Avoiding Internet Centralization
draft-nottingham-avoiding-internet-centralization-00
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draft-nottingham-avoiding-internet-centralization-00
Network Working Group M. Nottingham
Internet-Draft 8 December 2021
Intended status: Informational
Expires: 11 June 2022
Avoiding Internet Centralization
draft-nottingham-avoiding-internet-centralization-00
Abstract
Avoiding centralization is an important goal for Internet protocols.
This document offers a definition of centralization, discusses why it
is necessary for Internet protocol designers to consider its risks,
identifies different kinds of centralization, catalogues some
limitations of current approaches to controlling it, and recommends
best practices for protocol designers.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nottingham-avoiding-internet-
centralization/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/mnot/avoiding-internet-centralization.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 11 June 2022.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Why Avoid Centralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Kinds of Centralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Direct Centralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Necessary Centralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Indirect Centralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Inherited Centralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.5. Platform Centralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. The Limits of Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Federation isn't Enough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Multi-Stakeholder Administration is Hard . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Blockchains Are Not Magical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Guidelines for Protocol Designers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1. Allow Intermediation Sparingly . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2. Encrypt, Always . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3. Reuse Existing Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.4. Accomodate Limited Domains Warily . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.5. Target Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.6. Acknowledge the Limits of Protocol Design . . . . . . . . 16
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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1. Introduction
The Internet is successful in no small part because of its purposeful
avoidance of any single controlling entity. While originally this
may have been due to a desire to prevent a single technical failure
from having wide impact, it has also enabled the rapid adoption and
broad spread of the Internet, because internetworking does not
require obtaining permission from or ceding control to another entity
-- thereby accommodating a spectrum of requirements and positioning
the Internet as a public good.
As a result, Internet protocols share a common design goal: avoiding
centralization, which we define as the ability of a single person,
company, or government -- or a small group of them -- to observe,
control, or extract rent from the protocol's operation or use.
At the same time, the utility of many Internet protocols is enabled
or significantly enhanced by ceding some aspect of communication
between two parties to a third party -- often, in a manner that has
centralization risk. For example, there might be a need for a
'single source of truth' or a rendezvous facility to allow endpoints
to find each other. How should such protocols be designed?
Furthermore, many successful proprietary protocols and applications
on the Internet are de facto centralized. Some have become so well-
known that they are commonly mistaken for the Internet itself. In
other cases, Internet protocols seem to favour centralized
deployments due to economic and social factors. Should standards
efforts attempt to mitigate centralization in these cases, and if so,
how?
Finally, some autonomous networks have requirements to control the
operation of Internet protocols internally, and some users or groups
of users might cede control of some aspect of how they use the
Internet to a central authority, either voluntarily or under legal
compulsion. In both of these cases, should Internet protocols
accommodate such requirements, and if so, how?
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This document discusses aspects of centralization with regard to
Internet protocol design (note that 'protocol' is used somewhat
loosely here, to also encompass what could be considered an
application). Section 2 explains why it is necessary for Internet
protocols to avoid centralization when possible. Section 3 surveys
the different kinds of centralization that Internet protocols might
be involved in. Section 4 then catalogues current high-level
approaches to mitigating centralization and discusses their
limitations. Finally, Section 5 discusses cross-cutting interactions
between centralization and protocol design, recommending best
practices where appropriate.
Engineers who design and standardize Internet protocols are the
primary audience for this document. However, designers of
proprietary protocols can benefit from considering aspects of
centralization, especially if they intend their protocol to be
considered for standardisation. Likewise, policymakers can use this
document to help identify and remedy inappropriately centralized
protocols and applications.
1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Why Avoid Centralization
Centralization is undesirable in the design of Internet protocols for
many reasons -- in particular, because it is counter to the nature of
the Internet, because it violates the purpose of the Internet from
the perspective of its end users, and because of the many negative
effects it can have on the networks operation and evolution.
