  Filtering Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.2.2.  Sample Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.3.  DOTS Signal Filtering Control Module  . . . . . . . .  10
         3.2.3.1.  Tree Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
         3.2.3.2.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

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   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.1.  DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry  . . . . . . .  13
     4.2.  DOTS Signal Control Filtering YANG Module . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

1.1.  The Problem

   The DOTS data channel protocol [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] is used
   for bulk data exchange between DOTS agents to improve the
   coordination of all the parties involved in the response to the DDoS
   attack.  Filter management is one of its tasks which enables a DOTS
   client to retrieve DOTS server filtering capabilities and to manage
   filtering rules.  Filtering rules are used for dropping or rate-
   limiting unwanted traffic, and permitting accept-listed traffic.

   Unlike the DOTS signal channel, the DOTS data channel is not expected
   to deal with attack conditions.  As such, an issue that might be
   encountered in some deployments is when filters installed by means of
   DOTS data channel protocol may not function as expected during DDoS
   attacks or exacerbate an ongoing DDoS attack.  The DOTS data channel
   cannot be used then to change these filters, which may complicate
   DDoS mitigation operations [Interop].

   A typical case is a DOTS client which configures during peace time
   filtering rules using DOTS data channel to permit traffic from
   accept-listed sources, but during a volumetric DDoS attack the DDoS
   mitigator identifies the source addresses/prefixes in the accept-
   listed filtering rules are attacking the target.  For example, an
   attacker can spoof the IP addresses of accept-listed sources to
   generate attack traffic or the attacker can compromise the accept-
   listed sources and program them to launch DDoS attack.

   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] is designed so that the DDoS server
   notifies the conflict to the DOTS client ('conflict-cause' set to 2
   (Conflicts with an existing accept list)), but the DOTS client may
   not be able to withdraw the accept-list rules during the attack
   period due to the high-volume attack traffic saturating the inbound
   link.  In other words, the DOTS client cannot use the DOTS data
   channel to withdraw the accept-list filters when the DDoS attack is
   in progress.  This assumes that this DOTS client is the owner of the
   filtering rule.

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1.2.  The Solution

   This specification addresses the problems discussed in Section 1.1 by
   adding the capability of managing filtering rules using the DOTS
   signal channel, which enables a DOTS client to request the activation
   or de-activation of filtering rules during a DDoS attack.

   The DOTS signal channel protocol [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] is
   designed to enable a DOTS client to contact a DOTS server for help
   even under severe network congestion conditions.  Therefore,
   extending the DOTS signal channel protocol to manage the filtering
   rules during a attack will enhance the protection capability offered
   by DOTS protocols.  Sample examples are provided in Section 3.2.2.

      Note: The experiment at the IETF103 hackathon [Interop] showed
      that even when the incoming link is saturated by DDoS attack
      traffic, the DOTS client can signal mitigation requests using the
      DOTS signal channel over the saturated link.

   Conflicts that are induced by filters installed by other DOTS clients
   of the same domain are not discussed in this specification.

2.  Notational Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in
   [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

3.  Controlling Filtering Rules

3.1.  Binding of the Data Channel and Signal Channel

   The filtering rules eventually managed using the DOTS signal channel
   must be created a priori by the same DOTS client using the DOTS data
   channel.  Managing conflicts with filters installed by other DOTS
   clients of the same domain is out of scope.

   As discussed in Section 4.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel], a
   DOTS client must use the same 'cuid' for both the signal and data
   channels.  This requirement is meant to facilitate binding channels
   used by the same DOTS client.

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   The DOTS signal and data channels from a DOTS client may or may not
   use the same DOTS server.  Nevertheless, the scope of the mitigation
   request, alias, and filtering rules are not restricted to the DOTS
   server but to the DOTS server administrative domain.  To that aim,
   DOTS servers within a domain are assumed to have a mechanism to
   coordinate the mitigation requests, aliases, and filtering rules to
   coordinate their decisions for better mitigation operation
   efficiency.  The exact details about such mechanism is out of scope
   of this document.

   A filtering rule controlled by the DOTS signal channel is identified
   by its Access Control List (ACL) name.  Note that an ACL name
   unambiguously identifies an ACL bound to a DOTS client, but the same
   name may be used by distinct DOTS clients.

