Using the SRP protocol as a key exchange method in Secure Shell
draft-nisse-secsh-srp-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Niels Moller | ||
| Last updated | 2001-03-30 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This memo describes an experimental method for authentication and keyexchange in the Secure Shell protocol. The main virtue of the SRP protocol [SRP] is that it provides authentication based on a small secret (typically a password). It is useful in situations where no authentic host key is known. For Secure Shell, it can be used as a bootstrapping procedure to get the host key of a server in a safe way. SRP also provides authentication of the user, which means that it might make sense to either skip the secsh 'ssh-userauth'-service [SSH-USERAUTH] when using SRP, or allow login with the 'none' or 'external-keyx' method.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)