By its very nature, the Internet must avoid centralization. As a
'large, heterogeneous collection of interconnected systems' [BCP95]
the Internet is often characterised as a 'network of networks'. As
such, these networks relate as peers who agree to facilitate
communication, rather than having a relationship of subservience to
others' requirements or coercion by them.
However, many Internet protocols allow a third party to be interposed
into communication between two other parties. In some cases, this is
not intended by the protocol's designers; for example, intervening
networks have taken advantage of unencrypted deployment of HTTP
[HTTP] to interpose 'interception proxies' (also known as
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'transparent proxies') to cache, filter, track, or change traffic.
In cases where interposition of a third party is a designed feature
of the protocol, it is often characterised as _intermediation_, and
is typically used to help provide the protocol's functions --
sometimes including those that are necessary for it to operate.
Whether or not interposition of a third party into communication is
intentional, the 'informational and positional advantages'
[INTERMEDIARY-INFLUENCE] gained can be used to observe behavior (the
'panopticon effect') and shape or even deny behaviour (the
'chokepoint effect') -- which can be used those parties (or the
states that have authority over them) for coercive ends.
[WEAPONIZED-INTERDEPENDENCE]
As Internet protocols' first duty is to the end user [RFC8890],
allowing such power to be concentrated into few hands is counter to
the IETF's mission of creating an Internet that 'will help us to
build a better human society.' [BCP95]
Additionally, concentration of power has deleterious effects on the
Internet itself, including:
* _Limiting Innovation_: Centralization can preclude the possibility
of 'permissionless innovation' -- the ability to deploy new,
unforeseen applications without requiring coordination with
parties other than those you are communicating with.
* _Constraining Competition_: The Internet and its users benefit
from robust competition when applications and services are
available from many different providers -- especially when those
users can build their own applications and services based upon
interoperable standards. When dependencies are formed on a
centralized service or platform, it effectively becomes an
essential facility, which encourages abuse of power.
* _Reducing Availability_: The Internet's availability (as well as
applications and services built upon it) improves when there are
many ways to obtain access to it. While centralized services
typically benefit from the focused attention that their elevated
role requires, when they do fail the resulting loss of
availability can have disproportionate impact.
* _Creating Monoculture_: At the scale available to a centralized
service or application, minor flaws in features such as
recommendation algorithms can be magnified to a degree that can
have broad (even societal) consequences. Diversity in these
functions is significantly more robust, when viewed systemically.
[POLYCENTRIC]
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* _Self-Reinforcement_: As widely noted (see, eg., [ACCESS]), a
centralized service benefits from access to data which can be used
to further improve its offerings, while denying such access to
others.
To summarize, we avoid centralization because it would allow the
Internet (or some part of it) to be captured, effectively turning it
into a 'walled garden' that fails to meet both architectural design
goals and users' expectations, while endangering the viability of the
Internet at the same time.
3. Kinds of Centralization
Not all centralization of Internet protocols is equal; there are
several different types, each with its own properties. The
subsections below list some.
3.1. Direct Centralization
The most straightforward kind of centralized protocol creates a fixed
role for a specific party.
For example, most proprietary messaging, videoconferencing, chat, and
simliar protocols operate in this fashion.
While it has been argued that such protocols are simpler to design,
more amenable to evolution, and more likely to meet user
needs,[MOXIE] this approach most often reflects commercial goals --
in particular, a strong desire to capture the financial benefits of
the protocol by 'locking in' users to a proprietary service.
Directly centralised protocols and applications are not considered to
be part of the Internet per se; instead, they are more properly
characterized as proprietary protocols that are built on top of the
Internet. As such, they are not regulated by the Internet
architecture or standards, beyond the constraints that the underlying
protocols (e.g., TCP, IP, HTTP) impose.
3.2. Necessary Centralization
Some protocols require the introduction of centralization risk that
is unavoidable by nature.
For example, when there is a need a single, globally coordinated
'source of truth', that facility is by nature centralized. The most
obvious instance is seen in the Domain Name System (DNS), which
allows human-friendly naming to be converted into network addresses
in a globally consistent fashion.
