@techreport{noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt-00,
    number =    {draft-noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt-00},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt/00/},
    author =    {Tora Toraman},
    title =     {{A SCITT Profile for AI-Agent Action Receipts}},
    pagetotal = 9,
    year =      2026,
    month =     jun,
    day =       23,
    abstract =  {This document profiles the IETF SCITT (Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust) architecture for *AI-agent action receipts*: tamper-evident, signed, offline-verifiable records of what an autonomous agent did, for which principal, under which policy, with what verdict. Each receipt is a COSE\_Sign1 Signed Statement (RFC 9052) over a canonical (RFC 8785 / JCS) payload, hash-chained for ordering, and registrable in any SCITT Transparency Service to obtain non-equivocation and tail-truncation properties a self-signed chain cannot provide alone. The profile makes a deliberately NARROW, checkable claim — "this is a tamper-evident, signature-verifiable record of the action, principal, policy identity, and recorded verdict" — and explicitly does NOT claim that the agent was correct, safe, or wise, that the recorded inputs were true or complete, or that any real-world outcome followed. A deterministic offline policy-REPLAY capability (re-deriving the verdict from the recorded inputs) is named here as a non-goal of this revision and is left to a separate companion profile.},
}