   The activation or de-activation of an ACL by the signal channel
   overrides the 'activation-type' (defined in Section 7.2
   [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]) a priori conveyed with the filtering
   rules using the DOTS data channel.

3.2.  DOTS Signal Channel Extension

3.2.1.  Filtering Control

   This specification extends the mitigation request defined in
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] to convey the intended control of the
   configured filtering rules.  The DOTS client conveys the following
   parameters in the CBOR body of the mitigation request:

   acl-name:  A name of an access list defined in the data channel.

      As a reminder, an ACL is an ordered list of Access Control Entries
      (ACE).  Each Access Control Entry has a list of match criteria and
      a list of actions [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel].  The list of
      configured ACLs can be retrieved using the DOTS data channel
      during peace time.

      This is an optional attribute.

   activation-type:  Indicates the activation type of an ACL overriding
      the existing 'activation-type' installed by the DOTS client using
      the DOTS data channel.

      This attribute can be set to 'deactivate', 'immediate', or
      'activate-when-mitigating' defined [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel].

      Note that 'immediate' or 'activate-when-mitigating' are equivalent
      when a mitigation request is being processed by the DOTS server.

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      If this attribute is not provided, the DOTS server MUST use
      'activate-when-mitigating' as the default value.

      This is an optional attribute.

   If the DOTS server does not find the ACL name conveyed in the
   mitigation request in its configuration data for this DOTS client, it
   MUST respond with a "4.04 (Not Found)" error response code.

   It is RECOMMENDED for a DOTS client to subscribe to asynchronous
   notifications of the attack mitigation, as detailed in
   Section 4.4.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].  If not, the
   polling mechanism in Section 4.4.2.2 of
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] has to be followed by the DOTS client.

   A DOTS client MUST NOT use the filtering control over DOTS signal
   channel if no attack (mitigation) is active.  By default, ACL-related
   operations are achieved using the DOTS data channel
   [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] when no attack is ongoing.

   A DOTS client relies on the information received from the DOTS server
   and/or local information to the DOTS client domain to trigger a
   filter control request.  Obviously, only filters that are pertinent
   for an ongoing mitigation should be controlled by a DOTS client using
   the DOTS signal channel.

   This specification does not require any modification to the efficacy
   update, the retrieval of mitigation requests, and the withdrawal
   procedures defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].  In particular,
   ACL-related clauses are not included in a PUT request used to send an
   efficacy update, GET responses, and DELETE requests.

3.2.2.  Sample Examples

   This section provides sample examples to illustrate the behavior
   specified in Section 3.2.1.

   Let's consider a DOTS client which contacts its DOTS server during
   peace time to install an accept-list allowing for UDP traffic issued
   from 2001:db8:1234::/48 with a destination port number 443 to be
   forwarded to 2001:db8:6401::2/127.  It does so by sending, for
   example, a PUT request shown in Figure 1.

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   PUT /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
       /dots-client=paL8p4Zqo4SLv64TLPXrxA/acls\
       /acl=an-accept-list HTTP/1.1
   Host: {host}:{port}
   Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
   {
     "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
       "acl": [
         {
           "name": "an-accept-list",
           "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
           "activation-type": "activate-when-mitigating",
           "aces": {
             "ace": [
               {
                 "name": "test-ace-ipv6-udp",
                 "matches": {
                   "ipv6": {
                     "destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:6401::2/127",
                     "source-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:1234::/48"
                   },
                   "udp": {
                     "destination-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 443
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "accept"
                 }
               }
             ]
           }
         }
       ]
     }
   }

         Figure 1: DOTS Data Channel Request to Create a Filtering

   Some time later, consider that a DDoS attack is detected by the DOTS
   client on 2001:db8:6401::2/127.  Consequently, the DOTS client sends
   a mitigation request to its DOTS server as shown in Figure 2.

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     Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
     Uri-Path: ".well-known"
     Uri-Path: "dots"
     Uri-Path: "mitigate"
     Uri-Path: "cuid=paL8p4Zqo4SLv64TLPXrxA"
     Uri-Path: "mid=123"
     Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
     {
       "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
         "scope": [
           {
             "target-prefix": [
                "2001:db8:6401::2/127"
              ],
              "target-protocol": [
                17
              ],
             "lifetime": 3600
           }
         ]
       }
     }

             Figure 2: DOTS Signal Channel Mitigation Request

   The DOTS server accepts immediately the request by replying with 2.01
   (Created) (Figure 3).