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Allocation of IP addresses is another example of a necessary facility
being a centralization risk. Internet routing requires addresses to
be allocated uniquely, but if the addressing function were captured
by a single government or company, the entire Internet would be at
risk of abuse by that entity.
Similarly, the need for coordination in the Web's trust model brings
centralization risk, because a Certificate Authority (CA) can control
communication between the Web sites that they sign certificates for
and users whose browsers trust the CA's root certificates.
Protocols that need to solve the 'rendezvous problem' to coordinate
communication between two parties that are not in direct contact also
suffer from this kind of centralization risk. For example, chat
protocols need a way to coordinate communication between two parties
that wish to talk; while the actual communication can be direct
between them (so long as the protocol facilitates that), the
endpoints' mutual discovery typically requires a third party.
Internet protocols currently tend to mitigate necessary
centralization using measures such as mandated federation Section 4.1
and multi-stakeholder administration Section 4.2.
3.3. Indirect Centralization
Even when a protocol avoids direct centralization and does not
exhibit any necessary centralization, it might become centralized in
practice when external factors influence its deployment.
Indirect centralization can be caused by factors that encourage use
of a central facility despite the absence of such a requirement in
the protocol itself. Such factors might be economic, social, or
legal.
For example, cloud computing is used to deploy many Internet
protocols. Although the base concepts and control protocols for it
avoid centralization in the sense that there is no need for a single,
central cloud provider, the economics of providing compute at scale
as well as some social factors regarding developer familiarity and
comfort encourage convergence on a small number of cloud providers.
Often, the factors driving indirect centralization are related to the
network effects that are so often seen on the Internet. While in
theory every node on the Internet is equal, in practice some nodes
are much more connected than others: for example, just a few sites
drive much of the traffic on the Web. While expected and observed in
many kinds of networks [SCALE-FREE], network effects award asymmetric
power to nodes that act as intermediaries to communication.
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Left unchecked, these factors can cause a potentially decentralized
application to become directly centralised, because the central
facility has leverage to 'lock in' users. For example, social
networking is an application that is currently supplied by a small
number of directly centralized, proprietary platforms despite
standardization efforts (see, e.g.,
[W3C.CR-activitystreams-core-20161215]), due to the powerful network
effects associated.
By its nature, indirect centralization is difficult to avoid in
protocol design, and federated protocols are particularly vulnerable
to it (see Section 4.1).
3.4. Inherited Centralization
Most Internet protocols depend on other, 'lower-layer' protocols.
The features, deployment, and operation of these dependencies can
surface centralization risk into protocols operating 'on top' of
them.
For example, the network between endpoints can introduce
centralization risk to application-layer protocols, because it is
necessary for communication and therefore has power over it. A given
network might block access to, slow down, or modify the content of
various application protocols or specific services for financial,
political, operational, or criminal reasons, thereby creating
pressure to use other services, which can in turn result in
centralization.
Inherited centralization risk is only present when users cannot use
an alternative means of accessing the desired service. For example,
users often have flexibility in choice of Internet access, so they
could just 'route around' a network that impacts their chosen
service. However, such choices are often not available in the
moment, and the Internet's topology means that a 'choke point'
upstream could still affect their Internet access.
Usually, inherited centralization -- both existing and anticipated --
is a factor to work around in protocol design, just as any other
constraint would be. One effective tool for doing so is encryption,
discussed further in Section 5.2.
3.5. Platform Centralization
The complement to inherited centralization is platform centralization
-- where a protocol does not directly define a central role, but
could facilitate centralization in the applications it supports.
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For example, HTTP [HTTP] in itself is not considered a centralized
protocol; interoperable servers are relatively easy to instantiate,
and multiple clients are available. It can be used without central
coordination beyond that provided by DNS, as discussed above.
However, applications built on top of HTTP (as well as the rest of
the 'Web Platform') often exhibit centralization. As such, HTTP is
an example of a platform for centralization -- while the protocol
itself is not centralized, it does facilitate the creation of
centralized services and applications.
Like indirect centralization, platform centralization is difficult to
completely avoid in protocol design. Because of the layered nature
of the Internet, most protocols are designed to allow considerable
flexibility in how they are used, often in a way that it becomes
attractive to form a dependency on one party's operation. Notably,
this can happen even if the protocol does not accommodate
intermediation explicitly.
4. The Limits of Decentralization
4.1. Federation isn't Enough
A widely known technique for avoiding centralization in Internet
protocols is federation - that is, designing them in such a way that
new instances of any intermediary or otherwise centralized function
are relatively easy to create, and they are able to maintain
interoperability and connectivity with other instances.
For example, SMTP [RFC5321] is the basis of the e-mail suite of
protocols, which has two functions that are necessarily centralized:
1. Giving each user a globally unique address, and
2. Routing messages to the user, even when they change network
locations or are disconnected for long periods of time.
E-mail reuses DNS to mitigating first risk (see Section 5.3). To
mitigate the second, it defines an intermediary role for routing
users' messages, the Message Transfer Agent (MTA). By allowing
anyone to deploy a MTA and defining rules for interconnecting them,
the protocol's users avoid the need for a single, central router.
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Users can (and often do) choose to delegate that role to someone
else, or run their own MTA. However, running your own mail server
has become difficult, due to the likelihood of a small MTA being
classified as a spam source. Because large MTA operaters are widely
known and have greater impact if their operation is affected, they
are less likely to be classified as such, thereby indirectly
centralizing the protocol's operation (see Section 3.3).
This illustrates that while federation can be effective at avoiding
direct centralization and managing necessary centralization,
federated protocols are still vulnerable to indirect centralization,
and may exhibit platform centralization.
Another example of a federated Internet protocol is XMPP [RFC6120],
supporting 'instant messaging' and similar functionality. Like
e-mail, it reuses DNS for naming and requires federation to
facilitate rendezvous of users from different systems.
While some deployments of XMPP do support truly federated messaging
(i.e., a person using service A can interoperably chat with someone
using service B), many of the largest do not. Because federation is
voluntary, some operators made a decision to capture their users into
a single service, rather than provide the benefits of global
interoperability.
The examples above show that federation can be a useful technique to
avoid direct centralization, but on its own is not sufficient to
avoid indirect centralization. If the value provided by a protocol
can be captured by a single entity, they may use the protocol as a
platform to obtain a 'winner take all' outcome -- a significant risk
with many Internet protocols, since network effects often promote
such outcomes. Likewise, external factors (such as spam control)
might naturally 'tilt the table' towards a few operators of these
protocols.
4.2. Multi-Stakeholder Administration is Hard
Delegating the administration of a necessarily centralized function
(see Section 3.2) to a multi-stakeholder body is an onerous but
sometimes necessary way to mitigate the undesirable effects.
A multi-stakeholder body is an institution that includes
representatives of the different kinds of parties that are affected
by the system's operation ('stakeholders') in an attempt to make
well-reasoned, broadly agreed-to, and authoritative decisions.
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The most relevant example of this technique is the administration of
the Domain Name System [RFC1035], which as a 'single source of truth'
requires centralization of the naming function. To mitigate
centralization, this task is carried out by multiple root servers
that are administered by separate operators -- themselves diverse in
geography and a selection of corporate entities, non-profits and
government bodies from many jurisdictions and affiliations.
Furthermore, those operators are regulated by ICANN
(https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/governance-en),
which is defined as a globally multi-stakeholder body with
representation from a end users, governments, operators, and others.
Another example of multi-stakeholderism is the standardization of
Internet protocols themselves. Because a specification effectively
controls the behavior of implementations that are conformant with it,
the standardization process can be seen as a single point of control.
As a result, Internet standards bodies like the IETF allow open
participation and contribution, make decisions in an open and
accountable way, have a well-defined process for making (and when
necessary, appealing) decisions, and take into account the views of
different stakeholder groups [RFC8890].