   {
     "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
        "scope": [
           {
             "mid": 123,
             "lifetime": 3600,
         }
       ]
     }
   }

                    Figure 3: Conflict Status Response

   Assuming the DOTS client subscribed to asynchronous notifications,
   when the DOTS server concludes that some of the attack sources belong
   to 2001:db8:1234::/48, it sends a notification message with 'status'
   code set to '1 (Attack mitigation is in progress)' and 'conflict-
   cause' set to '2' (conflict-with-acceptlist) to the DOTS client to
   indicate that this mitigation request is in progress, but a conflict
   is detected.

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   Upon receipt of the notification message from the DOTS server, the
   DOTS client sends a PUT request to deactivate the "an-accept-list"
   ACL as shown in Figure 4.

   The DOTS client can also decide to send a PUT request to deactivate
   the "an-accept-list" ACL, if suspect traffic is received from an
   accept-listed source (2001:db8:1234::/48).  The structure of that PUT
   is the same as the one shown in Figure 4.

     Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
     Uri-Path: ".well-known"
     Uri-Path: "dots"
     Uri-Path: "mitigate"
     Uri-Path: "cuid=paL8p4Zqo4SLv64TLPXrxA"
     Uri-Path: "mid=123"
     Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
     {
       "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
         "scope": [
           {
             "target-prefix": [
                "2001:db8:6401::2/127"
              ],
              "target-protocol": [
                17
              ],
              "acl-list": [
                {
                  "acl-name": "an-accept-list",
                  "activation-type": "deactivate"
                }
              ]
             "lifetime": 3600
           }
         ]
       }
     }

                  Figure 4: PUT for Controlling a Filter

   Then, the DOTS server deactivates "an-accept-list" ACL and replies
   with 2.04 (Changed) response to the DOTS client to confirm the
   successful operation.

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3.2.3.  DOTS Signal Filtering Control Module

3.2.3.1.  Tree Structure

   This document augments the "dots-signal-channel" DOTS signal YANG
   module defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] for managing the
   filtering rules.

   This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-signal-control-
   filter", which has the following tree structure:

   module: ietf-dots-signal-control-filter
     augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type
              /ietf-signal:mitigation-scope/ietf-signal:scope:
       +--rw acl-list* [acl-name] {control-filtering}?
          +--rw acl-name
          |    -> /ietf-data:dots-data/dots-client/acls/acl/name
          +--rw activation-type?    enumeration

3.2.3.2.  YANG Module

 <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-signal-control-filter@2018-11-20.yang"

 module ietf-dots-signal-control-filter {
   yang-version 1.1;
   namespace
      "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-control-filter";
   prefix signal-control-filter;

   import ietf-dots-signal-channel {
     prefix ietf-signal;
     reference
       "RFC SSSS: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
                  Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
     }
   import ietf-dots-data-channel {
     prefix ietf-data;
     reference
       "RFC DDDD: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
                  Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification";
   }

   organization
     "IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
   contact
     "WG Web:   <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
      WG List:  <mailto:dots@ietf.org>

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      Author:  Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
               <mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>

      Author:  Mohamed Boucadair
               <mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>

      Author:  Kaname Nishizuka
               <mailto:kaname@nttv6.jp>

      Author:  Takahiko Nagata
                  <mailto:nagata@lepidum.co.jp>";

      description
        "This module contains YANG definition for the signaling
         messages exchanged between a DOTS client and a DOTS server
         for the DOTS signal channel controlling the filtering rules
         configured using the DOTS data channel.

         Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
         authors of the code.  All rights reserved.

         Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
         without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
         to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
         set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
         Relating to IETF Documents
         (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

         This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
         the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

       revision 2018-11-20 {
         description
           "Initial revision.";
         reference
           "RFC XXXX: Controlling Filtering Rules Using DOTS Signal
                      Channel ";
       }

       feature control-filtering {
         description
           "This feature means that DOTS signal channel is able to
            manage the filtering rules created by the same DOTS
            client using the DOTS data channel.";
       }

       augment "/ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type/" +
               "ietf-signal:mitigation-scope/ietf-signal:scope" {

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         if-feature control-filtering;

         description "ACL name and activation type";

         list acl-list {
           key "acl-name";
           description
             "List of ACLs as defined in the DOTS data
              channel.  These ACLs are uniquely defined by
              cuid and name.";
           leaf acl-name {
             type leafref {
               path "/ietf-data:dots-data/ietf-data:dots-client/" +
                    "ietf-data:acls/ietf-data:acl/ietf-data:name";
             }
             description
               "Reference to the ACL name bound to a DOTS client.";
           }
           leaf activation-type {
             type enumeration {
               enum "activate-when-mitigating" {
               value 1;
               description
                 "The ACL is installed only when a mitigation is active.
                  The ACL is specific to this DOTS client.";
               }
               enum "immediate" {
                 value 2;
                 description
                   "The ACL is immediately activated.";
               }
               enum "deactivate" {
                 value 3;
                 description
                  "The ACL is maintained by the DOTS server, but it is
                   deactivated.";
               }
             }
             description
               "Set the activation type of an ACL.";
           }
         }
       }
 }
 <CODE ENDS>

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4.  IANA Considerations

4.1.  DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry

   This specification registers the 'activation-type' parameter in the
   IANA "DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values" registry established by
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

   The 'activation-type' is a comprehension-required parameter.  The
   'acl-list' and 'acl-name' parameters are defined as comprehension-
   required parameters in Table 6 in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].
   Following the rules in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel], if the DOTS
   server does not understand the 'acl-list' or 'acl-name' or
   'activation-type' attributes, it responds with a "4.00 (Bad Request)"
   error response code.

   o  Note to the RFC Editor: Please delete (TBD1) once the CBOR key is
      assigned from the (0x0001 - 0x3FFF) range.

   +-------------------+------------+--------+---------------+--------+
   | Parameter Name    | YANG       | CBOR   | CBOR Major    | JSON   |
   |                   | Type       | Key    |    Type &     | Type   |
   |                   |            |        | Information   |        |
   +-------------------+------------+--------+---------------+--------+
   | activation-type   | enumeration| 0x0031 | 0 unsigned    | String |
   |                   |            | (TBD1) |               |        |
   +-------------------+------------+--------+---------------+--------+

4.2.  DOTS Signal Control Filtering YANG Module

   This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the
   "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:

      URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-control-filter
      Registrant Contact: The IESG.
      XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

   This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in
   the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950].

  name: ietf-dots-signal-control-filter
  namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-control-filter
  prefix: signal-control-filter
  reference: RFC XXXX

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5.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations discussed in
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] and [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] need
   to be taken into account.

6.  Acknowledgements

   Thank you to Takahiko Nagata for the comments.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]
              Boucadair, M., K, R., Nishizuka, K., Xia, L., Patil, P.,
              Mortensen, A., and N. Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-
              Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel
              Specification", draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-24 (work in
              progress), December 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]
              K, R., Boucadair, M., Patil, P., Mortensen, A., and N.
              Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
              Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification", draft-
              ietf-dots-signal-channel-26 (work in progress), December
              2018.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3688]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.

   [RFC7950]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
              RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

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Internet-Draft        DOTS Signal Control Filtering         January 2019

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
              Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and R. K, "Distributed
              Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling
              Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-16 (work in
              progress), October 2018.

   [Interop]  Nishizuka, K., Shallow, J., and L. Xia , "DOTS Interop
              test report, IETF 103 Hackathon", November 2018,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/103/materials/
              slides-103-dots-interop-report-from-ietf-103-hackathon-
              00>.

Authors' Addresses

   Kaname Nishizuka
   NTT Communications
   GranPark 16F 3-4-1 Shibaura, Minato-ku
   Tokyo  108-8118
   Japan

   Email: kaname@nttv6.jp

   Takahiko Nagata
   Lepidum
   Japan

   Email: nagata@lepidum.co.jp

   Tirumaleswar Reddy
   McAfee, Inc.
   Embassy Golf Link Business Park
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560071
   India

   Email: kondtir@gmail.com

   Mohamed Boucadair
   Orange
   Rennes  35000
   France

   Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com

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