Yet another example is the administration of the Web's trust model,
implemented by Web browsers as relying parties and Certificate
Authorities as trust anchors. To assure that all parties meet the
operational and security requirements necessary to provide the
desired properties, the CA/Browser Forum (https://cabforum.org) was
established as an oversight body that involves both of those parties
as stakeholders.
In each of these examples, setup and ongoing operation of a multi-
stakeholder organization is not trivial. This is the major downside
of such an approach. Additionally, the legitimacy of such an
organization cannot be assumed, and may be difficult to establish and
maintain (see, eg, [LEGITIMACY-MULTI]). This concern is especially
relevant if the function being coordinated is broad, complex, and/or
contentious.
4.3. Blockchains Are Not Magical
Increasingly, distributed consensus technologies such as the
blockchain are touted as a solution to centralization issues. A
complete survey of this rapidly-changing area is beyond the scope of
this document, but at a high level, we can generalise about their
properties.
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These techniques avoid centralization risk by distributing
intermediary or otherwise potentially centralized functions to
members of a large pool of protocol participants. Verification of
proper performance of a function is typically guaranteed using
cryptographic techniques (often, an append-only transaction ledger).
The assignment of a particular task to a node for handling usually
cannot be predicted or controlled. To assure diversity in the pool
of participants (thereby preventing Sybil attacks), techniques such
as proof-of-work (where each participant has to demonstrate
significant consumption of resources) or proof-of-stake (where each
participant has some other incentive to execute correctly) are used.
As such, these techniques purposefully disallow direct centralization
and are robust against inherited centralization. Depending upon the
application in question, indirect and platform centralization may
still be possible, but in general these techniques do not lend
themselves to these ends as readily as federated systems do.
However, distributed consensus technologies have several potential
shortcomings that may make them inappropriate -- or at least
difficult to use -- for many Internet applications, because their use
conflicts with other important goals:
1. Distributed consensus protocols can have significant implications
for privacy. Because activity (such as queries or transactions)
are shared with many unknown parties, they have very different
privacy properties than traditional client/server protocols.
Mitigations (e.g., Private Information Retrieval; see, eg, [PIR])
are still not suitable for broad deployment.
2. Their complexity and 'chattiness' typically results in
significantly less efficient use of the network. When
distributed consensus protocols use proof-of-work, energy
consumption can become significant (to the point where some
jurisdictions have banned its use).
3. Distributed consensus protocols are still not proven to scale to
the degree expected of successful Internet protocols. In
particular, relying on unknown third parties to deliver
functionality can introduce variability in latency, availability,
and throughput. This is a marked change for applications with
high expectations for these properties (e.g., commercial Web
services).
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4. By design, distributed consensus protocols diffuse responsibility
for a function among several, difficult-to-identify parties.
While this may be an effective way to prevent many kinds of
centralization, it also means that making someone accountable for
how the function is performed is impossible, beyond the bounds of
the protocol's design.
It is also important to recognise that a protocol can use distributed
consensus for some functions, but still have centralization risk
elsewhere. Even when distributed consensus is used exclusively
(which is uncommon, due to the associated costs), some degree of
coordination is still necessary -- whether that be through governance
of the function itself, creation of shared implementations, or
documentation of shared wire protocols. That represents
centralization risk, just at a different layer (inherited or
platform, depending on the circumstances).
These potential shortcomings do not rule out the use of distributed
consensus technologies for every use case. They do, however, caution
against relying upon these technologies uncritically.
5. Guidelines for Protocol Designers
While the following recommendations are not a complete guide, they
can be a starting point for avoiding or mitigating centralization in
Internet protocols.
5.1. Allow Intermediation Sparingly
The introduction of an intermediary role -- i.e., one that performs a
function but is not a first party to communication -- adds
centralization risk to Internet protocols, because it brings
opportunities for control and observation. Even when the protocol is
federated (see Section 4.1) to avoid direct centralization,
significant indirect centralization risks exist when intermediation
is allowed.
However, intermediation can sometimes add significant value to a
protocol, or enable what is considered a necessary function. In such
cases, the centralized function SHOULD be as minimal as possible, and
expose only the information and pontential for control necessary for
that function to be performed. Protocol designers SHOULD consider
the likely deployment patterns for those intermediaries and how
network effects and other factors will influence them.
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Such predictions can be difficult. For example, an intermediary
interposed by the end user of a protocol might allow them to delegate
functions to a party they trust, thereby empowering them. However,
if an intervening network is able to force users to delegate to a
particular intermediary, inherited centralization could result.
When carefully considered, intermediation can be a powerful way to
enforce functional boundaries -- for example, to reduce the need for
users to trust potentially malicious endpoints, as seen in the so-
called 'oblivious' protocols currently in development (e.g.,
[I-D.pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh]) that allow end users to hide their
identity from services, while still accessing them.
The same advice applies in these cases; the observation and control
potential SHOULD be as minimal as possible, while still meeting the
design goals of the protocol.
See [I-D.thomson-tmi] for more guidance.
5.2. Encrypt, Always
When deployed at scale, encryption can be an effective technique to
reduce many inherited centralization risks. By reducing the number
of parties who have access to content of communication, the ability
of lower-layer protocols and intermediaries at those layers to
interfere with or observe is precluded. Even when they can still
prevent communication, the use of encryption makes it more difficult
to discriminate the target from other traffic.
Note that the benefits are most pronounced when the majority (if not
all) traffic is encrypted. As a result, protocols SHOULD be
encrypted by default.
See also [RFC7258].
5.3. Reuse Existing Tools
When a protocol function has necessary centralization risk and there
exists an already-deployed solution with appropriate mitigations,
that solution should be reused in favour of inventing a new one.
For example, if a protocol requires a coordinated, global naming
function, reusing the Domain Name System is preferable to
establishing a new system, because its centralization risk is known
and understood (see Section 4.2).
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5.4. Accomodate Limited Domains Warily
[RFC8799] explores a class of protocols that operate in 'limited
domains' -- that is, they are not intended to be 'full' Internet
protocols with broad applicability, but instead operation within a
particular network or other constrained environment.
Often, limited-domain protocols address network requirements -- for
example, imposing security policy, integrating services or
application functions into the network, or differentiating different
classes of network services.
Such network-centric requirements can introduce the risk of inherited
centralization when they allow the network to interpose itself and
its requirements between the endpoints of a given communication.
These risks can be partially mitigated by requiring such functions to
be opted into by one or both endpoints (once both the network and the
endpoint are authenticated to each other), so that the network is
acting on their behalf. However, this approach is still vulnerable
to indirect centralization, because the endpoints may be pressured to
acquiesce to a network's demands.
5.5. Target Extensibility
An important feature of Internet protocols is their ability to evolve
over time, so that they can meet new requirements and adapt to new
conditions without requiring a 'flag day' to convert users.
Typically, protocol evolution is accommodated through extension
mechanisms, where optional features can be added over time in an
interoperable fashion.
Protocol extensions can bring risk of platform centralization if a
powerful entity can change the target for meaningful interoperability
by adding proprietary extensions to a standard protocol. This is
especially true when the core standard does not itself provide
sufficient utility to be appealing on its own.
For example, the SOAP protocol [SOAP] was an extremely flexible
framework, allowing vendors to attempt to capture the market by
requiring use of their preferred extensions to interoperate.
This kind of centralization risk can be mitigated in a few ways.
First and foremost, Internet protocols SHOULD provide concrete
utility to the majority of their users as published; 'framework'
standards facilitate this kind of risk.
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Furthermore, Internet protocols SHOULD NOT make every aspect of their
operation extensible; extension points SHOULD be reasoned,
appropriate boundaries for flexibility and control. When extension
points are defined, they SHOULD NOT allow an extension to declare
itself to be mandatory-to-interoperate, as that pattern invites
abuse.
5.6. Acknowledge the Limits of Protocol Design
Centralization cannot be prevented through protocol design and
standardization efforts alone. While the guidelines above may
forestall some types of centralization, indirect and platform
centralization are often outside the control of a protocol's
architecture.
Thankfully, architecture is not the only form of regulation; legal
mechanisms combined with changing norms and the resulting market
forces have their own regulatory effects. [NEW-CHICAGO]
In this view, the job of a protocol designer is to avoid
centralization with architecture where possible, but where it is not,
to create affordances for these other regulating forces.
6. Security Considerations
This document does not have direct security impact on Internet
protocols. However, failure to consider centralization risks might
result in a myriad of security issues.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
7.2. Informative References
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[ACCESS] Vestager, M., "Defending Competition in a Digitised World,
Address at the European Consumer and Competition Day",
April 2019, <https://wayback.archive-
it.org/12090/20191129202059/https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/
defending-competition-digitised-world_en>.
[BCP95] Alvestrand, H., "A Mission Statement for the IETF",
BCP 95, RFC 3935, October 2004.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp95>
[HTTP] Fielding, R. T., Nottingham, M., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
Semantics", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
httpbis-semantics-19, 12 September 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-
semantics-19>.
[I-D.pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh]
Kinnear, E., McManus, P., Pauly, T., Verma, T., and C. A.
Wood, "Oblivious DNS Over HTTPS", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh-08, 3
December 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh-08>.
[I-D.thomson-tmi]
Thomson, M., "Principles for the Involvement of
Intermediaries in Internet Protocols", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-thomson-tmi-02, 6 July 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-thomson-tmi-
02>.
[INTERMEDIARY-INFLUENCE]
Judge, K., "Intermediary Influence", 2014,
<https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/
faculty_scholarship/1856>.
[LEGITIMACY-MULTI]
Palladino, N. and N. Santaniello, "Legitimacy, Power, and
Inequalities in the Multistakeholder Internet Governance",
2020.
[MOXIE] Marlinspike, M., "Reflections: The ecosystem is moving",
May 2016,
<https://signal.org/blog/the-ecosystem-is-moving/>.
[NEW-CHICAGO]
Lessig, L., "The New Chicago School", June 1998.
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[PIR] Olumofin, F. and I. Goldberg, "Revisiting the
Computational Practicality of Private Information
Retrieval", 2010.
[POLYCENTRIC]
Aligia, P.D. and V. Tarko, "Polycentricity: From Polanyi
to Ostrom, and Beyond", April 2012.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1035>.
[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321>.
[RFC6120] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, DOI 10.17487/RFC6120,
March 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6120>.
[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7258>.
[RFC8799] Carpenter, B. and B. Liu, "Limited Domains and Internet
Protocols", RFC 8799, DOI 10.17487/RFC8799, July 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8799>.
[RFC8890] Nottingham, M., "The Internet is for End Users", RFC 8890,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8890, August 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8890>.
[SCALE-FREE]
Albert, R., "Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks",
October 1999, <https://barabasi.com/f/67.pdf>.
[SOAP] Mitra, N. and Y. Lafon, "SOAP Version 1.2 Part 0: Primer
(Second Edition)", World Wide Web Consortium
Recommendation REC-soap12-part0-20070427, 27 April 2007,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/2007/REC-soap12-part0-20070427>.
[W3C.CR-activitystreams-core-20161215]
Snell, J. and E. Prodromou, "Activity Streams 2.0", World
Wide Web Consortium CR CR-activitystreams-core-20161215,
15 December 2016, <https://www.w3.org/TR/2016/CR-
activitystreams-core-20161215>.
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[WEAPONIZED-INTERDEPENDENCE]
Farrell, H. and A.L. Newman, "Weaponized Interdependence:
How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion", 2019,
<https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00351>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
This document benefits from discussions with Brian Trammell during
our shared time on the Internet Architecture Board.
Author's Address
Mark Nottingham
Prahran
Australia
Email: mnot@mnot.net
URI: https://www.mnot.net/
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